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Foreword
By the year 2000, the idea of networks had developed into social science 
mainstream. The concept was highly esteemed not only as a metaphor of 
modern society but also for providing social science and economics with 
tools seemingly capable of more accurately assessing the structure and dy-
namics of a world obviously becoming increasingly information- oriented 
and increasingly globalised. During the previous decade, by applying the 
pattern of personal networks to firms, an economic dimension was added to 
the concept of social networks, a concept which had already been in use for 
quite some time in sociology. In the economics’ literature of the 1990s on 
business networks, then a new and immensely growing field, the network, 
known before only as a specific form of social structure, was now appraised 
as a sort of third principle of coordination for commercial exchange that 
existed in its own right beside the market and the hierarchy.
With this in mind, and deeply inspired by the early articles of Avner 
Greif on the Maghribi traders, in which he used several aspects of the net-
work concept for his description and analysis of a medieval Mediterranean 
system of trade that was based on culture, friendship and reputation with-
out naming it a network (Greif instead called it a ‘coalition’), we prepared 
a working paper for an international business history conference in 2001. 
In this paper, we started to make use of the concept of network organisa-
tion with respect to the analysis of Hanseatic trade. Originally designed 
only to explain the astounding flexibility of the late medieval merchants of 
the Hanse in handling all relevant business information, the analysis soon 
turned to a much larger scope because we found an almost perfect match 
of theory with some stylised facts concerning the trading practices and the 
pattern of Hanseatic trade. By taking the concept of network organisation 
as a model of Hanseatic trade, we were able to show that many features 
of this late medieval institutional arrangement such as the dominance of 
small- size firms and reciprocal trade without formal contracting, a slow 
transfer of information between merchants, a lack of risk capital and certain 
forms of sociability among Hansards were either elements of a network 
organisation or directly related to this specific structural pattern. More-
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over, since the concept of network organisation was originally developed in 
light of postmodern business firms, its high explanatory potential for a late 
medieval system of trade proved that a discussion, initiated by Wolfgang 
von Stromer in the 1970s, about the apparent backwardness of Hanse-
atic merchants compared to the emerging Upper German business houses 
was, in a way, an inappropriate judgement on the efforts of specific trade 
institutions.
Beginning with the publication of our study in German in the leading 
scholarly journal of Hanse research – the Hansische Geschichtsblätter – in 
2001, the idea of networks became an increasingly important topic in the 
research into the Hanse, to which we contributed further with several other 
articles. We recognise, quite happily of course, that the issue of networks is 
still of interest in current Hanse historiography. However, the tone of the 
debate has somehow changed, and the concept itself is now mainly used 
in its obvious metaphorical sense rather than in a way allowing for further 
exploitation of its explanatory power. Describing the Hanse as a network 
would only repeat a self- evident fact. And to be clear, this is something we 
have never said. We have shown instead that the institutional arrangement 
found by the merchants of the Hanse for their commercial exchange can be 
described in terms of network organisation, and this particular finding then 
opens the floor for a further in- depth analysis of the institutional mecha-
nisms which made the commercial exchange of Hansards work.
For the first time, this volume presents the different aspects of the medi-
eval Hanse as a network organisation which we so far have presented to an 
international audience in separate working papers at international work-
shops and international conferences such as the International Economic 
History Congress 2006 in Helsinki, the European Social Science History 
Conference 2006 in Amsterdam, the European Historical Economics Soci-
ety Conferences 2009 in Geneva and 2011 in Dublin and the International 
Medieval Congress in Leeds 2012. We are grateful to all those who helped 
to make this opportunity happen. This book intends to re- focus Hanse re-
search on the issue of institutions and institutional arrangements of trade, 
on the interplay of these institutions and on its driving mechanisms as well 
as to re- connect the research into Hanseatic trade to the international de-
bates in economics and economic history on incentive structures and the 
meaning of institutions in medieval trade.
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Chapter 1 
Hanse History and Economics –  
a New Institutional Economics Perspective  
on Hanseatic Trade
Points of Departure
This book is about the Hanseatic trade system and its institutions, which 
were invented, used and further developed by the merchants of the Hanse 
for their commercial exchange. We are not giving a comprehensive histo-
riographical description of the medieval Hanse. Indeed, what we are aiming 
at is instead the explanation, on the theoretical grounds of institutional 
economics, of both the specific structure of this trade system and the mecha-
nisms deployed to coordinate economic activities within it. This book can, 
and should, also be read as an attempt to mediate between two sciences. 
We attempt to describe and explain the structure and function of the late 
medieval Hanse and the commerce of its merchants by using economic 
theoretical concepts, namely from New Institutional Economics. There-
fore, the book solicits understanding between the disciplinary cultures of 
medieval historical research and modern economics. It thus falls “between 
two cultures”, a very conscious positioning which follows the economic 
historian Carlo M. Cipolla, who sees economic history exactly there; be-
tween historical research and economics.1 Cipolla’s reasoning is that, for 
economic historians, taking a position between these two cultures creates 
an exceptional opportunity to profitably function as interpreters between 
two very differently structured fields of research. However, not all histori-
ans feel safe in this position or role, but instead experience a strange inner 
strife. For instance, recent discussions concerning the purpose of economic 
history in Germany bear witness to this specific problem.2
1 Cf. Cipolla 1991; Pierenkemper 1995.
2 Cf. Tilly 1994; Ambrosius (ed.) 1996; Schremmer (ed.) 1998; Berghoff / 
Vogel (eds.) 2004; Schulz et al. (eds.) 2004.
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When modern economic theory is applied to medieval history, there is 
always the potential risk that the result of such an undertaking might be 
appear like the moderation of a dialogue between the audibly impaired. It 
would, therefore, seem imperative to elucidate the concept of this book and 
our viewpoint. It is founded on two assumptions: firstly, the argumentation 
is based on the idea that the economic dimension is of key significance in 
understanding the medieval Hanse. This consideration might sound banal, 
but what is elaborated in the first section of this chapter is not as self- evident 
as it would or should seem. A careful analysis of the economic dimen-
sion of the Hanse should, and this is our second assumption, be organised 
as a fruitful exchange between historians with an economic interest and 
economists with an interest in history. Economic approaches, in particular 
New Institutional Economics and New Political Economy, would seem to 
offer an interesting invitation for those concerned with economic history. 
Therefore, for those who are unfamiliar with New Institutional Econom-
ics, its methodological basis and its concepts will be briefly outlined in the 
second section of this chapter. There, we will also present some approaches 
to certain Hanseatic phenomena by economists.
Hanse Research, the Economy and Economics
Research into the Hanse has always had a high standing within the field of 
medieval history, although its impact appears to be more or less restricted 
to historical research in Germany. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
medieval Hanse is still considered as merely a ‘German’ phenomenon. The 
still high reputation of Hanse research is undoubtedly connected to the 
fact that it has always possessed a great aptitude for integrating new issues, 
innovative methods and (naturally) the latest trends in science, an ability 
it has preserved to this day. For other fields of historical research – one 
may consider, for example, research into the history of war, engineering, 
councils or the German Peasant War – this is not always quite self- evident. 
The paradigmatical openness of Hanse history also mirrors the ongoing 
debate on what the Hanse really was, which presumably has prevented an 
ossification of Hanse research with respect to both its subject matter and 
methodology.
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What the core of Hanse research should be has however in recent decades 
shifted a number of times. This is also due to the split into different eras of 
the history of the Hanse, e.g. early Hanseatic trade in the high Middle Ages, 
the late medieval Hanse or the Hanseatic League in early modern times. 
All these fields have naturally created their own pictures of the Hanse and 
the Hanseatic League, and will certainly continue to do so.3 What is more 
crucial is that in many of these concepts the economic dimension of both 
the Hanse and the Hanseatic League was only of marginal importance. 
Although there has never been a phase in which the economic aspect (or 
more precisely: Hanseatic trade) was totally neglected, it would neverthe-
less be exciting to examine the whole of Hanse research to ascertain the 
extent to which economics appeared in any of these images.4 With the 
following analysis can thus only central milestones of Hanse research be 
touched upon. Of course, a more detailed investigation would be necessary 
to examine all other non- scientific trends and interests5, whose impact on 
scientific research into the Hanse were also of considerable significance.
A connection with contemporary desires and hopes is particularly obvi-
ous in the beginnings of scientific research into the Hanseatic League in 
the nineteenth century, especially with regard to the establishment of the 
Hansischer Geschichtsverein (Hanseatic History Association) in 1870.6 
The long- desired German national unity, which had finally been realised 
in 1871, was in a sense imported into the medieval world of the Hanseatic 
League, which then took on the appearance of a powerful union of cities 
whose naval power protected the interests of the German Empire in the 
North. Had the older, romantically inspired research already been lacking 
in an approach to the sheer economic power embodied by the medieval 
Hanseatic League7, after 1871 the economic history potential was finally 
and completely buried under a political, legal and constitutional view.
3 Cf. Henn 1994; Hill 2001.
4 Cf. Selzer 2010, pp. 6–12.
5 Cf. Holbach et al. (eds.) 2011.
6 Cf. von Brandt 1970.
7 Cf. Schwebel 1964, p. 15; Postel 1996.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
14
It was primarily Dietrich Schäfer (1845–1929) who was responsible for 
such non- economic understanding of the Hanseatic League.8 His role can be 
deemed inappropriate when one considers that his nationalist- monarchist 
views would automatically have given rise to scientific backwardness. His 
scientific stance, which did not even take into account economic, social and 
cultural history, is also misunderstood if it is only presented as a result of 
the narrow- mindedness of a bourgeois theorist, because Schäfer, being the 
son of a Bremen docker, was very well acquainted with the world of trade 
and with life in a seaport. In his autobiography he touchingly describes how 
he grew up in a cellar bar at the harbour and played between the goods 
shipped from all over the world.9 Such socialisation is virtually unique 
among medievalists of the same generation10, and such life experience can 
also very rarely be found among Hanse historians, the only parallel being 
the biography of Karl Koppmann (1839–1905), who was the son of a 
Hamburg butcher and failed his entire life to obtain a professorship.11 Both 
historians of the Hanseatic League became interested in the subject through 
the famous Göttingen historian Georg Waitz (1813–1886). Schäfer had, 
however, already come to Göttingen in 1871 with the intent of completing 
a prize essay on “The German Hanse Towns and King Waldemar of Den-
mark”, a task set the previous year by the Hansischer Geschichtsverein. A 
careful examination of the resulting 1879 publication reveals that although 
it mainly concentrates on foreign policy aspects of the matter, it also con-
tains economic, social and cultural history passages of striking density.12 
Schäfer had a deep knowledge of the Hanse’s economic history, as attested 
to in his introduction to the edition of the “Buch des Lübeckischen Vogts 
auf Schonen”13 or his commitment to the Sound Toll Registers.14 It was, 
therefore, not the result of his ignorance to the shaping power of economic 
conditions when he emphatically pointed Hanse research in another direc-
tion. In his memoirs, Schäfer retrospectively describes his stance, which 
8 Cf. Pitz 1996; Ackermann 2004.
9 Cf. Schäfer 1926, pp. 13–44.
10 Cf. vom Bruch 1980.
11 Cf. Wentz 1940; Witt 1988.
12 Cf. Schäfer 1879; Pitz 1996, p. 144.
13 Cf. Schäfer 1887; Pitz 1996, p. 145.
14 Cf. Schäfer 1926, p. 164 f.; Pitz 1996, p. 151 f.
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clearly shows the influence of Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896).15 In 
an almost regretful tone he notes: “It was my involvement with the history 
of the Hanseatic League that initially led me to scientifically sophisticated 
studies. Its very nature has a great deal to do with economic matters; it 
is concerned with the activities of citizens.”16 Yet, for some reason, this 
economic dimension is not the focus of his historical efforts: “But it is 
particularly the study of Hanse history which defined my conviction that 
the permanent size and welfare of nations are based on the health and 
might of its state life.”17 For him the focus of historical consideration must 
be the history of state action in which the Hanseatic League acted as a 
union of towns and a substitute of the German empire in the North. Or 
in Schäfer’s own words: “As if the state were not the highest product of 
all culture, which has up to now been the centre of historical research and 
publication, and which must always remain so […]”.18 His decision to give 
priority to the constitutional and political history of the Hanseatic League 
was not due to limited research time. For Schäfer, economic success was 
merely a direct consequence of state power. In his 1885 essay “The Hanse 
and its Trade Policy”, he came to the programmatic conclusion which he 
quoted once again in his 1926 autobiography: “Like all other mercantile 
states, the history of the Hanse teaches us that economic size can only be 
achieved and maintained through political power.”19 The economic suc-
cess of the Hanseatic League in the North and in the Baltic was thus not 
15 Cf. Langer 1998.
16 Schäfer 1926, p. 100: „Beschäftigung mit der Geschichte der Hanse hatte mich 
zuerst zum wissenschaftlichen ausgereiften Arbeiten geführt. Sie hat sich ihrer 
Art nach besonders viel mit wirtschaftlichen Dingen zu beschäftigen; es handelt 
sich um Betätigung von Bürgern.“
17 Schäfer 1926, p. 100: „Aber gerade das Studium der hansischen Geschichte 
hat in mir die Überzeugung festgelegt, daß dauernde Größe und Wohlfahrt der 
Völker auf Gesundheit und Kraft ihres staatlichen Lebens beruhen […]“.
18 Schäfer 1926, p. 236: „Als wenn nicht das höchste Erzeugnis aller Kultur der 
Staat wäre, der bisher im Mittelpunkt geschichtlicher Forschung und Darstellung 
gestanden hat und immer stehen muß […]“.
19 Schäfer 1926, p. 101: „Auch die Geschichte der Hanse lehrt wie die aller an-
deren merkantilen Staatenbildungen, daß wirtschaftliche Größe nur zu erringen 
und zu behaupten ist durch politische Macht.“ Cf. also Schäfer 1913, vol. 1, 
pp. 168–193.
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caused by more clever economic strategies, more efficient trading practices 
or cheaper transport opportunities, but was instead a result of its political 
power.20 However, was it possible to expand this field of research if the 
source material about the domestic and foreign policy of the Hanseatic 
League was edited and evaluated? Schäfer resolutely rejected this thought, 
too. In 1908, in a lecture given at Lübeck, he strictly did not recommend 
the synchronous integration of additional dimensions into Hanse history, 
but plead, in full accordance with the political and military developments 
in the years before World War I, for a diachronic expansion of a political 
history of German maritime and naval power up to present day.21
The impact of this pronounced state cult, which not only affected 
Schäfer’s historical research around 190022, was not restricted to the 
analysis of the Hanseatic League. It followed from the inaugural lecture he 
gave in Tübingen in 188823, and it finally resulted in a conflict with Eberhard 
Gothein (1853–1923)24, who is now seen as one of the founding fathers of 
national economics in Germany, even though he always considered himself 
to be a historian.25 It seems necessary to take a look at this controversy, 
which is less known than the famous methodological dispute of the 1890s 
between Karl Lamprecht on one side and Max Weber, Friedrich Mei-
necke and Georg von Below on the other26, but had a far greater influ-
ence on Hanse research. Since then it was not just the contact to cultural 
history which was blocked for Hanse history, but in particular contact to 
research into economic history was also almost completely lost. This di-
version of Hanse history and economic history occurred at the time when 
the Jüngere Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie (Younger Historical 
20 Cf. Cymorek 1998, p. 145.
21 Cf. Schäfer 1909.
22 See for instance Hammerstein (ed.) 1988; Oexle 2002.
23 Cf. Dietrich Schäfer, Das eigentliche Arbeitsgebiet der Geschichte [1888], in: 
Schäfer 1913, vol. 1, pp. 264–290.
24 Cf. Gothein 1889, and the reaction of Dietrich Schäfer, Geschichte und Kul-
turgeschichte [1891], in Schäfer 1913, vol. 1, pp. 291–351. Cf. also Schäfer 
1926, p. 113 f.
25 Cf. Hampe 1924, p. 479 f.; Alter 1982.
26 Cf. Schorn- Schütte 1984; Raphael 1990.
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School of National Economics) enjoyed its greatest respect in Germany.27 
Its methodically controlled work on historical source material resulted in 
high quality economic historical research, such as Gothein’s “Wirtschafts-
geschichte des Schwarzwalds” (“Economic History of the Black Forest”, 
1892).28 However, a Hanse history in the sense propagated by Schäfer 
was not receptive to the likes of this. So it is not surprising that Gustav 
Schmoller (1838–1917), the head of the Jüngere Historische Schule der 
Nationalökonomie29, sided with Gothein, while Schmoller’s declared 
adversary Georg von Below (1858–1927)30 became one of Schäfer’s sym-
pathisers.31
Yet, how fruitful such cooperation of economic history in the spirit of the 
Jüngere Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie and of Hanse research 
might have been can be seen in the case of the few historians who attempted 
this kind of approach. These include Wilhelm Stieda (1852–1933), his-
torian of the famous Veckinchusen family, who was a trained national 
economist.32 It also has to be mentioned that the first tenured professorship 
for economic history in Germany was given to Bruno Kuske (1876–1964) 
in Cologne, even though his interest was primarily in the history of Cologne 
and not in the history of the Hanseatic League.33 Despite the fact that no 
genuine Hanse topics were dealt with in the Kuske School, another medi-
evalist with a deep knowledge of national economics provided an extremely 
vitalising impetus for Hanse research in the direction of economic history. 
At his grandfather’s upper middle- class Berlin home, Heinrich Sproem-
berg (1889–1966)34 had met Gustav Schmoller in person and was truly 
impressed. Although he completed his doctorate under the supervision of 
Dietrich Schäfer in Berlin, he was actually more interested in the history 
of Western Europe, which led to his close links with the Belgian historian, 
Henri Pirenne (1862–1935). In 1917, Germany’s war policy in Belgium 
27 Cf. Winkel 1977, pp. 101–121.
28 Cf. Gothein 1892.
29 Cf. Bock et al. (eds.) 1989.
30 Cf. Cymorek 1998, pp. 158–168.
31 Cf. Cymorek 1998, p. 159; Ackermann 2004, pp. 99–121.
32 On his life see Stieda 1921.
33 Cf. Henning 1988; Deeters 1996, p. 136 f.
34 Cf. Didczuneit / Unger / Middell 1994.
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then caused a split between Heinrich Sproemberg and Dietrich Schäfer. 
Schäfer openly assured Sproemberg that Sproemberg would never ob-
tain a professorship in Germany.35 Ironically, it was this role as a ‘maverick’ 
within the German medieval history scene that motivated Sproemberg 
to join the Hansischer Geschichtsverein in 1921 following the advice of 
Schäfer’s master student Walter Vogel (1880–1938).36 Nevertheless, in 
the period after World War II Sproemberg became very influential in the 
economic history of the Hanseatic League after he had received a profes-
sorship in Rostock in 1946. The works on social and economic history 
subjects which he initiated over the following years are numerous, but of 
all of these only Karl- Friedrich Olechnowitz’s study of the shipbuilding 
industry is mentioned here.37 In 1950, Sproemberg moved on to Leipzig 
University. He became head of the Hanseatic Working Group in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic in the same year38, and later also a member of 
the board of the Hansischer Geschichtsverein, which he had to re- join 
after having been forced out in 1938 for being politically unacceptable in 
the Nazi era.39 It is symptomatic that Heinrich Sproemberg was unable 
to become professionally successful in a scientific milieu in which Dietrich 
Schäfer was so powerful and exerted so much influence.
Nevertheless, in the 1920s there was a determined embracing of the 
economic history of the Hanseatic League.40 This new approach is closely 
associated with Fritz Rörig (1882–1952) and his students.41 Rörig him-
self wrote reflectively of his course, milestones and goals:42 In his view he 
developed his concept of the history of the Hanseatic League on two fronts. 
On the one hand, he considered Schäfer’s idea of the political history of 
the Hanseatic League to be inappropriate, and, after 1918, also outdated. 
On the other hand, however, he agreed just as little with the economic his-
tory approach of the national economists Karl Bücher (1847–1930) and 
35 Cf. Sproemberg 1971, p. 437, footnote 212.
36 Cf. Rörig 1938.
37 Cf. Olechnowitz 1960.
38 See to the resarch on Hanseatic history in the GDR Müller- Mertens 2011.
39 Cf. Didczuneit / Unger / Middell 1994 (eds.), pp. 34 and 47.
40 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 15; Friedland 1963, p. 484 f.
41 On Rörig’s intellectual biography see Selzer 2016a.
42 Cf. Rörig 1950.
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Werner Sombart (1863–1941)43, in whose thinking medieval foreign trade 
seems to be unimportant, and the world of the merchant all too narrow. 
Rörig was, however, able to refute these approaches with the help of the 
archives of the city of Lübeck. There, he discovered the medieval foreign 
traders in Hanse historiography, and there he found important source ma-
terial to construct an economically based history of the Hanseatic League. 
He was less interested in business cycles and statistics, as he found “the 
people who drove the economy, their contexts and organisational forms, 
far more important […] than the goods they sold.”44 His student Ahasver 
von Brandt (1909–1977)45 incorporated all the findings from Rörig’s time 
into his 1963 essay “The Hanse as a Medieval Economic Organisation”.46 
In a reversal of Schäfer’s premises he reiterated that: “The political, also 
power- political, activity of the League is not an end in itself […], but a 
means to secure the economic concerns.”47
When Ahasver von Brandt took stock of the 40 years of Rörig’s para-
digm shift, not much was known of these issues outside the closer scientific 
community. This, not untypical, phase shift in the progress of new scientific 
approaches to a broader professional public was particularly due to the 
fact that Fritz Rörig had failed to write an overall view of Hanse history. 
The standard work by Karl Pagel (1898–1974), published in 1942 and 
reprinted several times since then, was still the aggregate of Schäfer’s 
image of the Hanse. Things started to change when Philippe Dollinger’s 
(1904–1999) “La Hanse” was published in Paris in 1964. The German 
translation that appeared in 1966 soon became standard reading on the sub-
ject.48 The contradictory structure of these two works, which describe the 
43 Cf. Lenger 1995.
44 Rörig 1950, p. 393: For him the economic agents, their interactions and forms 
of organisation are much more important than the goods they exchange („[…] 
die Wirtschaft treibenden Menschen, ihre Zusammenhänge und Organisations-
formen, ungleich wichtiger […] als die von ihnen umgesetzten Güter“).
45 Cf. Friedland 1979.
46 Cf. von Brandt 1963.
47 Von Brandt 1963, p. 28: „Die politische, auch machtpolitische Betätigung der 
Gemeinschaft ist nicht Selbstzweck […], sondern Mittel zur Sicherung jener 
wirtschaftlicher Belange.“
48 Cf. Dollinger 62012.
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fault line between Schäfer’s and Rörig’s outlines of Hanse history, was 
substantial and was shrewdly commented on in a review of both works in 
1965: “And while in Pagel’s perception, Hanse history is anything but just 
town history or even just economic history, for Dollinger it is primarily 
an ‘economic history’ phenomenon”.49 This notwithstanding, by the time 
von Brandt’s essay and Dollinger’s Hanse volume appeared, Ernst Pitz 
(1928–2009) had already diagnosed a crisis in historical research on the 
Hanseatic League. He clearly stated that “as well as a general blurring of 
the boundaries of Hanse research”, a key problem was that the “dialogue 
between historians and national economists broke down as a result of dis-
interest in economics during the Nazi era and the switch from economic 
science to economic theory that we experienced after 1945.”50
Following the dispute (Methodenstreit) between the Austrian Economic 
School (Wiener Grenznutzenschule) led by Carl Menger (1840–1921) and 
the Historical School led by Gustav Schmoller, it soon became clear 
that the German avenue of historical economics was something that was 
not going to be followed at an international level.51 The reorientation of 
economic methodology as it emerged after 1945 meant an increased math-
ematisation of the field, which had to operate on the exclusion of problems 
and limitation of the scope of research in order to be successful.52 One can 
argue that this is why there is a certain tragedy in the convergence of Hanse 
research with economic phenomena promoted by Rörig, because precisely 
this opened up the field for a historical approach to economics, which 
nevertheless failed to succeed internationally. His economic re- alignment 
of Hanse research came up against a general de- historicising trend in eco-
49 Schmidt 1965, p. 115 f.: „Und während für Pagels Empfinden hansische Ge-
schichte ‚alles andere’ ist ‚als nur eine Städtegeschichte oder gar nur Wirtschafts-
geschichte’, ist sie für Dollinger eben gerade ein in erster Linie ‚wirtschaftsge-
schichtliches Phänomen’ “.
50 Pitz 1961, pp. 259 and 261: „Verwischung der Grenzen historischer For-
schung“ sowie „Gespräch zwischen Historikern und Nationalökonomen durch 
das Desinteresse der Nazizeit an der Wirtschaftslehre und die 1945 auch bei uns 
hervorgetretene Umstellung der Wirtschaftswissenschaften auf die Wirtschafts-
theorie abgerissen ist.“
51 Cf. Winkel 1977, pp. 138–151.
52 Cf. Winkel 41994; Borchardt 2001.
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nomics. And it was this separation of both methods and subjects that also 
caused the current problems within the dialogue between medievalists, who 
generally consider the categories used by economists as too rigid and out 
of touch with the everyday life of the past, and economists, who vice versa 
consider historians to be naïve amateurish collectors of facts who think that 
common sense is a method.
In the 1960s, the renewal of economic history mainly in the Anglo Saxon 
world centred on models and quantification. As the necessity to use theory 
for scientific explanation was stressed, this ‘New Economic History’ was 
clearly designed to meet the needs of economics. And it was in particular 
Cliometrics53 that deepened the gulf between economists and medievalists 
even more. Thus, in the words of Arnold Esch, one gets the impression 
that there are two economic histories, depending on whether the respective 
researcher has a historiographical or an economics background.54
New Institutional Economics and the Hanse – a Challenge
One might say that breaking the link to economic theory is fundamental 
for medieval studies in the German language, with the result being that 
medieval economic issues are only of minor importance.55 In favour of 
Hanse research, one could say that this field, when compared to others, has 
always been accessible for suggestions from economic history. Based on this 
tradition, one could hope that a newer economic theoretical framework and 
methodology would be met with interest by Hanse researchers.
In the past thirty years, with the New Institutional Economics a new 
concept has arisen within economics, in that historians should be interested 
in. Starting from a critique of the so- called neoclassical model of economic 
exchange, concepts of New Institutional Economics improve this model in a 
number of ways.56 The core assumption of the neoclassical exchange model 
is, on the one hand, that individuals behave opportunistically and attempt 
to maximise their personal benefit. This part of the model is also extensively 
used in the related fields of social science such as sociology, psychology 
53 See for instance Dumke 1986; Komlos / Scott (eds.) 1997; Baten 2004.
54 Cf. Esch 1987, p. 10 f.
55 Cf. Goetz 1999, pp. 242–249.
56 See e.g. Neus ³2003; Richter / Furubotn ³2003; Blum 2005.
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and political science where it is commonly called ‘rational choice’. On the 
other hand, in this model it is assumed that the exchange of scarce goods 
and resources at markets is coordinated by means of a price mechanism. 
This works to perfection as long as the property rights of those interested in 
exchange are well- defined, and as long as all those involved in exchange are 
fully informed about market developments and the intentions of potential 
trade partners, so that exchange in general can be handled without costs. 
However, these assumptions turned out to be unrealistic in light of empiri-
cal research. Markets are usually not perfect, property rights often are only 
incompletely specified and individuals only possess limited information on 
what is going on at the market. Applied to the case of medieval trade, these 
clarifications mean that due information, contract and monitoring costs 
exchange via markets is not automatically the most efficient way of ex-
change. New Institutional Economics thus further develops the neoclassical 
model: firstly, in transaction cost theory exactly this information, contract 
and monitoring costs, is emphasised as being an important determinant of 
individual economic behaviour. Secondly, the property rights theory clearly 
demonstrates that the exact definition, distribution and legal guarantee 
of property rights for useful, and thus tradeable resources and goods are 
the chief prerequisites for the willingness of individuals to engage in com-
mercial activities such as production, exchange and distribution. Finally, 
in principal- agent-theory the common presumption of information being 
symmetrically distributed between economic agents is abandoned, so that 
contracts would have to be drawn up in such a way that any inherent infor-
mation asymmetry between them will be balanced, in order to protect the 
less- informed principal against attempts of the agent to take advantage of 
private information at the principal’s cost. To sum up, ‘rational choice’ as 
the core behavioural model underlying all neoclassical economic reasoning 
is now specified in terms of a ‘RREEMM’ (resourceful, restricted, expecting, 
evaluating, maximising man).57
All three basic concepts of New Institutional Economics thus emphasise 
the enormous importance that institutions have for human exchange. In-
stitutions are, according to Douglass C. North, humanly shaped formal 
57 Cf. Frings 2007, p. 64.
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or informal rules, which influence and structure human interactions.58 A 
set of such rules regulating the action of individuals is also referred to as 
an institutional arrangement. New Institutional Economics has now been 
applied for over three decades, especially in Anglo- American economic 
history. However, even though all institutional economics approaches use 
more or less equivalent definitions of institutions and rely on the same 
kind of behavioural model, for the analysis of medieval trade two distinc-
tions with respect to the nature of institutional analysis are particularly 
important. According to North, institutional analysis is primarily about 
working out the historical dimension of institutions and describing those 
institutions that have either accelerated or inhibited European economic 
development since the Middle Ages.59 In contrast, the approach taken by 
Avner Greif is more prescriptive, in that it attempts to explain the func-
tionality, or dysfunctionality, of institutional arrangements in a very basic 
manner. To this end he primarily avails himself of game theory60, with 
which the neoclassical postulate of opportunistically acting individuals 
is methodologically extended insofar as individuals are, by assumption, 
anxious to maximize their own benefit, yet act strategically and include 
the expected reactions of their potential interaction partners in their own 
calculations.
With institutional economics, whether in its descriptive or prescriptive 
variant, the focus tends to be more on such social, political and legal frame-
works of economic practice. However, it is precisely this lack of considera-
tion of such a framework in the sterile neoclassical mathematical models 
that has been criticised by historians. In Germany in particular, this fun-
damental critique resulted in an unexpected interest once again due to the 
German tradition of the historical school of national economy. The first 
presentation of the new research approach by Knut Borchardt in 1977 
was also motivated in this manner. Although published in an otherwise 
friendly environment for theory, his summation had hardly any impact. His 
careful analysis of the meaning of property rights to economic history was 
the first attempt of a German economic historian at discussing improve-
58 Cf. North 1991, p. 97.
59 Cf. North 1981; North / Weingast 1989, North 1991; 1993; David 1994.
60 Cf. Greif 1993; 1997; 1998; 2000, pp. 265–272; 2002a; 2002b; 2004.
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ments and deficits of New Institutional Economics, and for a long time it 
also remained the only one.61 Only in a second attempt from the beginning 
of the 1990s onwards did the idea of the discipline of New Institutional 
Economics and its applicability to historical problems truly get through to 
German economic historians.62 In the meantime the same applies for ap-
plications of this concept to medieval economic issues.63
However, although quite recently the economic dimension of the Hanse 
reappeared on the agenda, a real embrace of economic theory and method-
ology by Hanse historians can only be seen in a few cases.64 Theoretically 
inspired studies on the (economic) history of the Hanse and its merchants 
were published in most cases by economists, political scientists or political 
historians.65 Likewise, the reverse is also true: in the debate in international 
economic history on the medieval European merchants’ institutional ar-
rangements, Hanse examples are mentioned66, but Hanse research itself 
is not really actively involved in this discussion. Interestingly enough, the 
Hanse was also used in arguments during the development of New In-
stitutional Economics. Institutions which played a significant role in the 
development of Europe’s economy from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy are examined in the works of Douglass C. North and Avner 
Greif. So it is hardly surprising that medieval long- distance trade in par-
ticular is given more attention in these studies. North distinguishes two 
fundamental problems in medieval long- distance trade for which institu-
tional arrangements had to be found in order to enable merchants to trade 
61 Cf. Borchardt 1977.
62 See e.g. Wischermann 1993; Butschek 1998; Berghoff 1999; Butschek 
2000; Fiedler 2001; Ellerbrock / Wischermann (eds.) 2004; Wischer-
mann / Nieberding (eds.) 2004; but especially Volckart 2004b, who classifies 
the concepts of New Institutional Economics and shows how these concepts 
could be applied to historical examples.
63 See e.g. Munro 2001; Schui 2003; Volckart 1998; 2001; 2002; 2004a.
64 See e.g. Selzer / Ewert 2001; 2005; 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2007; 2010; Ewert / 
Sunder 2012; Jenks 2005; Link / Kapfenberger 2005.
65 See e.g. Schoneville 1998 on the impact of financial markets on the Hanse, 
or Pichierri 2000, Schellers 2003 and Schipmann 2005 on the political 
organisation of the Hanseatic League.
66 Cf. Harreld 2015, p. 4; Ogilvie 2011; Edwards / Ogilvie 2011, p. 19, there 
citing Selzer / Ewert 2005; 2010.
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profitably. On the one hand, sedentary merchants had to find solutions for 
the problems of sending goods to trading partners in distant markets, evalu-
ating the performance of their trading partners and protecting themselves 
against possible fraud and against any other form of loss. On the other 
hand, travelling merchants had to negotiate privileges in foreign markets 
and plausibly convince the local authorities that they would not tolerate 
any infringement of the trade privileges that had been granted to them. An 
institutional solution for the first problem was, for example, to trade with 
relatives, while the second problem was often historically overcome through 
the formation of a union of foreign traders in merchant guilds.67 In the 
institutional economics analysis of medieval trade, an initial differentiation 
was made between institutions which regulated the relationships between 
geographically separated trading partners68 and those which evolved in the 
recurrent negotiations of merchants trading at a particular foreign market 
with the local granters of privileges (princes, towns).69 Taking merchant 
guilds as an example, it becomes clear that a third type of institution ex-
ists, namely those which determined the relationship between (sedentary) 
merchants at one location70, even though guilds would also fall in the cat-
egory of institutions that governed relations between rulers and merchants 
abroad, of course.
While the Hanse is only marginally touched on in North’s research 
as one of many examples, other institutional economic research focuses 
explicitly on Hanseatic trade and the Hanseatic League as an economic 
and political player in medieval Northern Europe. In a study published in 
1994, Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast addressed the 
question as to why the Kontore of the Hanse were established at particular 
trading places, which served as outposts of the Hanseatic trade system.71 
From an economics point of view, the Kontore were initially nothing more 
than trading cartels that were able to gain a monopoly on certain goods 
by means of privileges granted. According to this diction, the Kontore 
67 Cf. North 1991, p. 99 f.
68 Cf. Greif 1992, pp. 129–131.
69 Cf. Greif 1992, p. 128 f.; 2000, pp. 260–265; 1993.
70 Cf. Greif 1992, p. 131 f.
71 Cf. Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994.
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were to be viewed negatively because of the notion that Hanseatic mer-
chants, by acting as oligopolists, made efficient trade impossible, adding 
surcharges and reducing the trade volume. Greif, Milgrom and Wein-
gast show that the Kontore, or merchant guilds in general as information 
hubs, not only had a coordinating function for the trading activities of 
the merchants with its associated economic advantages, but were, as a 
consequence, with their group privileges also able to reduce the costs of 
contracting for the granter of said privileges. Finally, due to the possibility 
to place sanctions on their own members, they also supported the self- 
commitment that was all too necessary for the growth of trade. Jochen 
Streb expanded these conclusions insofar as he was able to clarify that 
the transition from the merchants’ Hanse to the Hanseatic League was a 
logical step because the Hanse towns had even greater financial resources 
than the Hanseatic merchants themselves, with which they could protect 
their merchants more effectively against all efforts made by the granters 
of privileges to exploit them.72
Which opportunities does New Institutional Economics offer for future 
research into the history of the Hanse and its trade? The concepts provide 
Hanse research with categories and a methodology for the analysis of Hanse 
institutions. By using this conceptual framework, these institutions can be 
compared with and evaluated against the background of other institutional 
arrangements in long- distance trade that evolved elsewhere in medieval Eu-
rope. In particular, we will be taking a closer look at the following aspects 
of Hanseatic trade:
In the subsequent Chapter 2 Reputation, Trust and Culture – the Net-
work Structure of Hanseatic Trade and its Benefits we provide the reader 
with an institutional economics analysis of both the structure and coordina-
tion of the internal Hanseatic trade. This trade system is described in terms 
of the model of network organisation. We look at commonly used forms 
of commercial exchange and business cooperation between merchants and 
we show why the resulting trade network for Hansards was an efficient 
way to handle their commercial exchange, and why this trade system also 
prompted merchants to act fairly.
72 Cf. Streb 2004.
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In part, this efficiency of the internal Hanseatic network trade stemmed 
from an overlap of business and family, which in general seems to be a rath-
er typical characteristic of the economic activities of pre- modern merchants 
and entrepreneurs. Therefore Chapter 3 A ‘Small World’ – Reconstruction 
and Meaning of the Hansards’ Social Networks is primarily dedicated to the 
concept of social network analysis and its analytical potential with respect 
to the manifold social relationships that are found within the late medieval 
Hanse. In particular, we review different types of surviving sources – e.g. let-
ters, wills, membership in guilds –, which all help to reconstruct different 
layers of social networks by providing valuable data on the kinship and 
social relationships of Hansards and their social proximity. Kinship and 
social bonds complemented the commercial relationships of traders and 
created a so- called ‘small world’ for Hansards, a highly segregated network 
which nevertheless allowed for an easy indirect reach of other members on 
rather short paths through the network.
Chapter 4 Bridging Distances and Filling Gaps – Strategies to Han-
dle Heterogeneous Commercial Environments deals with the seemingly 
huge differences in economic development by which the various regions 
of Hanseatic trade were characterised. Being continuously faced with het-
erogeneous commercial environments, the merchants of the Hanse, as a 
consequence, developed certain strategies – e.g. hedging against the risk of 
transportation, networking, standardisation of commercial institutions – to 
handle this kind of heterogeneity, and in doing so were able, to a certain 
extent at least, to bridge these significant gaps in economic development 
that existed within the Hanse’s realm.
In Chapter 5 State of Cities, Commercial Trust, or Virtual Organisa-
tion? – Structure and Coordination of the Hanse the focus is expanded 
insofar as we now take a closer look at the outside appearance and the 
overall structure of the Hanse. In particular, we are concerned with the 
interplay of the internal network trade system with the Kontore and the 
emerging political structure of the Hanseatic League. We also deal with 
the measures that were applied to coordinate the commercial activities of 
merchants and to balance the economic interests of towns.
Why were Hanseatic merchants so successful? And why did their seem-
ingly unassailable economic position begin to decline at the end of the 
fifteenth century? In Chapter 6 Competitive Advantage or Limit to Busi-
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ness? – Contingency and Path Dependence we discuss exactly this question, 
arguing that apart from a number of exogenous political and economic 
developments around the year 1500, which could not be influenced by 
Hanseatic merchants at all, their growing economic power in the preceding 
centuries, and their loss of competiveness at the end of the fifteenth and in 
early sixteenth century were to a large extent endogenously driven. Both 
economic success and later failure seem to have been highly determined 
by the structure of the Hanse’s network trade system and were thus path- 
dependent.
Finally, in the concluding Chapter 7 Perspectives of Research into Han-
seatic Trade – the Impact of the Model of Network Organisation we will 
review our own results concerning the Hanseatic network trade system in 
the light of current trends in Hanse history and recently published studies on 
the Hanse, as well as in light of the ongoing and lively debate in economic 
history on the mechanisms of medieval long- distance trade and the determi-
nants of its rise, which still is dominated by those economic historians who 
draw their conclusions from Mediterranean or West European cases. And 
even though some scholars already have used Hanse examples of course, 
so far a full- scope institutional economics analysis of Hanseatic trade was 
still lacking. With this book we seek to fill this gap.
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Chapter 2 
Reputation, Trust and Culture – the Network 
Structure of Hanseatic Trade and its Benefits
Hanseatic Trade and its Historiographical Evaluation
In the literature on the late medieval German Hanse, the business practices 
of Hanseatic merchants are supposed to have been backward.73 This vigor-
ous claim of backwardness is based upon two features that characterise the 
specific way the merchants of the Hanse operated their trade:
Firstly, and most visibly, the trade between Hanseatic merchants was 
organised differently in comparison to commercial exchange elsewhere in 
those days. The type of hierarchical- bureaucratic corporate organisation, 
which seems to have been the common pattern employed by Italian mer-
chant bankers and trading businesses from Upper Germany74, can rarely be 
found along the Baltic shores. For Werner Sombart, the trading practice 
of the Hanseatic merchants had only a ‘craft- like’ character.75 The organi-
sational mode of the Hanseatic businesses instead typically consisted of 
mutual transactions between two partners operating at distant locations, 
with each partner selling the other partner’s goods. Very often these part-
ners were related to each other by kinship or they were linked through 
friendship relations. In many cases, their commercial relationships usually 
were not defined by any written contract.76
Secondly, a cursory glance suggests that by that time the merchants of the 
Hanse had fallen considerably far behind the state- of-the- art business prac-
tices and techniques such as the double- entry bookkeeping, the use of bills 
of exchange and buying on credit. These techniques had been invented in 
Italy and were employed by Italian firms and merchant bankers, which also 
were trading in northwest Europe, and later on these innovative commercial 
73 Cf. von Stromer 1976, pp. 334–336.
74 Cf. Bauer 1923; von Stromer 1968; 1973; Riebartsch 1987; Hildebrandt 
1996; 1997.
75 Cf. Sombart 21916–1927, pp. 300–306.
76 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 27; Stark 1993; 2000.
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means were successfully implemented by firms from Nuremberg and Augs-
burg. Although Hanseatic merchants occasionally bought on credit77, these 
newer business practices did not really become their standard techniques.
However, the main objection to the claim of a Hanseatic backwardness 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be raised on the grounds of 
the Hanse’s economic performance and the commercial success of its 
merchants. Despite sticking to business practices that were already out-
dated, the merchants of the Hanse were very successful indeed.78 Not 
only were they able to practically monopolise all trade in the Baltic and 
North Sea areas during the late Middle Ages, but they could also secure 
their domination of the trade with a fairly wide range of products until 
way beyond the turn of the fifteenth century. Moreover, only a few of the 
seemingly more modern firms from Upper Germany could really establish 
long- term businesses in the Hanse’s commercial realm in the Baltic and 
North Sea areas.
Nevertheless, in recent decades this very special and unique structure of 
Hanseatic trade and the paradigm of ‘backwardness’ somewhat obscured 
most researchers’ views of the Hanseatic merchants’ success in the Baltic. 
A pessimistic as well as an optimistic position can be distinguished in the 
literature: the research of those who argued in favour of backwardness was 
mainly focussed on the comparison of the Hanseatic business style with the 
Upper German firms’ type of bureaucratic organisational structure. In the 
tradition of the writings of Max Weber79 these authors misleadingly as-
sumed that the hierarchical- bureaucratic organisation was the ‘normal’ and 
indeed progressive form of organisation. Their according conclusion that 
Hanseatic merchants operated in an old- school manner was a quite logical 
step under consideration. In contrast to this, many attempts were made by 
those who denied a Hanseatic backwardness in trading practice, to show 
that commercial exchange between Hanseatic merchants was very special 
indeed, and that the claim of backwardness was wrong and a corresponding 
77 Cf. Sprandel 1975; Jenks 1982.
78 Cf. Afflerbach 1993, Sprandel 1984; Irsigler 1989; Stark 1993.
79 Cf. Weber 1889; 51980.
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xenophobia of Hanseatic merchants never really existed.80 As a result, the 
literature has thus far failed to classify the typical elements of Hanseatic 
business transactions in terms of and with concepts of present- day theory 
of organisation. By arguing along the lines of ‘backward vs. non- backward’ 
and ‘non- modern vs. modern’ modes of organisation, the analysis of the 
functional mechanisms that drove the very specific organisational structure 
employed by the merchants of the Hanse was often neglected and faded 
out of sight, as did possible interrelations between this particular structure 
and its economic performance.
In using concepts of organisation theory, transaction cost theory, 
principal- agent-theory and game theoretical methods we attempt to ana-
lyse this particular organisational structure. We also aim to explain how 
coordination within such a system of trade was achieved, and especially, 
why merchants at distant locations consented to repeated cooperation, very 
often without relying on written contracts.
The Network Structure of Hanseatic Trade
Forms of Commercial Exchange and Cooperation
In general, business transactions between the merchants of the Hanse were 
handled on a partnership basis. Several juridical forms of cooperation were 
in use: within the so- called wedderleginge (labelled also kumpanie or vera 
societas) two merchants cooperated, one of them traded goods whereas the 
other only contributed part of the financial capital the first merchant used 
for his trading operations. Profits were shared in such partnerships.81 In con-
trast, the so- called sendeve was a sort of commission business. A particular 
merchant – the commission agent – sold the goods he had received from 
another merchant by order and on behalf of the partner who had instructed 
the sale and who had sent the goods to the commission agent, with profits 
and risks remaining with the sender.82 Yet, by far the most frequent and 
80 Cf. Jenks 1982; 1996; North 1999; Sprandel 1984; Irsigler 1989; Stark 
1993; 2000. For late medieval bookkeeping techniques see Pelus- Kaplan 1994; 
Jenks 1992.
81 Cf. Ebel 1957; Cordes 1998; 1999, pp. 67–71; 2000.
82 Cf. Cordes 1998; 1999; 2000.
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thus most important form of commercial transaction between Hanseatic 
merchants was a cooperation of two traders, which was somewhat differ-
ent from a commission business and can be labelled as a ‘reciprocal’ busi-
ness. In such reciprocal partnerships each partner sold the other’s goods, 
but in every case the profits were pocketed by the sender while the risks 
remained with the partner who operated the sale.83 Of course, simultaneity 
of reciprocal sale operations was not necessary. The striking feature of this 
sort of mutual transaction is the fact that it was usually handled without 
any written contract. Neither written long- term agreements between two 
merchants, nor occasional transaction- specific written instructions existed. 
Even during the sixteenth century this form of reciprocal cooperation was 
prevalent among Hanseatic merchants, a fact which can be proved with the 
example of Bertram Bene from Oslo and his trading partners of the Kron 
family from Rostock.84
Another feature of Hanseatic commercial exchange worth mention-
ing is something that in organisation science is known as ‘cooptition’.85 
This term is a coinage of ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’, and recently 
came in use in the theory of network organisations. Since the reciprocal 
commercial exchange of Hanseatic merchants allowed each of them to 
cooperate with more than one trading partner and thus to operate poten-
tially conflicting sales, in a group of Hanseatic merchants, competition 
can very well be found alongside cooperation. At least in the late Middle 
Ages the Hanse never really forbade this sort of competition.86 An exam-
ple of an explicit prohibition of competition between trading partners is 
that of the company formed by Hermann Carsten, Gert vom Brocke and 
Heinrich von Kampen in Lübeck in the middle of the sixteenth century, 
which nonetheless is atypical in the sense that it was one of the later 
Hanseatic companies for which the bureaucratic- hierarchical style had 
already been adopted.87
83 Cf. Mickwitz, 1937, pp. 24–39; 1938; Stark 1984; 1993; Cordes 1998; 2000.
84 Cf. Thierfelder 1958, pp. 194–197.
85 Cf. Beck 1998, pp. 271–276.
86 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 28.
87 Cf. Jeannin 1963, pp. 46 and 57.
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Firm size and Network Organisation
A vast majority of Hanseatic businesses were self- employed merchants, 
family businesses and small- scale firms. Because of their small size, complex 
hierarchical structures are seldom, if ever found among them. The company 
of Falbrecht- Morser-Rosenfeld 88, which operated in the early fifteenth cen-
tury in England and Hungary, the sixteenth- century business- house Loitz 
from Stettin / Szczecin89, and the aforementioned company of Carsten- Vom 
Brocke- Von Kampen from Lübeck are three of these rare cases. However, 
the simple organisational structure of small- scale firms is only part of the 
trading pattern that can be observed in the Baltic and the North Sea in the 
late Middle Ages.
A more complex structure of commercial exchange emerged from 
the interactions between such rather simply structured firms. Hanseatic 
merchants formed trade networks of different sizes, varying density and 
endurance. These commercial networks were medium- term or long- term 
cooperations between legally independent merchants who traded goods 
with each other. A spatial specialisation – as it is called in organisation 
science – was achieved insofar as traders from different places in the Baltic 
could feed many different products and goods into such networks. It is 
crucial to distinguish Hanseatic commercial networks from the ‘network-
ing’ activities of other merchants and firms in the late Middle Ages, for 
instance families from Upper Germany90 or Italian firms.91 It is obvious 
that the Fugger and Welser from Augsburg also possessed large kinship 
and friendship networks, but they used them primarily to control pro-
duction processes and to influence political issues from the headquarters 
of their respective firms in Augsburg. From very early on, a hierarchical- 
bureaucratic organisation stood at the centre of their business operations, 
with numerous employed agents who represented the firm at every market 
of importance. In contrast, Hanseatic merchants as (in principle) legally 
independent economic units employed each other as commercial agents 
in distant places, and their trade networks then evolved as a result of the 
88 Cf. von Stromer 1976; Irsigler 1979, pp. 22–24.
89 Cf. Papritz 1932; 1957; Böcker 1998.
90 Cf. Sieh- Burens 1986.
91 Cf. Dahl 1998.
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commercial exchange relationships that were handled in this particular 
manner and consisted of firms of quasi equal rank. Nevertheless, these 
networks did not possess a formal or legal definition, they were lacking in 
formal hierarchies and as a whole showed only a small degree of formal-
ism. Naturally, some sort of headquarters was also missing, meaning that 
all trading activities had to be coordinated by means other than hierarchy. 
Thus, from an economic perspective, the Hanseatic trade networks were 
not primarily networks of persons, but rather they have to be considered 
as networks of firms.
Figure 2.1: Bureaucratic- hierarchical Organisation vs. Network Organisation
Characteristics of the ideal types of bureaucratic- hierarchical organisation and net-
work organisation.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
Hence, it follows that the organisational form of Hanseatic trade networks 
cannot be judged by the standards of Max Weber’s nineteenth- century-
style model of bureaucratic organisation.92 As a medieval example of the 
modern paradigm of network organisation93, this form indeed fits into the 
92 On the effect of Max Weber’s theories on organisation science see Hauschildt 
1987, pp. 3–21.
93 On the concept of network organisation see e.g. Powell 1990; Galaskiewicz 
1996; Illinitch / D’Aveni / Levin 1996; Osborn / Hagedoorn 1997; Rit-
ter / Gemünden 1998; Thompson 2003; Berghoff / Sydow (eds.) 2007.
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conceptual framework of present- day organisation theory.94 A ‘network 
organisation’ is defined as a loose cooperation of legally and economically 
independent entities. This kind of inter- organisational network possesses 
neither hierarchical levels nor is it controlled by a central authority, so 
that cooperation between network members is thought to happen only by 
voluntary and flexible couplings. Such inter- organisational networks are 
characterised by a minimal degree of formal definition (see Figure 2.1).
This pronounced network pattern of commercial exchange between 
Hansards emerged in the period of demographic expansion before 1300, 
when many towns in the Baltic were founded. Through a simulation ap-
proach – a methodology which can partly compensate for the significant 
lack of written sources on Hanseatic merchants in this early period of the 
Hanse – it can be shown that a slow transmission of information and high 
transportation costs in the Baltic as well as the exclusive trade privileges 
held by Hansards at the markets of London, Novgorod, Bruges and later 
on at Bergen, were all important determinants in the formation of trade 
networks.95
Overlapping Circles of Family and Business
The Hanseatic commercial networks were embedded into a larger social 
network, and cohesion between merchants appears to have been fostered 
by all sorts of other personal ties, a feature that will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3 of this volume. Since much of the Hanseatic trade was 
operated by self- employed merchants and small- scale family businesses, the 
trade network consisted of several dyadic relationships between merchants 
residing all over the Baltic and the Kontore of London, Bruges, Novgorod 
and Bergen. The structure and composition of such commercial networks 
can be determined by researching account books, letters, or, as will be 
shown in Chapter 3, wills. With the exception of wills, there are not many 
written records about Hanseatic merchants’ commercial practices avail-
able. For Johann Pyre from Danzig / Gdańsk, Vicko von Geldersen from 
Hamburg and Hermann and Johann Wittenborg from Lübeck, account 
94 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001; Ewert / Selzer 2010, pp. 43–50.
95 Cf. Ewert / Sunder 2012, pp. 145–149.
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books have been preserved.96 The account book belonging to Johann Pyre, 
for instance, covers a period of approximately 32 years. Moreover, account 
books and letters from the Veckinchusen family give an idea of what a 
Hanseatic merchant’s business life must have been like in the early fifteenth 
century.97 Following these sources, the number of a merchant’s trading 
partners could reach a maximum of 40 during a period of approximately 
30 years, and cooperation with certain partners could last up to 22 years.98 
If a single merchant cooperated with approximately 40 other merchants, 
one could imagine that the total size of commercial networks must have 
been much larger, assuming that the density of the whole network was 
not complete. To a certain extent, it is indeed an analytical drawback that 
sources do not provide enough information to calculate a complete trade 
network’s density or the degree of centrality of each merchant’s position 
within such a network.99 However, it is possible, as it has been shown in the 
case of the Veckinchusen family, to take an ego- centred network approach 
and try to reconstruct only the part of an exchange network that belongs 
to a particular merchant.
The rare source material allows for some general conclusions, at least. 
The total number of a merchant’s trading partners can be divided into (at 
least) three groups: family members, friends and occasional partners. For 
each merchant, the relative position of all trading partners can be plotted 
on circles surrounding his own position in an ego- centred network (see 
Figure 2.2a). Core partnerships have a high frequency of mutual exchange 
and they existed for longer periods of time.
96 Cf. Nirrnheim (ed.) 1895; Mollwo (ed.) 1901; von Slaski 1905; Schmidt- 
Rimpler 1915; Sprandel 1984; Stark 1984; 1985; 1993.
97 Cf. Stieda (ed.) 1921; Irsigler 1985.
98 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 28.
99 Cf. Brass / Burkhardt 1992, pp. 191–215.
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(a) Zones of network members with respect to their classification into family 
members, friends and occasional partners and overlapping personal networks; 
(b) an example of intensification of transactions over time after occasional part-
ners have become friends.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
In theory, family bonds and core partnerships coincide significantly.100 In 
practice, there seems to be strong evidence from the surviving sources that 
core partnerships were often relationships of trade with family members 
and friends. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, for instance, Hilde-
brand Veckinchusen traded from Bruges with some of his friends as well 
as with some of his relatives, including his father- in-law Engelbrecht Witte 
in Riga, his brother Sivert in Lübeck – who stayed in Cologne during the 
period of 1408 to 1419 –, his other brothers Cesar and Hans in Riga and 
Reval / Tallinn, his brothers- in-law Klaus Swarte in Dortmund and Hilde-
brand von Bokel in Dorpat / Tartu, his son- in-law Peter van den Damme in 
Lübeck, and finally his nephews in Lübeck, Reval / Tallinn, Dorpat / Tartu, 
and even in Venice (see Figure 2.3).101
100 Cf. Ping Li 1998.
101 Cf. Irsigler 1985; Stark 1993; Cordes 1998; Kluge 2013.
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Sivert [brother] (not 1408–19)
Drude [sister] with husband and sons










Hildebrand von Bokel [brother-in-law]
Johan [nephew, son of Dedeke]
DORPAT
Graph of the family network of Hildebrand Veckinchusen showing trading relation-
ships and the geographical spread of the Veckinchusen family.
Source: Authors’ own drawing following Irsigler 1985, pp. 75–99 and Stark 
1993, pp. 191–201.
Once established, a commercial network became increasingly dense (see 
Figure 2.2b) as it was a common strategy of merchants to make friends 
out of occasional partners and relatives out of friends. Engelbrecht Witte 
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
39
from Riga, the later father- in-law of Hildebrand Veckinchusen, married 
his daughter into the Veckinchusen family with a clear aim of becoming 
friends with them.102
Coordination of the Network Trade System
The Problem of Coordination
To describe the structure of the late medieval Hanseatic trade system, we 
use the model of network organisation. By choosing a network organi-
sation for their commercial exchange, the merchants of the Hanse were 
able, as shown above, to solve the so- called problem of organisation. An 
additional organisational feature of the network trade system to be inves-
tigated in more detail is the aspect of coordination. Hanseatic merchants 
obviously also had to overcome a coordination problem pertaining to the 
Hanse’s internal trade. In network organisations like the one formed out 
of the multiple business partnerships of Hansards, often problems such as 
free- riding and cheating arise103, especially if a considerably large number 
of members are involved.104 With a lack of written contracts, it seems as 
though it must have been quite easy to participate in a commercial network 
of merchants and to take personal benefits for free. In principle this was 
possible if a merchant refused to contribute substantially to the diffusion 
of goods within the network. A merchant, for example, would sell another 
merchant’s commodities and pocket the profit, without sending the goods 
back for recompensation, as was usually done in reciprocal trade. It is thus 
necessary to analyse the mechanisms by which the cooperation of Hanseatic 
merchants was achieved and by which traders were motivated to gener-
ally play fair, even though there are, of course, also examples of fraud and 
betrayal.105 However, such a fair exchange between merchants within the 
network organisation could be guaranteed by various mechanisms, these 
being reputation, trust and culture, all of which facilitated and stabilised 
cooperation and thus had a coordinating effect within the Hanse’s net-
102 Cf. Irsigler 1985, p. 81; 1989, p. 530.
103 Cf. Tesfatsion 1997, pp. 495–498.
104 Cf. Diekmann 1992.
105 See e.g. von Ranke 1925, p. 250; Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 154.
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work trade system. How these mechanisms worked and why exactly these 
means were of significant importance can be delineated with the help of 
principal- agent-theory. This theory is commonly used to identify difficul-
ties that typically arise in agency relationships. The relationship between a 
principal and a commissioned agent can generally be analysed in terms of 
an agency problem.106
The Agency Problem
The spatial segregation that usually existed between sedentary traders in the 
late Middle Ages always gave rise to an agency problem. Such a problem 
evolved because merchant A, who wanted to sell his goods at a distant 
market, for example, not only had to deal with shipping the goods to this 
market, he also needed somebody on site – a merchant B, for instance – as 
a sales agent. Merchant B would thus become a sort of factor for merchant 
A, representing merchant A in commercial affairs at his home market, which 
for merchant A was a foreign market. Thus, merchants A and B entered 
into an agency relationship, where merchant A took the position of a prin-
cipal, while merchant B serving as his factor took the position of an agent. 
This could be become problematic, especially if merchant A was not able 
to effectively judge the commercial abilities of merchant B, or if he was 
inadequately informed about the personal objectives of merchant B. In ad-
dition, merchant A would also not be able to monitor merchant B’s concrete 
actions, at least not without a great deal of effort and extremely high costs. 
In terms of the principal- agents-theory, for the principal (merchant A), the 
agent (merchant B) possessed ‘hidden characteristics’, ‘hidden information’ 
and ‘hidden intentions’, and his commercial behaviour which can be moni-
tored only insufficiently by merchant A was a kind of ‘hidden action’. As a 
consequence, information was asymmetrically distributed among the two 
merchants – the principal and the agent –, and it would have been rational 
for merchant B to use this information asymmetry to his own advantage 
and to the disadvantage of merchant A, either by lying or by cheating.
106 Cf. Schenk 1992, pp. 337–378; Richter / Bindseil 1995, pp. 132–140; 
Cezanne / Mayer 1998, pp. 1345–1352; Richter / Furubotn 32003; Blum 
2005; Voigt 22009.
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This sort of an agency problem was rather typical of pre- modern trade 
in general, and it was largely fostered by the huge distances that usually 
had to be bridged by medieval and early- modern trade, as well as by a slow 
transmission of information and by a lack of legal institutions capable of 
protecting merchants’ property rights from any offence. In this respect, the 
commercial exchange of Hansards can be considered as a rather typical 
example. Hence, medieval merchants, in order to cope with the agency 
problem, had to develop and deploy institutions through which they could 
protect themselves against all risks that could possibly stem from such 
an asymmetric distribution of information among commercial partners 
operating in distant locations. Both the appearance of risks and potential 
strategies to minimise these risks can be analysed within a game- theoretical 
framework.
A Game-theoretical Analysis of Medieval Commercial Exchange
The basic structure of the agency problem which often appeared in long- 
distance trade is usually modelled as a game. To this end, Avner Greif uses 
what is known as the sequential prisoners’ dilemma game (see Figure 2.4).107 
In this representation of the agency problem, the choices available for the 
two players (merchants) are assumed as simplified binary strategies, and 
utility values attached to each possible outcome of the game represent the 
consequences of the players’ respective decisions. The structure of such 
a one- shot game of exchange is very simple. The player who draws first 
(merchant A as principal) can decide whether or not he wants to employ 
merchant B as an agent. If no commission is awarded to merchant B, 
neither of the players wins or loses anything. In the case of a commission, 
merchant B decides whether he will play fair or whether he wants to betray 
merchant A. If merchant B is playing fair profits are divided between them, 
with lP and (1–l)P denoting the shares of the profit for merchant A and 
merchant B respectively. By defecting, merchant B can keep all profits for 
himself, whereas merchant A would then not only have to bear the costs 
of the transaction, such as the costs associated with the shipping of the 
commodities, but he would also have to book a loss. It should be noted 
107 Cf. Greif 2000, pp. 254–256.
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that any negotiation between principal and agent about the distributional 
scheme of profits is not part of this game.
Figure 2.4: Game- theoretical Model of Medieval Commercial Exchange
A   B
[–C A, P]shipping goods  to B
A B
[0, 0]







One- shot one- sided sequential prisoners’ dilemma game to model bilateral com-
mercial exchange: P = profits of sale; CA = costs of shipping goods to merchant B; 
0 ≤ l ≤ 1 = A’s percentage share of profits.
Source: Authors’ own drawing adopted from Greif 2000, p. 255.
Common assumptions made in such a one- shot game of exchange are that 
both players are anxious to maximise their personal benefit, that the two 
act strategically, that the game is played for a single round only, and finally 
that there is no authority able to help merchant A to react effectively to any 
fraudulent behaviour against himself committed by merchant B. Given these 
assumptions concerning the players’ behaviour, and given these rules of the 
game, the outcome is easily predictable. If merchant B wants to maximise 
his personal benefit, and if he acts strategically, thus having certain expec-
tations about merchant A’s choice of strategy, he will always choose the 
fraud option because by this he will achieve a greater benefit – P instead 
of only (1-l)P – than he would if he acted honestly. Merchant A, who is 
also assumed to act strategically in order to maximise his own benefit by 
trying to minimise the risk of being betrayed by merchant B, will always 
anticipate merchant B’s rational behaviour correctly, and therefore he will 
never commission merchant B. As a consequence, under such restrictive 
behavioural assumptions, there would be neither a transfer nor exchange 
of commodities, and thus no long- distance trade would ever happen. Not 
awarding the commission by merchant A and a fraud by merchant B would 
thus be the respective best responses of each of the players to the rational 
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
43
behaviour they expect of their counterpart. According to Avner Greif such 
an outcome of this game, which is a Nash- equilibrium108, has to be consid-
ered as the ‘The Fundamental Problem of Exchange’.109
Even if these assumptions about the behaviour of the two merchants ap-
pear too restrictive, or even unrealistic, they still help to clearly accentuate 
the necessary constraints of long- distance trade and the agency problem 
associated with it. With such an abstract formulation of the game, based 
on the individual rationale of traders, it is possible to explain the shape of 
the historically observed contractual arrangements in long- distance trade 
which were found to cope with exchange problems. Yet, the existence of 
long- distance trade all across medieval Europe proves, in a way, that it 
was possible to overcome the fundamental problem of exchange. However, 
what conditions for long- distance trade between merchants needed to be 
established? And which institutions were needed to enhance fairness among 
merchants once trade had been established?
Firstly, in order to make the principal (merchant A) even consider award-
ing a commission to a potential agent (merchant B) as an option, the agent 
must signal a sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness to the principal. 
Trust (on the part of the principal) and reputation (on the agent’s part) can 
be regarded as two sides of the same coin, and consequently, trust and repu-
tation are fundamental prerequisites for establishing trade relationships.
Secondly, in the event of a commission being awarded to merchant B by 
merchant A, a well- defined institutional framework would be necessary to 
offer merchant B incentives to act honestly. With the help of such an insti-
tutional framework, sanctions against merchant B can be enforced in the 
event of dishonest or fraudulent behaviour. Enforcement can, for example, 
be achieved by formal contracting, but this would in turn require additional 
institutional regulations, provided by a legal system, for instance, or by 
certain authorities capable of effectively executing any sanctions against 
individual merchants. If the scope of analysis is shifted from bilateral to 
multilateral trade relationships, a setting that existed within the Hanse’s 
108 By definition a Nash- equilibrium is characterised by mutual best answers of 
all players in a game to the strategic choices of all other players. Cf. Kreps 
1990, pp. 28–36.
109 Cf. Greif 2000.
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internal trade networks, it becomes necessary to also consider the problem 
of ‘free- riding’. This would be a much more realistic approach to the his-
tory of systems of trade. Free- riding occurred because individual merchants 
tried to use club goods or even public goods that were provided within a 
network for free. An example of Hanseatic club goods are the Hanse’s 
trade privileges at the Kontore by which only Hanseatic merchants gained 
access to the market, while the standardisation of weights and measures 
is an example of a public good available within the Hanse. To prevent 
traders from free- riding, or to make it more difficult at least, it would be 
necessary to create appropriate institutions through which fair behaviour 
could be rewarded.
Finally, as shown above, the principal potentially evokes the risk of the 
agent’s dishonest and defrauding behaviour.110 For a classification of con-
tractual risks a principal can be faced with, it is crucial to consider when 
exactly contract modalities such as schemes of risk- taking, cost- bearing and 
profit- sharing between the principal and agent are negotiated. The design 
of the incentive structure and the efficiency of the processing of a com-
mercial transaction are directly affected by these modalities, and it makes 
a great difference whether modalities are negotiated ex- ante or ex- post, 
because either way shapes the information asymmetry between principal 
and agent differently. If, on the one hand, the potential agent is to obtain a 
fixed price for a commission business, during negotiations he (in this case 
merchant B) can pretend that his costs are higher than they really are, and 
book the difference as profit while the principal (in this case merchant A) 
would actually have to pay too high a price. Consequently, merchant A 
being the principal would make an ‘adverse selection’ of agents, thereby 
allowing the agent (merchant B) to make use of his better knowledge about 
his personal abilities to extract an information rent. On the other hand, 
if the distribution of profits among commercial partners is only defined 
after the execution of the commission business, as is characteristic for a 
cost- plus-contract, the principal merchant A, with hindsight brought by 
the result of a commissioned sale, cannot be sure that the agent merchant 
B has acted exclusively in his (the principal’s) best interests. If the agent is 
110 For an overview of the different considered types of contractual risk see 
e.g. Ripperger 1998, pp. 63–67; Wolff / Grassmann 42004, cc. 1587–1590.
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fully reimbursed for the costs of executing a commission business, he has 
no reason to keep these costs down. In this case there is also the risk that 
the commissioned sale will be too expensive and, in addition, might not be 
executed in merchant A’s best interest. This contractual risk is referred to 
as ‘moral hazard’. If the principal finally binds himself to a particular agent 
by making specific investments when awarding a commission, the agent can 
also exploit the principal’s commitment to his own advantage, for instance, 
by making higher financial demands to the principal, which would bring 
the agent into a so- called ‘hold- up position’. Again, in the two latter cases, 
the agent would be able to exploit an existing asymmetry of information 
for his personal benefit.
The Viability of Hanseatic Reciprocal Trade
These insights into the agency problem and its repercussions on exchange 
in general as well as the results of the analysis of a simple Greif- type one- 
shot trading game allow us to evaluate the contractual scheme of reciprocal 
trade that was commonly agreed upon by the Hanseatic merchants, and 
that stood at the core of the Hanse’s network organisation of trade. It now 
becomes possible to derive the extent to which this very special contractual 
scheme was prone to the aforementioned contractual risks, and why Han-
sards in most cases were able to minimise or even avoid such risks. Thus, 
the fact that reciprocal trade was a viable solution for Hansards to solve 
the agency problem arising in long- distance trade can also be considered 
as proof of the efficiency of the Hanse’s network organisation of trade. 
Furthermore, such an analytical framework generally paves the way for a 
comparison of different contractual schemes used in medieval and early- 
modern long- distance trade.111 With respect to the internal Hanseatic trade, 
this particularly appears to be a promising approach, although, given the 
aforementioned results concerning the institutional conditions necessary 
for establishing long- distance trade in general, it may initially be rather 
surprising that Hanseatic merchants ever traded with one another in the 
way described above, often without formal contracting.
111 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005, p. 27 f.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
46
Figure 2.5: One- shot Game of Reciprocal Trade
A   B










One- shot one- sided sequential prisoners’ dilemma game to model Hanseatic recipro-
cal trade: P = profits of sale; CA = costs of shipping goods to merchant B.
Source: Authors’ own drawing adopted from Greif 2000, p. 255.
The one- sided one- shot sequential prisoners’ dilemma game discussed 
above, from which Avner Greif derives the immense importance of 
fairness- enhancing institutions for medieval long- distance trade, can be 
easily adopted for the kind of reciprocal trade that was so typical for ex-
change among Hansards (see Figure 2.5). This adoption is a special case 
of Greif’s game of exchange with a parameter value l = 1. In fact, the 
reciprocal trade of two Hansards always encompassed two agency rela-
tionships in parallel, because in most cases each of the two merchants was 
principal as well as agent, but not necessarily at the same time. Without 
any loss of generality, for a further clarification of the incentive structure 
underlying the particular contractual scheme of reciprocal trade, it is suf-
ficient to model only one part of this bilateral agency relationship. And 
even though Hansards commonly entered into reciprocal exchange without 
formal contracting, principal- agent-theory can also be applied to this kind 
of implicit and informal contracting.
The analysis of this simple model of reciprocal trade is straightforward, 
and the message derived from it seems to be more than clear: because profits 
of a sales operation were unevenly distributed between the principal and the 
agent – profits always remained with the principal –, and because the agent 
knew this up- front, the implicit contractual scheme of reciprocal trade at 
first glance seemingly did not produce any incentive for agents to act fairly, 
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which in theory should have made commercial exchange among Hansards 
very difficult, if not impossible.
However, the opposite was true. For their commercial exchange Hanse-
atic merchants predominantly employed reciprocal trade, they stuck with 
it for quite a long time, and cheating does not seem to have been a too 
common strategy among Hansards. In the end, Hanseatic reciprocal trade 
was a viable institution and this viability can be derived from the analysis 
of a reputation- based infinite game112, for which the structure of the two 
players’ decision- making is depicted in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Reputation- based Infinite Game of Reciprocal Trade
A     B










Repeated and reputation- based one- sided prisoners’ dilemma game to model Hanse-
atic reciprocal trade: P = profits of sale; CA = costs of shipping goods to merchant B; 
rB = reputation value pertaining to B’s behaviour.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
In this more realistic scenario, where trading activities can be repeated, some 
of the former assumptions are modified. First of all, a reputation value rB > 0 
is introduced by which a fair behaviour of the agent (merchant B) is awarded, 
whereas an eventual defecting behaviour is penalised by rB < 0. Agents are 
now able to either gain or lose their reputation. However, reputation can 
only be effective as an incentive to fair play within an agency relationship 
if there is a past as well as a future. This is why it is so important to model 
commercial exchange not only as a repeated game, but also as an infinite 
112 A rather similar infinite game is used, for instance, to analyse political conflict 
between social groups in late medieval towns or gift-exchange at late medieval 
courts (cf. Lehmann 2004 and Hirschbiegel / Ewert 2013).
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one. Both principal and agent can only establish a good reputation as busi-
nessmen in the preceding rounds of the game. Likewise, a potential loss of 
reputation can only be a real threat to those defecting or cheating if there are 
future rounds of interaction. Secondly, assuming the infinity of repetitions is 
plausible insofar as in reality both partners did not know when exactly their 
exchange relationship would come to an end. In general, whether a game can 
be repeated infinitely or only for a fixed number of rounds makes a great dif-
ference to its outcome. It can be proved by backward induction, that in finite 
games rational players always choose a non- cooperative strategy in the last 
round of the game, because they know that the game will not be continued 
afterwards. Choosing a cooperative, but for the moment only suboptimal 
strategy, will by definition not pay off in the future.113
In an infinite game, finding the players’ equilibrium strategies is straight-
forward, too, but derivation demands infinite number summation. For the 
agent (merchant B) betrayal of the principal (merchant A) will not pay off 
in the long run. Any sort of defection in the first round when being com-
missioned for a sales operation will result in merchant B no longer being 
considered as a trading partner in all subsequent rounds, even though this 
uncooperative strategy of the agent would earn him a higher level of util-
ity in round one than would fair behaviour. Nevertheless, if a long- term 
rationale is assumed, and such an assumption seems to be plausible with 
regard to medieval merchants, the agent should act fairly. However, since 
this is a general rule only, there is enough room for eventual betrayal. The 
fact that in some historical cases defection or even betrayal of Hansards is 
observed does not generally contradict the rule of fairness and it does not 
automatically imply that this rule has to be rejected. It might be the case 
that some merchants underestimated the long- term consequences of defec-
tion, or they simply thought their own betrayal would not be discovered.
Given that under these circumstances a rational agent in general is sup-
posed to always act fairly, the principal (merchant A) should employ mer-
chant B as an agent. Up- front, however, the principal cannot be sure of both 
the ability and honesty of merchant B. At this point of the game reputation 
comes into play. If merchant B is not a newcomer and thus already has 
113 Cf. Holler / Illing 31996.
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some sort of commercial reputation, this information will certainly facilitate 
merchant A’s decision- making. On the contrary, if there is no reputation 
available, a rational strategy choice of merchant A would be to commence 
a commissioned trade operation by only shipping a small volume of com-
modities at the beginning to test the ability as well as the honesty of mer-
chant B. All in all, by extending the game of trade to an infinite number 
of rounds and by introducing a reputation value the incentive structure of 
the game is altered so that fair exchange in general becomes self- enforcing, 
which in turn is proof of the viability of Hanseatic reciprocal trade as a 
means of commercial exchange.
Non- hierarchical Means of Coordination
To coordinate commercial exchange between Hansards based on reciprocal 
trade non- hierarchical means were necessary. With reputation, trust and 
a common culture, mechanisms can be identified that helped to overcome 
existing disincentives. Through these non- hierarchical means of coordina-
tion it was possible for the Hansards to exchange their commodities within 
the Hanseatic network organisation of trade, and in most cases exchange 
was also handled in a fair manner.
First of all, the most effective means of coordination within the Han-
seatic network organisation surely was the reputation mechanism.114 To 
have an excellent reputation, or at least to not lose this reputation, was 
important for medieval and early- modern merchants in general, not only for 
Hanseatic merchants. However, in the Hanseatic world, a commercial set-
ting dominated by individual merchants and small- size firms, a setting with 
relatively small volumes of trade, little financial capital available and weak 
juridical institutions, reputation was obviously of outstanding importance 
to make fair commercial exchange possible. Hanseatic merchants made use 
of their reputation as businessmen as a kind of social capital, to use Pierre 
Bourdieu’s term. Since somebody who cheated not only had to fear the 
loss of a particular business contact, but of all his business contacts, this can 
be called a multilateral reputation mechanism, which is a well-established 
114 See e.g. Staber 2000, pp. 69–71; MacLeod 2007.
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fact in the economic research into medieval trade.115 Having a high reputa-
tion was therefore essential to all merchants participating in the Hanse’s 
commercial networks, and the desire to maintain it was a primary incentive 
to act fairly, because cheating not only damaged the relationship with the 
betrayed partner, it also resulted in a loss of access to the whole network, 
and thus undermined all possible partnerships for the future. Moreover, the 
loss of reputation of individual merchants was in fact made public in the 
Hanseatic world, so such a threat was very real. Hanseatic societies and 
other institutions that presented opportunities for Hansards to socialise 
such as the Zirkelgesellschaft (‘society of the circle’)116 of Lübeck or the 
Artushöfe (‘King Arthur courts’)117 in the Baltic area contributed greatly to 
the multilateral self- enforcement of fairness through reputation, because 
starting from there information on the reputation of other network mem-
bers was distributed across the whole network. There is plenty of evidence, 
for example, that the names of those who were no longer allowed to share 
the Hanse’s privileges in Bruges were published in the Artushof of Danzig / 
Gdańsk.118 In contrast to exchange- related information that would have to 
be transmitted quickly in order to monitor particular trade operations, any 
information regarding the merchants’ reputation only needed to be somehow 
announced to prevent fraud among merchants in the future. The various 
forms of Hanseatic conviviality should therefore not just be considered as a 
social phenomenon of the late Middle Ages from a cultural- historical point 
of view, because as information exchanges these institutions proved to be 
extremely instrumental in giving the Hanse’s network organisation of trade a 
strong cohesion.119 As a result, the multilateral reputation mechanism helped 
the Hansards to solve the problems of free- riding and controlling agents and 
it made reciprocal trade a viable and self- enforcing mode of commercial 
exchange inside the Hanse.
However, the multilateral reputation mechanism was not the sole non- 
hierarchical means that helped to coordinate commercial exchange within 
115 Cf. Greif 1989; 1992, p. 130; 1993, pp. 531–535; Streb 2004.
116 Cf. Dünnebeil 1996.
117 Cf. Selzer 1996.
118 Cf. Selzer 1996, p. 105.
119 Cf. Selzer 2003b, pp. 84 and 96 f.
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the Hanse’s network organisation of trade. There is a long scholarly debate 
on alternatives to the classical coordination mechanisms such as the price on 
markets or the hierarchy within organisations, and one result of this debate 
is that under certain conditions trust can be regarded as an equally effective 
and efficient coordination instrument.120 In particular, trust is important 
for the coordination within a network organisation because trust can com-
pensate for the lack of control by hierarchical means. This is why network 
organisations are often called ‘total trust’ organisations, as opposed to ‘zero 
trust’ hierarchical- bureaucratic organisations.121 In a network organisation 
all actors have to trust each other. This can be applied to the principle of 
Hanseatic reciprocal trade and the agency problem resulting from the im-
plicit contractual scheme of this form of exchange. The principal has to trust 
in the honesty and the ability of the agent to carry out the commission in 
the principal’s interest. Likewise, the agent has to trust in the goodwill of 
the principal, and he has to trust that the principal will act in the same way 
when being an agent himself. In both cases, the reputation an actor gains 
can facilitate the earning of trust. Yet, a remnant of insecurity remains, the 
overcoming of which is considered as trust. Of course, it took time for trust 
between two merchants to develop, but once trust had been established, 
a reciprocal partnership was of great economic value for both sides. This 
also explains why some of the reciprocal partnerships between Hansards 
existed for such a long time.122 Following the reputation- based infinite game 
of reciprocal trade discussed above, a clever and utility- maximising strategy 
for both principal and agent within a partnership would be to mutually 
build up trust by only exchanging small volumes of commodities at the very 
beginning, and then to increase these volumes as long as each participant 
behaves fairly. This kind of step by step approach, which in game theory is 
called ‘Tit- for-Tat’123, can be identified, for instance, in the growing volumes 
of transactions between Hildebrand Veckinchusen and Gerwin Maschede. 
120 See on this debate and the effects of trust in more detail Ripperger 1998; 
Fiedler 2001. See also Bachmann 2000, pp. 110–114; Child 2001; Tom-
kins 2001; Reed 2001; Grey / Garsten 2001.
121 Cf. Reed 2001, p. 203. See also Figure 2.1 above.
122 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001, pp. 150–154.
123 Cf. Axelrod 1984; Håkansson / Sharma 1996, p. 116 f.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
52
This is an instructive example of how a bond of trust between Hanseatic 
merchants was formed over time.124 Very often, partners also tried to tighten 
such trade relationships by mutual gift- giving.125
Finally, common culture and commonly shared values are discussed in 
the literature as effective mechanisms of coordination.126 The spread of 
common values across the Baltic and the creation of a Hanseatic cultural 
identity were more or less a by- product of migration. The common Lower 
German language fostered a tight bond between Hanseatic merchants.127 
Common culture, commonly shared values and common standards were 
effective at several levels within the Hanseatic network organisation of 
trade. This becomes evident at the family level, in other words the area of 
the core trade relationships of Hanseatic merchants. Cheating or betray-
ing a family member or a friend not only meant losing a particular mutual 
transaction relationship, it was also a likely reason to be excluded from 
the entire network. The impact of a common culture can also be identified 
in cases of contact with foreign merchants. It has been demonstrated more 
than once that cultural identity and economic interests within the Hanseatic 
network organisation of trade were so strongly interwoven that foreign 
merchants simply had no other choice than to adopt Hanseatic culture if 
they wanted to be integrated on a lasting basis into the more or less closed 
circle of Hansards.128 The common cultural orientation among Hansards 
was also reflected in legal customs. This in turn was extremely supportive of 
any trade on a reciprocal basis in that it demanded that both sides involved 
in a commercial transaction treated the partner’s goods with exactly the 
same care and attention that they would have exercised with regard to their 
own affairs. The formula to synem besten to verkopen (“to sell something 
for his best interest”) can be found again and again in various sources.129 
Whoever neglected to sell the goods and commodities with which he was 
124 Cf. Stark 1985.
125 See for examples from Riga, Königsberg /Kaliningrad, Oslo and Rostock 
Stein 1898, pp. 89–91, Nr. 10, and pp. 93–97, Nr. 13, and p. 114, Nr. 21; 
Stark 1984, p. 141; Thierfelder 1958, p. 209.
126 Cf. Jones 1983; Wilkens / Ouchi 1983; Greif 1994; Ewert 1998, p. 65 f.
127 Cf. de Boer / Gleba / Holbach (eds.) 2001.
128 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 156 f.
129 Cf. Ebel 1957, p. 84.
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entrusted with the same amount of care as if they had been his own and, 
thus, to the best advantage of his partner, not only had to fear legal action, 
but also had to be aware of losing his reputation.
An Economic Assessment of the Hanse’s  
Network Organisation of Trade
Individual Economic Benefits
It was shown in the previously discussed game- theoretical analysis that 
reciprocal trade can in fact be considered as a viable commercial institu-
tion for the Hansards. Therefore, since the Hanse’s network organisa-
tion of trade was primarily built upon reciprocal trade, this institutional 
arrangement itself also proved to be viable, even more so because the 
Hansards were relying on non- hierarchical means such as reputation, trust 
and shared common values to coordinate individual commercial interests 
and to enforce fairness among them. Moreover, using these networks for 
commercial purposes was certainly beneficial for Hanseatic merchants, 
even though in the long run this institutional arrangement also had some 
ambiguous consequences for the competiveness of the Hanse as a whole, 
a point that will be elaborated in more detail below in Chapter 6 of this 
book. At first, ‘networking’ naturally also produced many costs instead 
of reducing them. Since merchants were engaged in medium- term or even 
long- term partnerships, they had to account for the opportunity costs 
that were due to these individual commitments. Common costs could be 
produced because single members of a commercial network could attempt 
to take the network services for free and to externalise private costs to 
the network community. So, why did Hanseatic merchants nevertheless 
prefer this pattern of trade and vigorously stuck to it until way into the 
sixteenth century? Participation in a commercial network for each of them 
must have generated personal profits, at least in the long run, otherwise 
there would not have been any incentive for participation at all. Such 
personal benefits were gained because with the network organisation of 
trade costs related to transaction as well as organisation costs were saved 
and because contractual risks could be minimised.
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Cost Savings
There are good theoretical reasons to believe that choosing a network struc-
ture for trade significantly reduced the costs of commercial exchange, and 
transaction costs considerations help to clarify where exactly costs could 
be saved or be even avoided. Individual level benefits of networking can 
be derived from the transaction costs approach, which was developed by 
Ronald H. Coase and Oliver E. Williamson.130 The role that particular 
institutions of trade played for the reduction of transaction costs, and thus 
the enhancement of trade and economic growth in medieval Europe, has 
been analysed in numerous studies, for example by Douglass C. North and 
Avner Greif.131 These savings can be split into reductions of transaction, 
information and organisation costs.
Probably the best- known benefit of a network structure is its ability to 
significantly decrease transaction costs. This cost reduction mainly stemmed 
from network members acting in accordance with the same set of norms, 
even more so because many of them were members of the same family or 
considered each other as friends. Mutual commercial transactions were 
facilitated within such a setting being based on kinship and friendship. 
Stable sets of partnerships also reduced transaction costs because merchants 
already knew what could be expected from a particular trading partner. 
Due to the commercial networks’ core principle of construction, legally in-
dependent merchants had to cooperate voluntarily. In general, each partner 
had the same interests and because of this congruence they could trust each 
other’s determination to keep to the partnership.
A second block of costs to be considered contains all costs arising from 
collecting and processing information. Being a member of a network helped 
Hanseatic merchants to find partners in whom they could trust. The net-
work provided them with all the necessary information on the reputation 
of a potential trading partner, either by its kinship character or its social 
institutions. Not only the risk of ‘adverse selection’, that is, choosing the 
wrong trading partner, was minimised. With networks based on reciprocal 
130 Cf. Coase 1937; 1984; Williamson 1979.
131 Cf. North 1981; 1985; 1990; 1993; Greif 2000; 2002; 2006. See on this 
also Munro 2001.
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trade, the costs of market information could also be reduced. In long- term 
partnerships, the information about market conditions in distant places 
where a partner sold a trader’s goods did not necessarily have to be gath-
ered by the sending merchant himself. As shown above, because of the 
multilateral reputation mechanism, the partner who handled the sale had 
strong incentives to do so in the best interest of the sender. Therefore, it 
was sufficient if only the seller had the relevant information at his disposal.
A decrease in the costs of organisation was probably the biggest profit 
that could be made from operating in commercial networks. The networks’ 
structural element of employing each other mutually as commercial agents 
implied that many of the core functions of trade systems could simply be 
delegated to a trading partner. As a consequence, Hanseatic businesses 
remained relatively small and simply organised. This enabled merchants to 
save most of the costs which otherwise would have been spent on hierarchi-
cal and extensive control of commercial transactions. Moreover, since the 
transmission of information was slow due to the immense geographical ex-
tent that had to be bridged by trade in the Baltic and the North Sea, instruct-
ing and controlling employed commercial agents in distant market places 
on a regular basis was almost impossible. By deploying trading partners as 
agents instead, transactions could be handled much more easily and much 
more safely. Due to a potential threat to their reputation if they acted oth-
erwise, both partners acted primarily in the other partner’s interest. Such a 
desirable, fairly responsible conduct of merchants was also enforced by the 
common judicial practice within the Hanse. In lawsuits concerning trading 
activities, arbitration usually pointed to the principle that each party had to 
act in such a manner that also its own interest would have been guaranteed. 
Therefore, a backup of commercial transactions by written contracts was 
unnecessary in most cases.
The Minimisation of Contractual Risks
Efficient coordination and cooperation within the (in principle) loose and 
very flexible structure of the Hanse’s network organisation of trade could 
be guaranteed by a multilateral reputation mechanism, by mutual trust and 
a common cultural orientation. With reciprocal trade embedded in their 
network trade structure, the Hanseatic merchants were even able to mini-
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mise any existing contractual risks.132 Since the agent was always allowed to 
subtract all the expenses he made in the operation of a sale, reciprocal trade 
has to be considered as a specific form of an implicit cost- plus-contract. 
It can be shown that for the Hanseatic merchants who committed to such 
an implicit and informal contractual scheme, networking was an efficient 
solution to cope successfully with the contractual risks known as ‘moral 
hazard’, ‘adverse selection’ and ‘hold- up’.133
The main feature commonly attributed to a cost- plus-contract is moral 
hazard. It was possible to minimise this contractual risk with the help of the 
multilateral reputation mechanism and a general policy of personal respon-
sibility. Irresponsible action or cheating by the agent would then cause him 
to lose his reputation. However, because it was clear from the outset that 
only the principal benefited from the sales profit of a specific commercial 
transaction, and that the distribution of profits between principal and agent 
was effectively decided prior to awarding the commission, reciprocal trade 
also incorporated elements of a fixed- price-contract to a certain extent. This 
is why it was also necessary to keep the risk of adverse selection as small 
as possible. As the reputation and trustworthiness of individual Hanseatic 
merchants was commonly made public across the trade network, selecting a 
‘wrong’ agent was very unlikely, at least in the long term. Signalling played 
also an important role. This is very well documented in surviving letters 
of Hanseatic merchants encompassing lists of prices by which a trading 
partner attempted to prove his commercial skills to the principal along with 
his profound knowledge about what was going on in his home market.134
Finally, by shipping his own goods to the trading partner a merchant 
always made a so- called specific investment. He bound himself, at least for 
this one commercial transaction, to the recipient of the goods, who was, as 
a matter of fact, then in a hold- up position.135 To a great extent, the mul-
tilateral reputation mechanism within the Hanse’s network organisation 
132 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005, pp. 27–29.
133 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 151 f.; 2005, p. 28; Ewert / Selzer 2010, p. 55 
and p. 58 f.
134 Cf. Stark 1993, p.  143; Afflerbach 1993, p.  193; Lindemann 1978, 
p. 21 f.
135 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005, p. 28.
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of trade prevented this position from being exploited by the agent to the 
disadvantage of the principal, so that it rarely resulted in an actual hold- up. 
A merchant who attempted to cheat his trading partner not only had to fear 
being permanently excluded from the trade network; by cheating he first 
and foremost risked losing his own goods which were, following the prin-
ciple of reciprocal exchange, in the hands of his trading partner and thus 
provided this trading partner with a form of security. An example of such 
an hold- up is the behaviour of Hildebrand Veckinchusen, who demanded 
a monetary compensation from Engelbrecht Witte for the agent services he 
had provided to his father- in-law for so many years at the Bruges market, 
after he had found out that he was not remembered in Engelbrecht Witte’s 
will.136
Concluding Remarks
It would therefore be utterly misleading to conclude that the merchants of 
the Hanse operated in a very modern style simply because the principle of 
network organisation in organisation science literature is often assumed to 
be the most progressive organisational mode to date. It nevertheless should 
have become obvious due to this analysis that categories such as ‘modern’ or 
‘backward’ in general fail to capture the relevant characteristics of histori-
cal institutional arrangements. The business practice of the late medieval 
Hanseatic merchants was neither ‘backward’ nor was it already ‘modern’. 
It was simply an effective as well as an efficient and therefore viable insti-
tutional arrangement for long- distance trade that on top of all that enabled 
all merchants to make individual profits, because with it transaction and 
organisation costs could be kept at a low level and contractual risk could 
be effectively minimised.
136 Cf. Afflerbach 1993, p. 93 f.; Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 154.
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Chapter 3 
A ‘Small World’ – Reconstruction and 
Meaning of the Hansards’ Social Networks
The objective of this chapter is to further elaborate on various sorts of 
personal relationships between the merchants of the Hanse. Kinship, friend-
ship and social proximity were the typical ingredients of Hanseatic social 
networks, which in turn supported trade in quite a substantial manner by 
connecting merchants with potential trading partners and providing them 
with business opportunities and all kinds of information. Therefore, in this 
chapter we will present an overview of the appearance of social networks 
in the Hanseatic world during the late Middle Ages and discuss the meth-
ods that can be used to reconstruct them. After a brief introduction to the 
sociological approach of network analysis, several examples are given of 
social networks that emerged in Hanseatic regions. These cases prove how 
such late medieval social networks can still be grasped by modern histori-
ography, and they also focus on the availability and validity of the sources 
that are used to reconstruct social networks.
Network Analysis as a Method to Describe Social Structure
The Theoretical Concept of Social Networks
An understanding of the basic concepts underlying the network analysis ap-
proach is fundamental to comprehend the formation and meaning of social 
networks within the Hanse.137 Similarly to ‘system’ and ‘social capital’, the 
term ‘network’ is very popular and is widely used as ‘social network’ in the 
social sciences and in history. Because of this popularity it appears to be 
a well- defined and clear concept, even though a broad range of meanings 
137 For an introduction to social network analysis see e.g. Berkowitz 1982; 
Burt 1982; Pappi (ed.) 1987; Wellman / Berkowitz (eds.) 1988; Wasser-
mann / Faust 1994; Wassermann / Galaskiewicz (eds.) 1994; Carring-
ton / Scott / Wassermann (eds.) 2005; Trappmann / Hummell / Sodeur 
2005; Jansen 2006; Scott 32013.
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are attributed to it. But what exactly is a social network? How can it be 
described? Which methods can be used to analyse it?
The social network approach claims to be both a theoretical and meth-
odological concept. Social network theory deals with the definition and 
meaning of networks as specific social configurations. Network methodol-
ogy develops techniques and provides tools for the analysis of such units. 
First of all, a network in the exact sense of the word is a complex system of 
crossing lines.138 Within a social network these crossing ‘lines’ are relation-
ships because they consist of “a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or 
relations defined on them.”139 Social networks are nonetheless distinct from 
groups and organisations, although these two forms could be described in 
much the same way. However, the way in which both membership and 
relationship are defined makes the difference. An organisation has formal 
criteria of membership, whereas social networks do not. In organisations, 
relationships between members are formally defined, but in social networks, 
relationships are informal. However, it is not this informality alone that 
distinguishes social networks from other social units. In groups all members 
interact with everyone else, whereas in social networks, interaction can be 
indirect and mediated by other members.
The beginning of social network analysis as a defined approach of social 
sciences only dates back to the 1970s, and it is marked by an increasing 
number of studies on modern networks and on the methodology of net-
work analysis.140 However, social network analysis follows the traditions 
of sociometric research and social anthropology, and the understanding 
of such networks is based on sociological concepts such as social relation-
ships, closeness and interdependence. These sociological concepts were 
formulated much earlier in the writings of Max Weber, Georg Simmel and 
George C. Homans. For the historical sciences, Wolfgang Reinhard’s141 
study on the entanglement of Roman city elites in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries was a sort of milestone, as it was the first time that the 
138 Cf. Pappi 1987, p. 12.
139 Wassermann / Faust 1994, p. 20.
140 Cf. Holland / Leinhardt 1970; 1979; Laumann / Pappi 1973; 1976; Hum-
mell / Ziegler 1977.
141 Cf. Reinhard 1979.
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methodology and potential of social network analysis were presented in the 
context of a historiographical study. In recent years, along with a growing 
interest of historians in applying both the concept of social networks and 
the methodology of social network analysis to historical cases, a vivid dis-
cussion evolved on the significance of social networks in historical contexts 
on the one hand and on the practicability of a structural analysis of histori-
cal network data using formal methods and graphical tools on the other.142
A Brief Sketch of the Methodology of Social Network Analysis
With the formation of social network theory, formal methods to describe 
the structure of networks were introduced into sociological research.143 
These techniques were derived from graph theory, group theory and matrix 
algebra. A set of relationships of a certain number of persons is depicted 
in a graph. The graph’s nodes represent individuals and its edges represent 
the relations found between them.144 Two structural measures are typically 
calculated from such a mathematical (and graphical) representation of a 
network. The network’s overall density is the actual relationships’ (edges) 
share of the number of all relations possible.145 The more potential con-
nections there are between individuals, the more dense the network is. 
Centrality measures how easy it is for a network member to get in contact 
with other participants in the network. Path distances within the network 
are commonly used for this.146 For example, a person who has personal 
relationships with every other member would obtain the highest possible 
degree of centrality because she/he can reach everyone else directly. Since 
networks are often constructed using sampling and survey techniques in so-
ciological research, problems of measurement error, validity and reliability 
142 Cf. Erickson 1997; Wetherell 1998; Gould 2003; Barkhoff / Böhme / 
Riou (eds.) 2004; Gorissen 2006; Boyer 2008; Neurath 2008; Neu-
rath / Krempel 2008; Reitmeyer / Marx 2010; Selzer / Ewert 2010; 
Stark 2010; Düring / Stark 2011; Lemercier 2012; Düring 2013; Dü-
ring / von Keyserlingk 2015.
143 A very good overview of the techniques used in social network analysis can 
be found in Trezzini 1998.
144 Cf. Kappelhoff 1987.
145 Cf. Pappi 1987, p. 28.
146 Cf. Freeman 1978/79, pp. 215–239; Pappi 1987, pp. 25–36.
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of the data do arise. The analysis of historical social networks is naturally 
restricted to those pieces of social structure documented in the surviving 
sources. Therefore, shortcomings of the data may also cause difficulties. As 
re- sampling of new data is impossible in historical research, the problems 
that arise because of limited or biased data can only be overcome with care-
ful interpretation. In applying the network concept to historical networks, 
it is important to know the following basic differentiations concerning the 
scope of and the methodology made within social network analysis.
A structural analysis can be performed for either a global or an ego- 
centred network.147 For complete or global networks, an excellent source 
material would be needed – a source or sources that reveal all extant in-
formal relationships. Criteria for differentiating between the members of 
a network and non- members would have to be defined as well. Even in 
the application to modern networks, neither the source problem nor the 
problem of membership definition can be solved satisfactorily. Instead, 
ego- centred networks are often analysed. Such an ego- centred or personal 
network comprises only the set of relationships that a certain person has. 
Given the rather scattered information on the personal relationships of 
merchants, focussing on ego- centred networks seems to be a reasonable 
approach to Hanseatic commercial exchange networks.
Networks can also be reconstructed on the empirical basis of either a 
single type of relationship or multiple sorts of personal connections.148 A 
network that is based on just one type of relationship is called a one- mode 
network. However, when a person possesses relationships of different types 
to other individuals, it is called a two- mode or a multi- mode network. Both 
approaches can also describe historical, informal social structures. One ex-
ample of a one- mode network is the common membership of Hansards in 
the towns’ official societies or fraternities, which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. Kinship and commercial exchange relationships, for instance, 
would constitute a two- mode network. Two- mode networks are in a sense 
‘real’ networks because, following the definition of social networks, several 
distinct layers of social structure are interwoven in them.
147 Cf. Trezzini 1998, p. 380.
148 Cf. Trezzini 1998, p. 379 f.
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Finally, closeness within a social network can vary depending on whether 
the measurement of closeness is relation- based or position- based.149 In a 
relation- based approach, closeness of network members is thought of as 
cohesiveness. Individuals are close to each other because they are located 
near to each other within the network and because they have intensive 
personal contact. This method can be used for identifying and describing 
the social networks of Hansards as far as opportunities to get in contact, ei-
ther personally or by letter, are analysed. In contrast, with a position- based 
approach, people are connected through structurally equivalent positions 
within a social network, not by personal contact. Hence, closeness by this 
definition is not a result of personal relationship, it would stem exclusively 
from structural equivalence. By this approach social roles are identified. 
However, this approach goes beyond the original idea of a social network 
being based on social contact. The position- based approach nevertheless 
can be used to analyse councillors and mayors of different Hanse towns, for 
instance, but even these people were connected by personal relationships, 
too, as will be seen below.
Social Networks within the Hanse – Examples and 
Corresponding Sources
Conditions of the Emerging Networks – Population Growth 
and Migration
The non- scientific but popular view of medieval society usually depicts 
it as very rigid and nearly immobile. This interpretation, however, is an 
over- simplification because even in the high and late Middle Ages, social 
structure was a flexible and ever- changing matter. Such a prejudice ignores 
the huge demographic and social dynamics that unfolded all across Eu-
rope, especially from the eleventh century onwards. A constant increase in 
population, a huge expansion of arable land, the foundation of hundreds 
of towns and a sustained economic growth resulting from this formed the 
socio- economic background of what was a significant societal take- off in 
the high Middle Ages. A further consequence of this process was the re- 
establishment of long- distance trade, an issue that, following the seminal 
149 Cf. Trezzini 1998, p. 382 f.; Kappelhoff 1987, pp. 39–41.
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analysis of Robert S. Lopez, is referred to as the ‘Commercial Revolution 
of the Middle Ages’.150 This general economic take- off initially occurred in 
West Europe and the Mediterranean, but it eventually spread over most 
of the continent and reached the Baltic within the first half of the twelfth 
century. Both the political integration of the Baltic regions and the conver-
sion to Christianity of the Slavic people were important prerequisites to 
the further economic development of the sparsely populated coastal areas 
and their hinterland. Numerous villages and towns were then founded 
along the Baltic coast between Lübeck and Reval / Tallinn until the late 
thirteenth century.
For people from the more densely populated areas in West Europe, the 
new settlements in the Baltic revealed much better economic opportuni-
ties and offered migrants the chance to begin a new life. Count Adolf II of 
Holsatia151 founded Lübeck in 1143 by using the name and a castle of a 
long existing Slavic settlement. This was, in many respects, the very model 
of Christian expansion into the coastal areas of the Baltic. More impor-
tantly, along with the foundation of Lübeck, the West European concept of 
making the classic medieval town a law- protected permanent market was 
transferred to the Baltic region. Based on this model, within only a century 
almost every important Hanse town along or near the southern Baltic shore 
had been founded or had received municipal law – Riga (1201), Rostock 
(1218), Danzig / Gdańsk (1224), Wismar (1229), Stralsund (1234), Elbing / 
Elbląg (1237), Stettin / Szczecin 1243, Greifswald (1250) and Königsberg / 
Kaliningrad (1255).152 The first western people who settled in Lübeck were 
of Rhinelandian, Westphalian and Saxon origins. Most of the other towns 
along the Baltic coast were founded according to the same or a fairly simi-
lar pattern. The new arrivals joined an already settled Slavic population. 
The western geographic origin of settlers can be traced by their surnames. 
In these times surnames were not yet of a character specific to the fami-
ly bearing it. In their new places of residence, western immigrants were 
150 Cf. Lopez 1971.
151 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, pp. 27–30.
152 And of course also the re- establishment of the newly founded town of Lübeck 
in 1158/9 by the Saxon Duke Henry the Lion, after it had been destroyed by 
a fire. Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 34.
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typically marked by their respective place of origin. A well- known family 
of municipal councillors in Lübeck, for instance, was named Warendorp, 
which was the contemporary name of a Westphalian town nowadays named 
‘Warendorf’. Similarly, in Thorn / Toruń there was a councillors’ family 
with the surname von Soest (“of Soest”, also a town in Westphalia).
Kinship Networks among Hansards
Population growth, eastern- bound migration and settlement were vital for 
the emergence of social networks among the Hansards. Another aspect of 
western immigration to the Baltic – a region that would become the realm of 
the Hanse – was its endurance for several generations. This migration pro-
cess was even prolonged as members of following generations also headed 
northeast, which likely promoted the foundation of many subsidiary towns. 
Therefore places like Wismar, Rostock or Stralsund were not only con-
nected to their hometown Lübeck by sharing a common municipal law, but 
also because of the multiple inter- town kinship bonds that had emerged as a 
by- product of continued eastern- bound out- migration. The continuance of 
migration also meant that after some time migrants’ relatives would follow 
them to their new places of residence in the Baltic. Additionally, some of 
the migrants or their children would also return to their western places of 
origin, if, for instance, the expectations of increasing personal wealth and 
improving social status there exceeded the opportunities in Baltic towns. In 
fact, the populations of those towns that would later become members of 
the Hanse were already interrelated through a wide range of family bonds 
long before the Hanseatic League emerged as an association of cities and 
towns. Thus, some citizens from Danzig / Gdańsk and Hamburg very cor-
rectly claimed to have relations in many other Hanse towns. Genealogical 
research, which is often not taken seriously enough, provides important and 
lucid insights into this kinship- based interweaving of Hanseatic town popu-
lations, which is very pertinent to the issue of Hanseatic social networks.
Kinship networks inside the Hanse can also be analysed by way of con-
sidering the kinship relations of citizens from the older western towns in-
stead of focusing solely on the relationships of citizens in the new Baltic 
settlements. Hereditary matters are a good source for pinpointing this. 
Quite often, the emigrants’ relatives still living in the western towns of 
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origin were named as their heirs. A particularly good example of this was 
the council of the Westphalian town of Soest, which repeatedly received let-
ters called Toversichtsbriefe (‘letters of confidence’) from Baltic towns, an-
nouncing wills of former emigrants in favour of Soest citizens. These letters 
were collected and can be used as a graphic representation of the kinship 
bonds by which many citizens of Soest were connected to citizens of other 
Hanse towns. The resultant graph – which is printed in the publication of 
Emil Dösseler – has a radial appearance with edges that represent kinship 
relations leading from Soest to almost all the Hanse towns in the Baltic.153
An illustrative and well- documented example of a wide- reaching Han-
seatic kinship network is the family named Plescow.154 Although the last 
name refers to the town of Pleskau / Pskov in North Russia and thus sug-
gests a family of Russian origin, it seems much more likely that the family 
originally came from Visby on the Swedish island of Gotland, where it can 
be proved that the earliest family members had lived. In this particular case, 
Plescow as a surname does not indicate the family’s origin but the place 
where family members traded. A branch of the family then emigrated from 
Visby to Lübeck by the end of the thirteenth century. In Lübeck as well as 
in Visby, the Plescow family was part of the local ruling class. As a result, 
in both towns, male members of the family repeatedly held the official 
duty of a councillor or a mayor. Among them was the mayor of Lübeck, 
Jordan Plescow, one of the most prominent Hanse politicians, who died in 
1425. Many additional kinship bonds with families in other Baltic towns 
were established, mainly through marriage, with councillor’s families in 
Stockholm for example.
The network effect on the political organisation of the Hanse should be 
considered first, before turning to specific kinship- based relations between 
Hansards and their meaning to both structure and organisation of trade. 
Kinship was a natural vehicle to unite councillors and mayors from various 
Hanse towns and cities, at least in particular regions of the Hanse’s realm.155 
A good example of such a personal kinship- based political network is that 
153 Cf. Dösseler (ed.) 1969; Dösseler 1988.
154 Cf. Wiegandt 1988.
155 Cf. Fahlbusch 2005.
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of Arnd Sudermann, who was mayor of Dortmund and died in 1473.156 
His family ties were a basis for his political bonds. Like many other fami-
lies in Westphalia, the Sudermann family had established a family branch 
in Thorn / Toruń in which close connections existed. Although this had 
already happened a generation earlier, Arnd Sudermann and other family 
members in Dortmund as well as in Thorn / Toruń still felt as though they 
were part of the same clan. Apart from that, the local political network of 
Arnd Sudermann also covered his co- mayor Christoph Hengstenberg, who 
was his brother- in-law. Hengstenberg also had some relatives in Prussia, 
so beside his own relationships Sudermann had through Hengstenberg a 
second tie between Dortmund and the eastern Hanse towns which could 
easily be activated via his brother- in-law Hengstenberg if it was needed. A 
third dimension of network structure is the regional aspect of kinship- based 
relationships, since people from other towns in Westphalia and the Rhine-
land were also bound to the Sudermann family. Both Arnd Sudermann’s 
sister and his daughter were each married to mayors of the town of Soest. 
Moreover, by that time his cousin Heinrich was a councillor several times 
as well as a mayor in the city of Cologne.
It is likely that since these local politicians were commissioned to rep-
resent their respective hometowns at the diets of the Hanse in Lübeck, a 
group of persons who met for political talks, they could rely on somehow 
firm kinship bonds. This must have had a lasting impact on Hanseatic 
politics and diplomacy. The kinship- based political networks worked as a 
sort of mediating instance. This can explain Hanseatic decision- making and 
enforcement better than before. For a long time, the Hanse was predomi-
nantly considered a hierarchical- bureaucratic organisation, economically 
as well as politically. Political decisions were commonly assumed to have 
been made at the annual Hanse diet in a quasi- parliamentary procedure. 
In contrast, recent studies like that of Dietrich W. Poeck demonstrate the 
importance of family bonds and other informal connections between the 
members of the leading groups of Hanse towns for the political structure of 
the Hanse to persist. More precisely, these politicians were the ones who, 
because of their mutual kinship- based connections, negotiated internal set-
156 Cf. Fahlbusch 2002, p. 47 f.; 1994.
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tlements between towns and were able to get even unpopular compromises 
accepted in their hometowns. Those who formed the Hanseatic leading 
group by sticking together because of family ties became the core of the 
Hanseatic political system. Interestingly enough, this group was referred 
to by contemporaries of the sixteenth century as de herre der Hense (“the 
masters of the Hanse”).157
Wills as a Source of Network Reconstruction – the Case of Lübeck
Wills have been used only during the last two decades as important sources 
of social and economic history. Prior to that time, it fell to legal histori-
ans to analyse this sort of documents. From a socio- historical perspective, 
wills offer insights into peoples’ belief and piety, but they can also answer 
many other questions regarding the history of everyday life. Compared to 
other types of sources of the history of the Hanse, wills have survived in 
large numbers. By far the biggest German late medieval corpus consists of 
approximately 6,400 wills from Lübeck, all originating from before the 
year 1500.158 Their serial character makes these documents attractive to 
historians. Men and women living in Lübeck – rich merchants, craftsmen, 
but also servants – decreed in their wills how their property was to be 
handled after their death. Consequently, wills reveal the testators’ social 
connections, especially when they include relatives living in distant places, 
former trading partners or illegitimate children. Because of such documents, 
it was possible, for instance, to reconstruct the commercial relationships 
of a group of merchants from Lübeck and Stockholm in 1350, the year of 
the Black Death.159
Additionally, another group of people appears in almost every known 
will from Lübeck. These are the executors of wills who were called vor-
mund (“guardian”) or, in Latin, provisor. Being chosen to execute a will 
157 Cf. Poeck 2002; 2010.
158 A good overview of the surviving archival material can be found in von 
Brandt 1979. Of the more recent studies see for Hamburg, Cologne, Lü-
neburg, Lübeck and Stralsund Riethmüller 1994; Klosterberg 1995; 
Mosler- Christoph 1998; Weidemann 2012; Noodt 2000; Meyer 2010; 
Lusiardi 2000.
159 Cf. Koppe 1933; Cordes 1998.
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was a demanding and often rather tricky task. The will of Hinrich van 
dem Braken, who died in 1413, is a good example of this. The men he 
had named to execute his will had to spend part of his money for devout 
and charitable purposes, not only in Lübeck, but also in Osnabrück and 
in the more distant town of Bergen. They were also requested to arrange a 
marriage for Hinrich’s daughter and to care for her until she was married. 
Finally, they had to administer the parts of Hinrich’s assets that he wanted 
his two sons to have after they had come of age.160 From this example it is 
clear that a testator had to be confident in his or her choice of guardian. 
A plausible ad hoc hypothesis would be to assume that testators generally 
commissioned their relatives with this kind of trustful duty. In reality, the 
opposite was true. Relationships between testators and executors were very 
rarely kinship- based. By taking a closer look at the problem, it is clear that 
honesty and willingness were not the only requirements for a potential ex-
ecutor or guardian to meet. A testator also had to be sure that the person 
he or she wanted to execute his or her will would be able to get the provi-
sions accepted by the testator’s creditors and debtors as well as by his or 
her possibly reluctant relatives.
Because of these requirements, analysing the choice of guardians is very 
promising. Firstly, one would naturally expect to find in such an analysis 
individuals who were men of high standing within their peer group. Not 
surprisingly, in some cases councillors and mayors were commissioned with 
guardianship because of their affiliation with the leading social class of 
Lübeck. Yet more interestingly, some of the executors and guardians were 
not chosen because of their official town duties. Instead, they were chosen 
because they were highly respected due to the more informal position they 
had within the society of Lübeck. The works masters of the parish churches 
were examples of this kind of executor, especially those at St. Mary’s and 
St. James’.
In general, a works master managed technical problems and economic 
issues that arose in everyday church operation. However, he was neither the 
master builder of the church nor the holder of the city’s church administra-
tion office. The latter was officially responsible for the financial assets of the 
160 Cf. Meyer 2002; 2005; 2010.
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church. Usually, this office was shared by two city councillors who held it 
alternately. Although the churches’ works masters were of a lower social 
rank within the society, compared to city councillors or master builders, 
they were highly esteemed within their home parish. A really outstanding 
example of the linking position these works masters held is that of the 
executor choices made in Lübeck between 1400 and 1450, as noted in 
Gunnar Meyer’s in- depth analysis. For this particular period, the choices 
of citizens mostly favoured Hermann Robecke, who was the works master 
of St. Mary’s, and his colleague Godeken Steenbeke, who held the same 
office at St. James’. If all the choices drawn from the surviving wills are 
represented in a sociogram161, the following becomes clear: only a few of 
the testators made mutual choices for an executor or guardian. Thus, an 
overall look at wills does not offer much insight into the sketch of the net-
works of citizens from Lübeck during the first half of the fifteenth century. 
However, this information indicates possible ways social networks could 
have been used by citizens for all kinds of purposes. Although the works 
masters were not in the centre of a specific social group, they functioned 
as a sort of bridging person to connect separate networks with each other 
because of their high standing.
Restricting the sample to those testators already connected by profes-
sional, social or political matters would be a much better approach to 
the reconstruction of citizens’ networks on the basis of wills. Gunnar 
Meyer also performed such an analysis for the group of merchants from 
Lübeck who specialised in trade with Bergen. Although not all the wills 
belonging to the people in this group survived, the final sample consists 
of 109 wills, 82 of which show a testator’s choice of a fellow member of 
this group of traders for the execution of one’s will. The corresponding 
graph162 only depicts these choices, but some of the wills contain addi-
tional information that would be relevant to social network issues, such as 
business connections to other group members. Thus, testators’ choices of 
executors can add much to the reconstruction of merchants’ multi- mode 
social networks.
161 This sociogramm is depicted in Meyer 2002, p. 289.
162 Cf. Meyer 2005.
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Social Proximity vs. Spatial Vicinity –  
Societies and Neighbourhoods
One approach to reconstructing the social networks of Hansards is to 
examine membership in societies and fraternities, which gives an indica-
tion of the social proximity between the members of these institutions. 
Membership could improve the quality of social networks in Hanse 
towns because it was extremely important for the informal communica-
tion within the political and economic leading groups. A majority of 
the councillors of Lübeck, for example, were also members of the dis-
tinguished Zirkelgesellschaft (‘society of the circle’).163 In the Prussian 
towns of the Hanse, town councillors, lay assessors and merchants met 
in the so- called Artushöfe (‘King Arthur’s courts’)164 and were always 
members of the fraternities belonging to these courts. As was customary, 
they would bring guests to the meetings, and travellers and strangers were 
generally allowed to join such functions as well. The institution of the 
Artushöfe thus also enabled interurban social contacts.
A good example of how effective and sustained such contacts were can 
be seen in the Schwarzhäuptergesellschaft (‘black head society’) of Riga. 
This society was a popular meeting place for experienced long- distance 
traders and their young apprentices. The latter were usually sent to the 
Baltic region to learn more about the goods and practices of Hanseatic 
trade with Russia. Two of these young men, Hans Swaneke from Danzig / 
Gdańsk and Johann van dem Springe from Lübeck, potentially met each 
other for the first time in 1419 in Riga at the meeting place of the Schwarz-
häuptergesellschaft. There, the two of them might have also met a third 
person, Gerd von Borcken, a citizen of Riga. The acquaintance of these 
three Hansards and especially the way in which they became acquainted 
is important to better understand their business relationship, which can 
only be verified over a decade later. In 1430, Gerd von Borcken sent wax 
to Johann van dem Springe in Lübeck, and part of this delivery was done 
by order of Hans Swaneke.165
163 Cf. Dünnebeil 1996.
164 Cf. Selzer 1996; 2003b.
165 Cf. Brück 1999, p. 118.
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Instead of relying only on social proximity, social networks could also 
be based on spatial vicinity. Towns possessed quarters with either expensive 
or cheap lodging and could therefore be divided into commendable and 
disreputable neighbourhoods, a fact not only relevant in modern cities166, 
but also, in Hanse towns, where specific quarters were rated differently by 
citizens. In the same way that a person’s clothing indicated social status, 
the location and appearance of a dwelling were commonly seen as a status 
symbol. A house built of stone, for instance, elevated the owner or tenant 
within the town’s social hierarchy over those who still lived in wooden 
buildings. The prestige derived from a dwelling’s location inside the town 
was highest in the centre around the market place, at the town hall or the 
parish church and along the main streets of the town. The prestige of a 
dwelling place also decreased as the distance to the city centre increased, 
so the least reputable areas were usually found near the town walls. The 
differing esteem for particular locations within the town affected the so-
cial character of a specific neighbourhood. In 1582, a travelling Swabian 
noticed that the members of Rostock’s upper class spoke in a much more 
distinguished manner than the people living in Fisher’s street, and that the 
latter again talked differently compared with the inhabitants of the harbour 
quarter of Warnemünde in the seaside port of Rostock.
Since both the purchase and sale of houses required a special juridical 
protection, real estate transactions were already being recorded by the end 
of the thirteenth century. For Lübeck, these property transactions can be 
found in the Oberstadtbuch, a book in which notaries of the city council 
wrote down all kinds of legal transactions relating to houses. Ownership 
can be established for each house in Lübeck from 1284 onwards based on 
the series of the annual records which survived without gaps. The records 
of the Oberstadtbuch provide historians with valuable information, for 
instance about the ups and downs of the real estate market. Also, in as-
sessing the remains of medieval buildings, information on ownership can 
be useful to find former owners of fire walls or mural paintings167, things 
typically discovered in archaeological diggings. Finally, these data also offer 
information for a socio- historical analysis. With respect to dwelling loca-
166 Cf. Kent / Kent 1982; Igel 2007.
167 Cf. Hammel 1987; Hammel-Kiesow 1988.
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tion it becomes possible to reconstruct the inner- urban spatial distance that 
existed between citizens, for example between merchants from a particular 
group of traders, craftsmen or members of a certain guild or fraternity. 
The results can be depicted on a street map, and such a social topography 
of the town helps to discover the spatial dimension of social networks.168
An interesting case for this pattern can be studied with data from the 
Pomeranian town of Greifswald around the year 1400. With the surviving 
administrative records it is possible to establish the dwelling places of the 
members of the town’s leading class and to map these locations, something 
which has recently been done by Karsten Igel.169 On the resulting map 
it can easily be seen that town councillors and mayors lived exclusively 
in the eastern parts of the town. They mostly resided at the market place 
and in Knopfstraße, which was a street connecting the market place with 
the neighbouring area. In contrast, the western areas of the town had a 
completely different social character because there craftsmen dominated 
the neighbourhood. Additionally, it can be shown that a rise within the 
town’s social hierarchy due to a person’s economic success usually meant 
that said person moved from the west side to the more reputable east side 
of Greifswald. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that spatial vicinity or 
even a direct neighbourhood of the councillors and mayors of the town 
would have increased the frequency of social contact as well as improv-
ing the density of their social network. In terms of sheer numbers, this 
situation cannot be compared to modern cities because even the medieval 
city of Lübeck, one of the larger examples, is estimated to have only had 
about 25,000 inhabitants, while the population of a town like Greifswald 
was likely to have only been about a quarter of Lübeck’s, in the range of 
5,000 to 6,000 inhabitants. Given these relatively small population figures, 
communication between the inhabitants of the town should have been pos-
sible, which makes the pronounced spatial and social segregation in such 
a small town all the more astonishing. And, compared to Italian towns of 
those days, which were very often divided into separate neighbourhoods 
each dominated by a powerful family of the town’s ruling class, the social 
168 See pp. 123–282 in Meinhardt / Ranft (eds.) 2005.
169 Cf. Igel 2002; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2010.
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networks of Hanseatic leading families were not only based on social near-
ness but also on spatial vicinity within the town.
The fact that both elements – social proximity and spatial vicinity – were 
often combined in the social networks of Hansards, can be explained by 
the case of those merchants from Lübeck who travelled to or traded with 
Bergen. The ‘oldest men’ (Ältermänner) in this merchants’ company, who 
stood in the centre of a sustained social network, usually also occupied a 
leading political role in the city of Lübeck, and they and their descendants 
lived for a very long time – well into the nineteenth century – near to each 
other in only a few streets in the inner city of Lübeck.170 A more in- depth 
investigation of this social network made up of merchants who traded in 
the same area was undertaken by Mike Burkhardt, and uses graphical and 
mathematical techniques of social network analysis. This analysis reveals 
a strong coherence of social proximity, kinship bonds and commercial co-
operation around a core of a few families for the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, and also reveals a visible change towards a less kinship- based 
trade pattern during the late fifteenth century.171
Social Networks of Hansards as a ‘Small World’
As already seen in Chapter 2 with the case of the Veckinchusen family and 
its commercial relationships within the extended family, and again in the 
present chapter with the example of the merchants’ triad consisting of Gerd 
von Borcken, Johann van dem Springe and Hans Swaneke, it’s obvious that 
Hanseatic merchants intensively used their personal networks for commer-
cial purposes. Of course, it goes without saying that the Hanse itself, being 
the aggregate of all these personal networks, was a large social network. 
However, this observation is of little validity, theoretically as well as em-
pirically. In theoretical terms, every human society can be described as a 
social network, because there are always various informal social ties between 
members, but this is a rather weak argument. Empirically, social network 
characteristics would have to be specified more precisely, in order to turn 
the weak argument into a valid statement. So, one of the main features of 
170 Cf. Asmussen 2002.
171 Cf. Burkhardt 2009; 2012.
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the Hanse’s social networks was their high degree of segregation into many 
subgroups, which nonetheless still could have been linked to each other quite 
easily. Thus, Hanseatic trade networks as a whole appear to have been a so- 
called ‘small world’172, as they allowed each merchant to contact any other 
network member through only a few mediating persons, despite having a 
weak overall density and despite having been fragmented into many separate 
subgroups. In theory at least, this ‘small world’ of the Hanse consisted of 
multiple interrelated layers, those primarily based on economic exchange, 
for instance, and those based on either kinship bonds, common membership, 
social proximity or simply on spatial vicinity. Kinship networks evolved 
through eastbound migration, whereas friendship networks developed from 
a common economic interest. However, making use of kinship bonds, social 
ties and political connections for business was not a practice unique only 
to Hanseatic merchants; other groups of medieval and early- modern trad-
ers also relied on social networks.173 Networking alone certainly was not 
the very principle of conducting business among Hansards. Nevertheless, 
this ‘small world’ fulfilled a very practical and sustaining function for their 
network trade system. The ‘small world’ was not only determined by the all 
too common overlap of family and business but was also shaped to a large 
extent by the manifold social institutions that were created such as societies, 
associations or fraternities, and by political institutions such as the town 
councils, all of which recurrently provided opportunities for merchants to 
get in contact with each other, to exchange business information or infor-
mation on other merchants’ reputations, or to intensify existing social ties 
and to cultivate friendships. This was necessary for the functionality of the 
business network organisation, proving both the social embeddedness of the 
network trade system and the strength of weak ties, as Mark Granovetter 
has put it.174
This is, however, a qualitative statement, mainly because a firm quan-
titative analysis of the multiple layers of Hanseatic social networks seems 
172 Cf. Watts 1999, pp. 495–498; Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 147.
173 See e.g. Rolley 1995; Dahl 1998; Markovits 2000; Schulte  Beerbühl / 
Vögele (eds.) 2004; Baghdiantz McCabe / Harlaftis / Pepelasis Mino-
glou (eds.) 2005.
174 Cf. Granovetter 1973; 1985.
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almost impossible to carry out, given the scattered and all too often incom-
plete network data that is provided by the surviving sources. Interurban 
connections of family members, wills, membership in societies and the 
social topography of Hanse towns are promising points of departure for 
reconstructing social networks, but certainly these sources do not show the 
full picture of the complex economic, social and political interrelatedness of 
Hansards. Even though some vigorous attempts have been made to apply 
the sophisticated quantitative and graphical techniques of social network 
analysis to various networks of Hansards – the above- cited study of Mike 
Burkhardt is one such example –, it becomes obvious that the number 
and quality of sources in general do not allow for a proper assessment of 
all the existing layers or the full spectrum of a social network. However, 
the sociological concept of network analysis helps to identify clusters of 
persons and different types of relationships, and this makes the concept ex-
tremely valuable in supporting the qualitative conclusions on the structure 
and function of the Hanse’s ‘small world’ that are drawn from a historical 
case analysis.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
77
Chapter 4 
Bridging Distances and Filling Gaps – 
Strategies to Handle Heterogeneous 
Commercial Environments
The merchants of the Hanse traded in heterogeneous mercantile environ-
ments. So far in this book, we have advocated a New Institutional Eco-
nomics’ perspective on the medieval Hanse and we looked in particular at 
the specific institutions that helped Hanseatic merchants to organise their 
commercial exchange without really taking into account the respective con-
text in which they traded their goods.175 Our aim with the present chapter 
is to slightly shift the common scope of analysis away from an in- depth 
look at the context of commercial activities in a particular mercantile city, 
to a focus on the late medieval Hanseatic merchants as a group, who in 
fact had to cope with several of such contexts, which even differed vastly 
from one another.
Extension of European Trade to the Baltic Sea –  
Merchants and Cities
Trade in North Europe from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, and 
even partly in the sixteenth century, was dominated by the merchants of 
the Hanse.176 With their trade they geographically covered the wide area 
spanning between London and Bruges in the West, Bergen in the North 
and Novgorod in the far Northeast, a total area with an approximate 
diameter of 3,500 km between its western and eastern poles.177 Hanseatic 
merchants functioned as commercial mediators by transporting furs, wax, 
timber and grains from the East to the West, cloth and luxury goods from 
the West to the North and to the East, and dried cod and herring from the 
175 See on that especially the Chapters 2 and 3 above. Cf. also Selzer / Ewert 
2001; 2005; 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2007; 2010.
176 Cf. Dollinger 41989; Hammel- Kiesow 2000.
177 Cf. Seibt / Borsdorf / Grütter (eds.) 1997.
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North to the West and to the South.178 The rise of Hanseatic long- distance 
trade was stimulated by various factors:179 in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries migrants from Lower Germany settled in the coastal areas of the 
South and East Baltic, transferring their urban culture north- and east-
wards, which had already been developed to a fairly high degree.180 This 
in turn stimulated a rapid population growth along the coastlines of the 
Baltic Sea.181 Furthermore, the sustained population growth in Northwest 
Europe generated a huge demand for products originating from the North 
and the Northeast of Europe in western markets. Moreover, merchants from 
Lower Germany obtained trade privileges in London, Bruges, Bergen and 
Novgorod, which enabled them to link the distinct centres of production 
and consumption in the Northwest and the Northeast via the Baltic Sea. 
From these times onwards, the Baltic became a part of the (then) much 
more expanded trade system in Northwest Europe.182
Cities and towns played an important role within this trade system be-
cause they were of course the very centres of commerce. It was in Bruges, 
London, Bergen and Novgorod where the German Hanse possessed com-
mercial outlets, the so- called Kontore.183 Hanseatic trade centres were locat-
ed there because of the liberties of the Hanse, and because these places also 
offered opportunities to make contact with other trade systems and with 
merchants of other geographic origins. Besides this, the big Hanse cities of 
Cologne, Lübeck, Hamburg and Danzig / Gdańsk and many other smaller 
towns served as a base for merchant families from which they could operate 
their businesses.184 In the Hanseatic period some of these cities, like Lübeck 
for instance, saw an unprecedented economic take- off that was only seen 
again during the nineteenth century era of industrialisation.185 Moreover, 
Hanseatic cities and towns were not only needed as points of exchange to 
maintain the chain- like trade of goods along the west- eastern line stretch-
178 Cf. Paravicini 1992, p. 99; Jahnke 2000.
179 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, pp. 21–26.
180 Cf. Fritze 1986.
181 Cf. Borgolte 2002, p. 236.
182 Cf. Mączak / Samsonowicz 1965.
183 Cf. Bracker 1989, pp. 143–176.
184 Cf. Bracker 1989, pp. 177–300.
185 Cf. Ranft 1995.
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ing from Bruges and London via Lübeck and Hamburg to Novgorod186, 
they were also pivotal elements in coupling this long- distance trade with 
the regional and local systems of distribution.
Although Hanseatic merchants and their enterprises were present every-
where in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, and although they were able to 
dominate the trade there to a certain extent, the regions they covered com-
mercially with this trade were far from homogeneous.187 In the following 
sections we will analyse two aspects of the heterogeneity that this trade was 
exposed to. Firstly, we shall distinguish several dimensions of the diversity 
and the variability the merchants in general were confronted with. From 
which sources did heterogeneity stem inside the Hanseatic system of trade? 
And in which respects did particular commercial settings differ? Secondly, 
we will attempt to explain how the merchants were able to cope with the 
immense degree of heterogeneity they usually had to handle. Which strate-
gies did they choose to balance the differing commercial environments in 
which they were active? What sorts of institutions emerged in order to 
consolidate the merchants’ commercial activities?
Unequal Hanseatic Commercial Settings –  
Sources of Heterogeneity
When talking about variability and diversity as important contextual fac-
tors which affected the trading operations of Hanseatic merchants, several 
sources of this heterogeneity have to be distinguished that in general caused 
the environmental conditions for traders to differ, and even changed these 
conditions over time. Geographic diversity in consumer preferences as well 
as in the availability of resources and in production is commonly consid-
ered as the driving force of inter-regional trade. By arbitrage between mar-
kets, opportunities are created for merchants to pocket profits from trade. 
Paradoxically enough, dissimilarities of several mercantile environments 
can nevertheless turn into a hindrance to trade because of the transaction 
costs arising from diversity. One such example within the trade system of 
the Hanse was the huge dissimilarity of the mercantile environments the 
186 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 90.
187 Cf. Moraw 1987.
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merchants were faced with at the Hanseatic outposts. Namely with Bruges 
on the one hand and Novgorod on the other, differences in mercantile set-
tings were most pronounced. The massive gap that existed between the 
Northeast and the West in commercial as well as in cultural matters, a gap 
that was visible in the marked differences between the westernmost and 
the easternmost trading posts, was probably the most important reason 
for diversity inside the Hanse. However, the merchants’ way of handling a 
variety of goods on the individual level as well as the embeddedness of their 
commercial exchange in the multiple organisational levels of the Hanse also 
contributed to the ever- present heterogeneity.
The Dissimilarity of Mercantile Environments
Given the vast spatial extent of the Hanse’s catchment area in the late 
Middle Ages, it presumably comes as no surprise that within this particu-
lar area various commercial environments existed. As a result, Hanseatic 
merchants made contact with very different mercantile habits on a regular 
basis. Cultural and economic differences between the western and north- 
eastern regions were tremendous indeed, although it was this divergence 
which for Hanseatic merchants had initially opened up opportunities to 
link these distinct environments through trade.188 The gradual diversity of 
trade institutions in many Hanse towns and in the Kontore of London and 
Bergen notwithstanding, this enormous contrast could possibly be best il-
lustrated by comparing the commercial settings which obviously differed the 
most – the market organisation at the western pole of the Hanseatic realm 
in Bruges and that in Novgorod at its north- eastern pole. These two cities 
where Hanseatic merchants shared trade privileges which they had obtained 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and where they had established, like 
in London (and later on in Bergen), the guild- like organisation of a Kontor, 
seem at first glance to be fairly equal in terms of their size, location and 
commercial function. Both cities could only be reached by the maritime 
long- distance trade via rivers, an element that was in general quite typical 
of Hanseatic trading places, and obviously both cities were very important 
commercial centres within their respective regions. Although Bruges was 
188 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 22 f.
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a lot bigger than Novgorod – the former had an estimated population of 
between 40,000 and 45,000 inhabitants by the middle of the fourteenth 
century and the latter had approximately 30,000 inhabitants around the 
year 1400 –, this difference in size was certainly not the decisive reason for 
the cities’ overall differences.189 These differences can be better illustrated 
by the unequal degree of urbanisation. Whereas Bruges was located in the 
densely populated and highly urbanised region of Flanders and was there-
fore embedded in a very close network of cities and towns190, Novgorod 
was virtually the only city in a fully rural region, and its sparsely popu-
lated hinterland stretched up to the Ural. To further highlight the extreme 
differences that existed between Bruges and Novgorod, the two cities can 
be compared with respect to the specific characteristics of how trade was 
handled there – the organisational design chosen for the Kontor, the trading 
practice on the local market and the financial and institutional framework 
for commercial exchanges on that particular market.
From the late thirteenth century onwards, Hanseatic merchants usually 
no longer accompanied their goods to overseas market places. Instead they 
had established an office (scrivecammere) in their home town and in general 
operated their business from there. Commodities were shipped to distant 
market places by shipping agencies and could be sold there with the help 
of relatives or friends.191 This sustained change in business style to promote 
an overall growth in trade developed very much in parallel to develop-
ments elsewhere in Europe, Italy or Flanders for instance.192 Nevertheless, 
the more old- fashioned type of caravan or convoy trade still remained in 
action within parts of the catchment area of the Hanse. For their trade in 
Novgorod, Hansards still had to travel there via the Baltic Sea, carrying 
their goods along with them. Although the Hanse established a Kontor in 
Novgorod with the St. Petershof, a location which was used for trade and 
as a traders’ residence, the permanent settlement of merchants there was 
strictly forbidden. In addition, the merchants were only allowed to go to 
Novgorod once a year, which meant that they had to choose to travel there 
189 Cf. Friedland (ed.) 1990; Angermann / Friedland (eds.) 2002.
190 Cf. Stabel 1997.
191 Cf. Rörig 1929; Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 53.
192 Cf. Lopez 1971.
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for either the summer or the winter. All these regulations were established 
in the so- called Schra, the written ordinances of the St. Petershof, and they 
remained effective until this Kontor was temporarily closed in 1494.193
As a consequence, the St. Petershof was predominantly frequented dur-
ing the two trading seasons of either summer or winter, and opportunities 
for merchants to assimilate or eventually to integrate into the Russian host 
society were severely undermined and virtually non- existent.194 In principle, 
the Kontore in Bergen (Brygge) and in London (Stahlhof ) were organised 
similarly to the St. Petershof, but regulations there were nowhere near as 
strict as they were in Novgorod.195 In Bergen and London the Hanseatic 
merchants possessed a well- defined location where they were requested to 
live and to operate while staying in the town, but in both cities merchants 
were not required to handle their trade personally, and the trade in London 
at least was not really a seasonal business. To some extent, seasonalities in 
trade always arose from the fact that shipping was closed during the winter 
months, which of course meant that travelling to and from London or Ber-
gen was not possible within this particular period of the year. Nevertheless, 
merchants could send goods to their partners in London and Bergen or visit 
these cities as many times as they wanted during the rest of the year when 
the sea ways were open.196
In contrast to Novgorod, mercantile organisation was completely dif-
ferent in Bruges.197 In the Flemish city, the Hanse ran a Kontor as well, but 
while the term Kontor described a well- defined trading outlet for London, 
for Bergen and especially for Novgorod, in Bruges it was more or less only 
a label for the group of Hanseatic merchants who operated on the Bruges 
market. Hanseatic merchants organised themselves as a group, with their 
own regulations and their own jurisdiction, and of course each merchant 
belonging to this group had to respect these rules. However, the presence 
of merchants was permitted throughout the whole year and for as long as 
desired, and neither residence nor trade of Hanseatic merchants were bound 
193 Cf. Schlüter 1911; Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 103 f.
194 Cf. Angermann / Friedland (eds.) 2002.
195 Cf. Bracker 1989, pp. 149–159; pp. 165–171.
196 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000.
197 Cf. Murray 2000; 2005; Stabel 2001; Greve 2011.
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to a fixed location in the city.198 Instead, as did traders of other origins, 
Hanseatic merchants lived all around the city in hostellers’ houses. These 
hostellers helped to mediate the commercial exchange between Hanseatic 
merchants and foreign traders, and they were to some extent also responsi-
ble for the behaviour of their Hanseatic guests, including a possible stand-
ing surety for their guests’ debts.199 Thus, Hanseatic merchants very often 
stayed in Bruges for many years before returning home.200 There is a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that some of them even owned houses in the 
city. Countless donations from Hanseatic merchants to hospitals, parish 
churches and monasteries in Bruges show how deeply they had integrated 
into the host society.201 A very good example of this behaviour is that of a 
group of Prussian merchants originating from the cities of Danzig / Gdańsk, 
Elbing / Elbląg, Königsberg / Kaliningrad and Thorn / Toruń – Radeke 
Vrowendorp, Johann vom Howe, Albrecht Keyser, Heinrich Schonhals, 
Jacob von der Kemenate, Johann von der Winde, Heinrich Hoet, Tidemann 
Rebber, Heinrich Simon. During the second half of the fourteenth century 
each of them had stayed in Bruges for many years on a permanent basis, 
and their presence there and their integration into the economic life of the 
city can be proved by entries in the Bruges tax list and by entries in the ac-
count books of exchange agents from Bruges. The members of this group 
of merchants obviously took over key functions as representatives of the 
Kontor in Bruges, and they acted as financial agents for other Hanseatic 
merchants from Prussia as well.202
For a comparison of the trading practices and commercial habits that 
can be traced on the markets in Bruges and Novgorod, one also has to 
consider the differences in market structure between these two extremes. 
Commodities to trade, productivity and the degree of market integration 
were obviously extremely different to their counterparts at the western and 
north- eastern borders of the Hanse’s realm. The goods mainly bought by 
Hanseatic merchants in Novgorod were furs and wax. A fur was a non- 
198 Cf. Friedland (ed.) 1990; Jörn / Paravicini / Wernicke (eds.) 2000.
199 Cf. Stark 2000; Greve 2001; 2002; 2011.
200 Cf. Selzer 2003a.
201 Cf. Rössner 2001.
202 Cf. Dierck / Rössner (eds.) 1999.
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standardised product of course, so that merchants had to spend time and 
money for both product assessment and quality control.203 The market 
supply came from many small producers, because Hanseatic merchants 
were not allowed to operate outside the St. Petershof, and therefore they 
were not able to organise a market supply that could be handled by them 
more efficiently. Business was conducted in person with the Russian sell-
ers of goods, usually with the assistance of an interpreter and that of a 
second Hanseatic merchant, with the latter having to witness the trade. 
Moreover, the purchasing volume of a single merchant was regulated to a 
certain maximum. In contrast, Hanseatic merchants in Bruges purchased 
goods such as cloth that in general were highly standardised products with 
a producer- guaranteed quality. Due to their market power they were also 
able to more or less take over the cloth production in some smaller Flemish 
towns, which then exclusively produced for the Hanse.204 Purchase on the 
Bruges market was often executed via local brokers, which guaranteed a 
high degree of legal certainty. Regulations of the Hanse’s Kontor regarding 
the volume of goods purchased or sold by Hanseatic merchants cannot be 
found. Similar to merchants of other geographic origins, Hanseatic mer-
chants could very much profit from the commercial infrastructure that was 
provided on the late medieval ‘world market’ of Bruges and from the high 
degree of integration this market already had reached.205
The markets in Bruges and Novgorod are also very good examples of 
how differently the financial institutions that framed commercial exchange 
were developed in the late Middle Ages. More or less as a corollary of the 
Hanseatic convoy trade to the St. Petershof, financial institutions at the 
Novgorod market remained severely underdeveloped way into the fifteenth 
century. Commercial exchange with the Russians usually was done in a bar-
ter trade or by paying for the Russian furs and wax in silver which had to 
be brought overseas to Novgorod by the Hanseatic merchants themselves. 
This silver, reaching the Novgorod market on a regular basis, also affected 
the local economic structure as it was used as a raw material for the silver 
craft that had been established in the city of Novgorod.
203 See on the fur- trade Delort 1978.
204 Cf. Holbach 1994.
205 Cf. Vermeersch (ed.) 1992; Stabel 2001; Murray 2005.
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As there was no possibility to buy on credit and given that banks were 
virtually unknown in this part of the Hanse’s commercial world, the almost 
complete lack of financial institutions fully developed by the standards of 
the time is crystal clear. These standards were set at the western border in 
Flanders, namely in Bruges. There, the Hanseatic merchants commonly 
traded on credit for either their purchases or sales. Usually, they stuck to 
cash purchases and cash payments in case a cash discount was granted to 
them. Moreover, the Hanseatic merchants kept an account with brokers, 
exchange agents or merchant bankers, and payments of commercial ex-
changes in general could be executed via these financial mediators. Thus, 
via the Bruges market, Hanseatic trade was not only financially integrated, 
to a certain extent at least, into the late medieval European financial sys-
tem, but the financial techniques that were in use in Bruges could also be 
adopted by Hanseatic merchants for their internal businesses in the western 
parts of their trade system. Cashless monetary transactions became the 
standard for their commercial exchanges between Bruges and Cologne, 
and these techniques could be easily used for transactions between Lübeck 
and Bruges as well.206
Putting together these pieces of evidence, one can conclude that the area 
covered by Hanseatic trade in economic terms was extremely heterogeneous 
indeed. Regulations exercised by the Kontore to constrain the merchants’ 
personal freedom were much more relaxed in the West. The reverse is also 
true; the extent to which the markets’ economic and financial institutions 
were developed decreased significantly the further northeast the markets 
were located.
Handling a Variety of Goods
In most cases, Hanseatic commercial businesses were self- employed mer-
chants or small- scale firms with a small number of employees.207 An im-
portant feature of these enterprises was that they usually did not specialise 
in trading particular products or goods. In contrast, Hanseatic merchants 
typically traded with a variety of commodities. The persistence of this lack 
206 Cf. Sprandel 1975; Jenks 1982; North 1999.
207 Cf. Cordes 1998.
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of specialisation can be seen as late as the middle of the sixteenth century: 
the merchants Bertram Bene from Oslo and Bernt Kron from Rostock, who 
were involved in a long- term reciprocal commercial relationship, mutually 
exchanged almost 30 different types of goods.208 Of course, since a specific 
knowledge of product quality and market conditions was necessary for 
trading goods, one can easily imagine that handling such a big number of 
products must have been far from an easy and straightforward task for the 
merchants. Knowledge of the trade of different goods such as furs, hats, 
belts, horses, apples, salmon or beer, as it was the case with Bertram Bene 
and Bernt Kron for example, had to be acquired by the merchants. They 
also had to keep their know- how up- to-date in order to remain competitive 
in the various markets at which they operated. Thus, at the individual level 
of the Hanseatic trade system, variability due to non- specialisation surely 
added to the degree of overall heterogeneity that already resulted from the 
existence of multiple and differing mercantile environments.
Bridging and Filling the Gap – Strategies to Balance  
the Effects of Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity in general has both positive and negative economic impacts 
on trade. On the one hand it creates opportunities for profit, which attract 
those merchants who are able to link distinct mercantile environments, 
and in turn further stimulates economic development. On the other hand, 
heterogeneity definitely increases the cost of transaction in terms of in-
formation and agency costs, since it would obviously be much easier for 
all parties involved to trade in a homogeneous environment. Hanseatic 
merchants had to deal with vastly different mercantile environments and 
multiple organisational levels, and therefore had to find ways to balance 
the possible impacts of this heterogeneity on their economic enterprises. 
However, it was not only a question of deploying sophisticated strategies in 
order to cope with such differences and to overcome the huge dissimilarities 
in economic development that existed inside the Hanse between the West 
and the Northeast. First of all, Hanseatic merchants had to bridge the vast 
geographic distances in the Baltic. Hanseatic trade was mainly seaborne, 
208 Cf. Thierfelder 1958, pp. 194–207; Selzer / Ewert 2001.
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and after the merchants in the western areas had substituted a settled and 
office- based system of trade for the older form of active convoy trade, in 
the Northeast, especially in Novgorod, this older practice remained the 
dominant form of trade which meant that merchants still had to accom-
pany their goods to market.209 For other destinations difficulties were not 
automatically eliminated with the transition to a settled and office- based 
system. Although the merchants in general no longer accompanied their 
goods to market, it was still necessary for them to transmit information 
between home town offices and overseas market places where commodi-
ties were purchased or sold. Given that in the fifteenth century a letter be-
tween Lübeck and Bruges took around 20 days to be transferred210, one can 
imagine that apart from being confronted with heterogeneous mercantile 
environments, doing business with only little information at hand, was a 
rather demanding task, especially when one considers that the information 
was probably already outdated at the time of receipt.
Hence, this section discusses four strategies that presumably helped Han-
seatic merchants to overcome the problems arising from trade in a vast and 
heterogeneously structured environment with only little information avail-
able. In the discussion a particular emphasis is placed on whether these solu-
tions were self- enforcing or whether their enforcement necessitated formal 
institutions that would then need to be created. Following the institutional 
economics’ approach to the history of trade and economic growth, the 
design of enforcement mechanisms plays a key role in whether economic 
development is either promoted or undermined. Institutions which unfold 
their effects in a self- enforcing manner usually reduce transaction costs more 
so than a third- party enforcement would. Self- enforcing institutions are also 
often viable solutions to problems of commitment, because incentives are 
structured in such a way that all parties concerned have a keen interest in 
keeping such an institutional arrangement.211
209 Cf. Bracker 1989, pp. 564–566.
210 Cf. Samsonowicz 1999; see also Lindemann 1978 and von Seggern 2001.
211 Cf. North 1981; 1991; 1993; Greif 1992; 1993; 2000.
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Hedging Against the Risks of Transportation
Although in the Middle Ages maritime trade was not that much faster than 
overland transportation, it was usually fairly unpredictable due to weather 
conditions and the threat of piracy, and therefore involved a lot of risk. 
For their trade in the Mediterranean, Venetian and Genoese merchants 
developed contractual forms like the commenda or the collegantia which 
not only clearly regulated the responsibilities for such an enterprise and the 
costs of risk, but also made it more likely for merchants to find risk capital 
for potential commercial enterprises.212 A similar problem was solved by 
Hanseatic merchants in a more informal and non- contractual manner. In the 
old- style caravan or convoy trade, goods were protected against risky events 
to some extent by the organisational pattern of the caravan or convoy itself. 
Seeking this sort of protection was presumably the main reason why in the 
past merchants in early trade all over the world and across all civilizations 
chose such a caravan trade organisation. Once caravan and convoy trade in 
many Hanseatic regions had been replaced by an office- based form of trade, 
Hanseatic merchants, in contrast to their Italian contemporaries, seemingly 
neither developed a formal sea insurance nor adopted the widespread use 
of formal contracts regulating the distribution of risk between trading part-
ners.213 As seen above, Hansards also used a contractual type known as the 
wedderleginge or kumpanie and very much resembled the Mediterranean 
commenda, by which capital could be accumulated for a specific endeavour. 
Both parties in such a contract added their financial resources, but only one 
of them operated the trade whereas profits were shared between both par-
ties. Nevertheless, this contractual scheme was only of minor importance 
for Hanseatic trade. Instead, merchants attempted to counteract the risk of 
transportation by using a more basic form of risk diversification. Usually, 
Hanseatic merchants tried to ship the commodities in a trade sample on 
several ships, and in the event they were also ship owners, they usually did 
not concentrate their investment on only one ship.214 As with such solu-
tions is was not possible for merchants to get successfully accepted their 
212 Cf. Lopez 1971.
213 Cf. Ebel 1957; Cordes 1998; Hammel- Kiesow 2000.
214 Cf. Wolf 1986.
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property rights by own measures in the event these rights had been violated 
by others, individual strategies of hedging against risk had to be sustained 
by general Hanseatic formal regulations regarding liability for the loss and 
the damage of commodities while being shipped.215
Creating Formal Institutions
Undoubtedly, Hanseatic merchants were entrepreneurs, who in seeking 
profits from their trade definitely followed an economic rationale. As citi-
zens of their respective home towns, they had also to respect their home 
town’s economic interests, trade regulations and juridical practices while 
carrying out their trade, at least to a certain extent.216 More importantly, 
contemporary foreign merchants recognised their Hanseatic competitors 
as belonging to a group sharing trade privileges at certain markets they 
themselves would have liked to share. These economic privileges, together 
with the backing of Hanse towns, were the basis on which Hanseatic mer-
chants built their system of long- distance trade within the Baltics.217 They 
nevertheless needed a set of formal institutions to do this.
First of all, the Kontore of the German Hanse have to be considered in 
this context. These Kontore were founded in the cities of Bruges, London, 
Bergen and Novgorod where Hanseatic merchants shared economic privi-
leges and certain liberties to their own economic benefit. As the outposts of 
the Hanse, the fairly formally defined institution of the Kontore regulated 
the merchants’ local trading comportment in order to enforce the privi-
leges against local rulers and in order to coordinate merchants’ activities.218 
Given that these markets were vital to the Hanse’s system of trade as a 
whole, inasmuch as they formed the commercial interface between this 
trade system and other systems of trade, Hanseatic merchant families had a 
keen interest in maintaining personal contact to their compatriots operating 
there.219 By the middle of the fourteenth century, a second Hanseatic formal 
institution had emerged with the constitution of the Hanseatic League as an 
215 Cf. Jahnke / Grassmann (eds.) 2003.
216 Cf. Afflerbach 1993.
217 Cf. von Brandt 1963.
218 Cf. Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994; Streb 2004.
219 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 29.
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alliance of many Hanse towns.220 The Hanseatic League never really served 
a headquarters’ function for Hanseatic trade, but it can be seen as a sort 
of a political superstructure of the Hanse and it was a necessary device, 
in theory at least, to coordinate the economic and political interests of the 
Hanse’s towns and cities.
For Hanseatic merchants, both the Kontore and the Hanseatic League 
did not work as self- enforcing institutions just because they were based on 
formal regulations and because participation within these institutions was 
regulated by exactly these formal rules; quite the reverse, in fact. These two 
institutions based to a large degree on formal definitions and were needed 
to enforce other regulations inside the Hanseatic system of trade such as 
those on the liability for losses and damages in sea transportation or those 
on the quality control of products. Interestingly enough, it was this rather 
formal part of the Hanse that had the largest and most lasting impact on 
historiography, making generations of historians believe that the Hanse was 
kind of a huge trading trust or a mercantile empire, an image of the Hanse 
which is categorically false.221
Networking and Reciprocal Trade
To cope with their heterogeneously structured commercial environment, 
Hanseatic merchants found a rather different way to confront the consid-
erable degree of variability and unpredictability of circumstances, as has 
been shown above in Chapter 2 in much more detail. They formed trade 
networks of different sizes, varying densities and endurance222, creating an 
exchange structure in which the parties involved often were related to each 
other through kinship or were attached to each other through friendship 
relations.223 And, as was explained in greater detail in a previous section on 
the overlap of business and family among Hansards, the medium- or long- 
term cooperation on the basis of informal and implicitly defined contracts 
220 Cf. Wernicke 1983; Henn 1984; Pitz 2001.
221 Also Schellers (2003) emphasises the character of the Hanseatic League as 
having been an alliance of cities with primarily political purposes. This point 
will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter of this book.
222 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001; 2005, 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2007; 2010.
223 Cf. Sprandel 1984; Stark 1993.
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that were inherent to this system enabled merchants to not only assure 
themselves against the classic problems that typically evolved in agency 
relationships, but to also keep their transaction, information and organisa-
tion costs low. Shared common values facilitated mutual cooperation. By 
reciprocal exchange of goods, mutual trust between partners could be built 
over the course of time allowing the merchants to entrust the collection and 
processing of information relevant to sales’ operations on foreign markets 
to their respective partner. Trust, reputation and shared common values, 
communicated through the various sociability institutions of the Hanse224 
and then distributed across the whole network225, could compensate for a 
lack of hierarchy in terms of coordination.226 The multilateral reputation 
mechanism enforced fairness amongst Hansards227, in the long run at least. 
This system of reciprocal trade was able to solve the problems of free- riding 
and of controlling agents without the need for speedy communication lines 
and powerful enforcement institutions. It was a viable and self- enforcing 
mode of commercial exchange inside the Hanse that kept transaction, in-
formation and coordination costs at a fairly low level and, compared to 
other possible solutions, made them more or less negligible.
The networking strategy probably was of the most valuable economic 
benefit to Hanseatic merchants in terms of the high degree of flexibility it 
offered them while at the same causing only moderate costs. Due to the 
reciprocal pattern of cooperation, employing mutual partners as commer-
cial agents, with their implication of each partner’s expertise on the type of 
goods traded on their home market, Hanseatic merchants could afford to 
not specialise in particular commodities. It was the fairly lean governance 
structure of these reciprocal exchange relationships that enabled Hanseatic 
merchants to operate on the poorly developed market in Novgorod as well 
as on the highly integrated market in Bruges. And it was because of the 
relatively small size of their enterprises and their embeddedness in trade 
224 See e.g. Dünnebeil 1996; Selzer 1996.
225 Cf. Selzer 2003b, pp. 84 and 96–97.
226 See in general on this Powell 1990; Galaskiewicz 1996; Staber 2000.
227 Cf. Selzer 2003b, and for the more general function of the multilateral repu-
tation mechanism within the interaction of Hanseatic merchants with foreign 
rulers Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994 and Streb 2004.
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networks that they could, in principal, engage in the Novgorod barter 
trade, but could also be involved in the commercial exchange at the Bruges 
market with its practice of complicated cashless financial transactions. The 
network always offered opportunities to establish commercial contacts in 
the distinct mercantile environments inside the Hanse. A fairly instructive 
example of the coexistence of different business styles is the activities of 
Hildebrand Veckinchusen who, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, 
was located in Bruges and traded from there intensively on the basis of 
reciprocal relationships with his brothers, cousins, father- in-law, nephews 
and some of his friends in Lübeck, Danzig / Gdańsk, Riga, Reval / Tallinn 
and Dorpat / Tartu.228 Besides this, he was also part of a fairly formal society 
through which he operated his trade with Cologne.229 Finally, the network 
pattern of trade caused all Hanseatic merchants to profit from the supply 
of goods at the markets of Bruges, London, Bergen and Novgorod, since 
the commodities traded on these markets could be easily accessed by almost 
every one via relatives or friends living and trading there. In turn, it were 
precisely these relatively stable kinship- and friendship- based relationships 
with commercial partners at distant locations in the Hanseatic trade area as 
well as at the Kontore in Bruges, London and Bergen that allowed Hanseatic 
merchants to handle their commercial exchange in an environment which 
was well- defined, even in times when the trade policies or regulations of 
the Hanseatic League might have interfered in that trade.230
Standardisation and Homogenisation  
of Commercial Institutions and Culture
The Hanse and their merchants were essentially aware that differences in 
the markets’ infrastructure, economic and financial institutions were quite 
inefficient and costly features of their trade system. As seen above, network-
ing kept the transaction costs of commercial exchange at a level low enough 
to make trade quite attractive to the merchants, even though they had to 
operate in distinct commercial environments. However, a significant reduc-
228 Cf. Irsigler 1985; Stark 1993; Cordes 1998; Greve 2002.
229 Cf. Schweichel 2001.
230 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 31 f.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
93
tion of the heterogeneity stemming from these heterogeneous settings would 
certainly have helped to lower transaction costs even more. Apart from 
closing this system for non- Hanseatic competitors to maintain monopoly 
rents, it was a fairly rational strategy to standardise and harmonise the vari-
ous mercantile environments in order to reduce the degree of heterogeneity 
inside the Hanse and the amount of transaction costs for traders. 
Several developments can be identified that contributed to a reduction 
of heterogeneity in commercial environments. First of all, the town laws 
of Magdeburg and of Lübeck had become the dominant town law in the 
Baltics. Over time, this initially unintended harmonisation of law proved 
to be extremely beneficial for commercial exchange. Although originat-
ing from many different Hanse towns or cities, most of the merchants 
of the Hanse therefore acted on the grounds of a commonly known and 
practised law.231 However, also deliberate attempts of harmonisation were 
made by the Hanse to create a more homogeneous commercial setting for 
merchants.232 For example, the Hanse standardised weights and measures 
for many of the commodities its merchants were dealing with.233 Concern-
ing the privileges of the Hanse in both Flanders and Novgorod measures to 
implement a quality control of commodities were also taken. For instance, 
the wax bought from the Russian producers in Novgorod had to be sealed, 
either in Novgorod before it was bought by a Hanseatic merchant, or in the 
particular Hanse town or city where it was sold to another merchant. Any 
breach of this rule was regulated with a fine.234 Interestingly enough, a simi-
lar regulation for Novgorod furs was not set. Nevertheless, the Hanse al-
ready possessed quite systematic and widely applied regulations of weights 
and measures and a system of quality control by which transaction costs 
were reduced in a way that facilitated the search for specific products and 
made passing them forward within the chain- like trade between Hanseatic 
merchants much easier.235
231 Cf. Ebel 1957.
232 Cf. Jenks 2005.
233 Cf. Witthöft 1976.
234 Cf. Jenks 2005, p. 38
235 Cf. Jenks 2005, p. 39; Link / Kapfenberger 2005.
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A further step along the path towards commercial settings that were 
more equal to each other was to also regulate the juridical practices con-
cerning overseas transportation and other matters of commerce. This was 
primarily done to reduce transportation risks, to guarantee fair exchange 
and to enforce commercial contracts. Regulations in great detail can be 
found for those Hanseatic merchants that were operating in Flanders. These 
statutes encompassed various rules regarding the liability of merchants and 
that of their customers as well as regulations concerning the competence 
in the event of a lawsuit and also procedural questions. Strikingly similar 
rules can be found in the Hanseatic privileges for Novgorod.236 A sophis-
ticated sea right was developed by which responsibilities and liabilities for 
damages and losses due to averages were regulated.237 To provide Han-
seatic merchants with rather standardised juridical procedures regarding 
the risks related to shipping and to the commercial exchange with foreign 
producers, brokers and traders, was an approach of the Hanse that cer-
tainly helped to lower transaction costs, mainly through a reduction of 
the costs for contracting and for contract enforcement. In contrast to the 
networking strategy, the part of the Hanse’s institutional arrangement of 
trade that resulted from such standardisation and homogenisation was 
not self- enforcing at all. Town councils, the Kontore and later on also the 
regular diets of the Hanseatic League were needed as kind of ‘third- party-
institutions’ to enforce these rules.
Finally, it should be noted that a kind of latent harmonisation also 
emerged, which was more or less a by- product of the Hanseatic merchants’ 
commercial activities all over the Baltic. This nevertheless turned out to 
be of great value for their economic transactions. With shared values and 
common norms it was possible to create a more homogeneous mercantile 
setting. However, the homogenisation of cultural beliefs was certainly not 
a clear strategy that had been deliberately implemented, but as Hanseatic 
merchants were present all across the Baltic, it was rather an unintended but 
nonetheless natural – and in a way also helpful – development that over time 
cultural beliefs and practices became more and more equal to each other. 
Shared common values were probably very obvious inside the merchants’ 
236 Cf. Jenks 2005, p. 39 f.
237 Cf. Jahnke / Grassmann (eds.) 2003.
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families and were therefore spread out across the areas of Hanseatic trade 
with family members settling at market places that were distant to their 
family’s home town. These values naturally materialised in festivities and 
marriage patterns and in having a good command of the Lower German 
language238, and they were certainly enforced by the various institutions 
that enabled and facilitated sociability. For the networking strategy, the 
homogenisation of cultural beliefs proved to be of fundamental impor-
tance, because it was, as shown in an earlier chapter of this book, also a 
key element for the enforcement of fairness within trade cooperation via 
the above- described multilateral reputation mechanism.
Success and Failure of Hanseatic Strategies  
to Cope with Heterogeneity
To sum up: late medieval Hanseatic merchants were confronted with a 
great deal of diversity concerning their trade. Their commercial activities 
covered a whole range of markets from highly integrated and very efficient 
markets with already quite sophisticated juridical and financial institutions 
in the West, to very inefficient and poorly developed markets lacking in 
developed institutions in the Northeast. Heterogeneity seems to have been 
an important determinant of this trade. Interestingly enough, it was this 
economic and cultural divergence within North Europe which had been one 
of the key factors that had previously allowed Hanseatic merchants to gain 
significant commercial advantages over former competitors. Because they 
were able to link these separate regions commercially, Hanseatic merchants 
could practically monopolise trade within this area. Within this economic 
framework that consisted of various mercantile environments showing tre-
mendous differences, merchants handled a variety of goods and products, 
meaning that in daily work they had to acquire a vast array of product- 
specific knowledge or instead had to rely on someone else’s expertise on 
these commodities.
The Hansards’ response to this challenge of heterogeneity was also het-
erogeneous. A clear pattern of reactions can nonetheless be seen: firstly, 
as maritime trade was virtually the only viable way to bridge the huge 
238 Cf. de Boer / Gleba / Holbach (eds.) 2001.
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distances in the Baltic and in the North Sea, merchants had to find a way 
to deal with the specific risk related to this kind of trade. There were at-
tempts to minimise the transportation risks involved in maritime trade by 
both non- formal individual solutions and corporate formal ones. Secondly, 
the Hansards created formal institutions like the Kontore and later on the 
Hanseatic League, which were necessary to enforce certain regulations and 
to coordinate the economic activities of both individual merchants and of 
town and cities. Thirdly, the merchants participating in the internal Hanse-
atic trade also maintained a rather simple form of reciprocal and informal 
cooperation between partners at distant locations, which allowed them to 
operate in a rather cost- efficient manner. At the same time, this business 
style was flexible enough to be suited to either a very sophisticated level of 
market development, as in the case of Bruges, or to a rather poorly devel-
oped market, as in the case of Novgorod. Finally, over the course of time, 
the Hansards made more and more attempts at standardising and harmonis-
ing the different mercantile environments they were operating in. Both the 
standardisation of weights and measures and the harmonisation of juridi-
cal regulations and cultural beliefs helped to reduce transaction costs in 
Hanseatic trade. However, given the fact that the strategy of forming trade 
networks by which merchants remained flexible, created enormous benefits 
for merchants, this rather simple and seemingly old- fashioned business style 
can be considered a key element in balancing the effects of heterogeneity. 
Thus, it was by harmonising the context while still remaining flexible with 
regard to individual trade opportunities that enabled Hanseatic merchants 
to successfully bridge, and to a certain degree even fill the existing gaps 
between the various mercantile environments inside their realm.
Towards the end of the fifteenth century however, the commercial advan-
tages the Hansards possessed in the Baltics were rapidly ceasing. This failure 
of the system as a whole seems to have been path- dependent239 insofar as it 
was precisely the networking strategy which had been employed success-
239 See on the theoretical concept of path dependence, a paradigm which has 
been discussed in economic theory for some time Arthur 1989; David 1994; 
Sydow / Schreyögg / Koch 2009. Its relevance for the history of the Hanse 
will be further elaborated in Chapter 6 of this volume.
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fully at earlier stages in the history of the Hanse that had now turned into 
a severe hindrance to the sustained growth of their trade system.240
Focusing solely on either the context or the individual level of the Han-
seatic trade system is certainly not the only explanation that can be given 
for the manifest degree of heterogeneity inside the Hanse. Besides the fact 
that the typical Hanseatic business was quite small in size and thus had 
to adapt itself to a given heterogeneous context, the Hanse’s commercial 
exchange was embedded in several overlapping organisational layers. The 
likelihood of potential conflicts between the individual interests of single 
merchants and the collective interests of town communities and of the 
Kontore presumably increased even more following the formation of the 
Hanseatic League. Although only a rather loose association of towns and 
cities, the Hanseatic League (or at least the town delegates who were in-
volved in the Hanseatic League’s decision making) thoroughly developed 
their own economic and political scopes and very strictly attempted to get 
these interests accepted not only by foreign traders but also by the Hanseatic 
merchants themselves. Once designed to coordinate merchants’ interests, to 
oversee trade and to provide the enforcement of privileges and trade regula-
tions, it was this multiplicity of structure itself that put a further constraint 
on the activities of Hanseatic merchants.241 As the economic and politi-
cal scopes of the Kontore in Bruges, London, Bergen and Novgorod, and 
those of particular Hanse towns and the Hanseatic League were sometimes 
conflicting merchants became more often affected by the negative effects 
of this multiplicity of structure. This of course could create situations in 
which individual merchants came into conflict with higher order economic 
interests, for instance when becoming subject of the Hanse’s typical ban on 
the formation of business partnerships with non- Hanseatic traders.242 This 
seems to have been the case especially during trade embargoes. For instance, 
during the Hanseatic blockade of Flanders from 1358 to 1360, the traders 
of the town of Kampen tried to profit from circumstances by circumventing 
240 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005; Ewert / Selzer 2007; 2010.
241 Cf. von Brandt 1963.
242 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 32 f.
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the ban on trade with Flanders.243 In a sense, with this superstructure of the 
Hanse a second- order problem of heterogeneity emerged.
Moreover, the merchants’ potential to remain flexible at the cost of a 
still lacking development of the capital market structure within the inner 
reach of the Hanseatic trade system, meant that Hanseatic merchants, un-
like their non- Hanseatic competitors, had almost no access to risk capital 
which would have been utterly needed for much bigger commercial en-
deavours than those typically undertaken in the internal Hanseatic trade.244 
The Hanse’s traditional policy of blocking opponents on the grounds of 
the privileges and liberties its merchants enjoyed in Bruges in the long term 
turned out to be a severe hindrance to keeping this beneficial economic posi-
tion. This was because ultimately the Hanse failed to realise early enough 
that the economic importance of the Bruges market had been rapidly declin-
ing with the rise of the Antwerp market in the second half of the fifteenth 
century. And finally, harmonisation of course reduced transaction costs 
inside the Baltics for Hanseatic merchants and helped them to carry out 
their trade. Yet, the external effect of this harmonisation produced lower 
transaction costs for non- Hanseatic merchants, too. As a consequence, the 
commercial competitors of the Hanse were able to overrun the Hanseatic 
system of trade and intrude into the Hanse’s commercial realm by the end of 
the fifteenth century, from then on posing a serious threat to the privileged 
commercial position held by the Hansards in the Baltic.
243 Cf. Friccius 1932/33.
244 Cf. Schonewille 1998.
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Chapter 5 
State of Cities, Commercial Trust, or Virtual 
Organisation? – Structure and Coordination  
of the Hanse
The Paradoxical Outward Appearance of the Hanse
The Hanse is probably one of the most dazzling phenomena in the eco-
nomic as well as in the political history of the Middle Ages. The mere 
economic facts are quite impressive. From the thirteenth to the early 
sixteenth centuries the Hansards, who were mostly, as we have seen in 
the chapters so far, self- employed merchants, could deliver all sorts of 
goods to the consumers in the ever growing cities all over the Baltic. Mer-
chants also acted as a coordinated group and together defended – with 
great success – the Hanseatic trade privileges they had once obtained in 
London, Bruges, Bergen and Novgorod, the places where they founded 
trading outposts, known as the Kontore of the Hanse.245 Despite the fact 
that they neither formed large firms nor really adopted state- of-the- art 
trading techniques, both features that we have discussed at great length 
in the previous chapters of this book, the merchants were able to main-
tain their quasi- monopoly of trade on Baltic markets until the turn of the 
sixteenth century.
The Hanse’s outward appearance has nevertheless been shaped until to-
day by the Hanseatic League, a rather loose alliance of towns that became 
visible around the mid- fourteenth century as a more or less formal entity 
although there are good reasons to assume that it had emerged earlier. The 
Hanseatic League appears as a kind of omnipotent political superstructure 
of the Hanse, which in fact it never was. And the focus which historians 
placed on the Hanseatic League is one of the reasons why the Hanse was 
for a long time discussed in historiography and neighbouring disciplines 
as a predominantly political rather than an economic phenomenon. The 
publications of Nicolas Eschach and Jefferey M. Schellers are newer 
245 Cf. Selzer 2010, pp. 52–58.
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examples of an analysis of the Hanseatic League with respect to its status 
as an alliance of cities with primarily political purposes.246 Yet, given this 
somewhat biased interpretation247, the Hanse seems to have been a state of 
cities and a huge mercantile empire at the same time, a sort of late medieval 
North European super trust.
Unfortunately, not much of this quite fascinating tale is true. It is par-
ticularly the organisational part of the story that raises questions instead 
of providing answers. This can be seen in some very well- known episodes 
from the late fifteenth and the early sixteenth century. While attempting 
to prolong the trade privileges of the Hanse in 1469, the representatives 
of the Hanseatic Kontor in Bruges prepared a list of the towns belonging 
to the Hanse, comprising 72 town names, but also noted that towns not 
actually included in the list could of course be members of the Hanse as 
well. In 1507, even the French king Louis XII wrote to the 72 cities of the 
Hanse, but this number of cities possessed more of a symbolic significance 
than a practical value.248
These episodes point to several aspects concerning the structure, func-
tion and meaning of the Hanse: first of all, as names of towns were re-
corded, the Hanse is certainly a very good example of late medieval trade 
being strongly connected with towns. This pattern is observed across Eu-
rope during the so- called ‘Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages’.249 
In Northwestern Europe, the model of the medieval European town as a 
permanent and legally protected market emerged during the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries and spread rather quickly in the Baltic region thereafter. 
In fact, the two foundations of Lübeck – one in 1143 by Count Adolf II 
of Holsatia, and again in 1158/9 by Duke Henry the Lion – can be con-
sidered a milestone in this process. Secondly, the merchants of the Hanse 
who dominated the commerce in Northern Europe during the thirteenth 
to fifteenth centuries acted primarily as members of their respective home 
246 Cf. Schellers 2003; Eschach 2010.
247 Cf. for an overview of the changing interpretations of the Hanse in the his-
toriography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Selzer / Ewert 2005, 
pp. 8–18 and Chapter 1 in this volume. See on the Hanse in general Hammel- 
Kiesow 2000; Dollinger 62012; Jahnke 2014.
248 Cf. Dollinger 62012, p. 109 f.
249 Cf. Lopez 1971.
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towns and were clearly recognised as such. This notwithstanding, they 
also cooperated beyond the legal boundaries of their home towns. This 
cooperative and coordinated behaviour of Hanseatic merchants was pre-
sumably an important determinant of their economic success. After all, 
a town became part of the Hanse in a broader sense, because some of its 
merchants were among those who shared the Hanse’s trade privileges in 
Bruges, London or Novgorod, and not the other way round, because of 
the town’s eventual cooperation with other Hanse towns.250 In economic 
terms, the Hansards formed a cartel, which in turn allowed them to enjoy 
a quasi- monopoly of trade in the Baltic. To some extent, this behaviour 
was quite different from the Mediterranean situation, e.g. in Venice or 
Genoa, where merchants traded in fierce competition on the legal grounds 
of their home towns. Thirdly, even against the background of the above- 
mentioned list of alleged member towns of the Hanse observers in the 
fifteenth century still had rather imprecise and vague ideas of what the 
German Hanse exactly was. Nevertheless, both the economic and the 
political importance of the Hanse, whatever it may have been, was a 
well- known and acknowledged fact in the political scene of Northwestern 
Europe in the late Middle Ages.
Thus, historical research on the Hanse is in a sense governed by a 
threefold paradox: on the one hand, most of the newer publications deal 
with the social history of the Hanse, although the Hanse is first of all 
an economic historical issue. On the other hand, even if the economic 
character of the Hanse is acknowledged and becomes the primary subject 
of analysis, very often a cultural history approach is taken, and as conse-
quence the Hanse is seldom analysed from an economist’s perspective and 
by using economic theory.251 Lastly, the different elements of the Hanse 
such as the Kontore, the diets of the Hanseatic League, which often took 
place in Lübeck, or the quite unique reciprocal trade pattern of Hanseatic 
merchants are very often studied as isolated cases. Hardly any attempt is 
made to combine all of these different pieces. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom 
250 Cf. Selzer 2010, p. 58.
251 There are of course exceptions to this rule, namely Schonewille 1998; Streb 
2004; Jenks 2005; Link / Kapfenberger 2005.
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and Barry R. Weingast252, for example, gave of course a pathbreaking 
and theoretically sound explanation of the Hanseatic guild formation at 
the Kontore, using the example of the Hansards trading at the Bruges 
market, but the Hanse cannot be reduced to its commercial outlets alone, 
especially not in the case of the Bruges Kontor, simply because this com-
mercial outlet was in many respects different to the other outposts. Thus, 
we will attempt an institutional analysis of the Hanseatic trade system and 
its political spin- offs, an analysis that is based on the fairly safe grounds 
of economic theory. In particular, this analysis shall reveal the interplay 
of different Hanseatic institutions. Within the sections of this chapter we 
intend to focus on two points: first of all, it shall be asked, which theo-
retical concept would be suitable for a description of the organisation of 
the Hanse? And secondly, the question arises of how this rather complex 
system was coordinated, enabling Hansards to get their economic inter-
ests accepted and to retain their quasi- monopoly in the Baltic, at least 
until the late fifteenth century. Given its seemingly vague structure, it is 
quite astonishing that the Hanse was not only capable of defining rules 
regarding the trade of its merchants, but could also enforce these rules, 
although not always successfully. Why was this possible? How did the 
Hanse solve this problem? We attempt to explain the relative stability of 
the Hanseatic cartel over the period of roughly 200 years as a result of 
the Hansards solving several emerging problems of cooperation. Our aim 
with this chapter is therefore to discuss these questions and hopefully to 
ascertain some general considerations concerning the issue. The focus lies 
more on the enhancement of cooperation rather than on the definition of 
rules. We also claim that in this process, conflict with existing rights had 
a catalytic function for a clearer definition of both the internal structure 
of the Hanse and its developing strategic interests.
252 Cf. Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994.
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Structure of the Hanse
A Theoretical Concept – the Network Approach and  
Virtual Organisations
First of all, we will present a theoretical concept able to describe the Hanse 
as a system of trade and also as a political organisation. With this concept 
it will be possible to explain the Hanse’s structure in economic terms. In 
Chapter 3 we already pointed to fact that, similarly to the terms ‘system’ 
and ‘social capital’, the term ‘network’ is very popular indeed and its exact 
meaning seems to be well- known. As in the case of the two other terms, 
‘network’ is also widely used in social sciences and in history, and a broad 
range of meanings is attributed to the theoretical concept underlying the 
term. For the purpose of being as precise as possible, ‘network’ is here used 
with respect to its meaning in management science, that is, describing a 
specific form of organisation.253
A network organisation is thus defined as a loose cooperation of legally 
and economically independent entities. Through ‘networking’ a ‘new’ 
structure evolves which constitutes the framework for potential coopera-
tion between the members of such an inter- organisational network. In 
theory, this ‘new’ structure – the inter- organisational network – neither 
possesses hierarchical levels nor is it controlled from a headquarters, be-
cause cooperation between network members is thought of as a voluntary 
and flexible coupling.254 Network organisations are therefore character-
ised by a low degree of formalism and a lateral flow of information. Since 
coordination within such an organisational pattern in principle cannot be 
achieved by either hierarchical means of coordination or third- party en-
forcements, cooperation has to be guaranteed by mutual trust and reputa-
tion.255 A spin- off of having only loose couplings is that network members 
can be simultaneously involved in both cooperation and competition. This 
feature of ‘cooptition’, underlining the flexibility of existing couplings, is 
253 Cf. Powell 1990; Nohria  / Eccles (eds.) 1992; Galaskiewicz 1996; 
Thompson 2003.
254 Cf. Powell 1990; Illinitch / D’Aveni / Levin 1996; Osborn / Hagedoorn 
1997; Windeler 2001.
255 Cf. Powell 1990, Galaskiewicz 1996 and Osborn / Hagedoorn 1997.
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believed to increase the network’s overall performance through internal 
competition.256
If a network organisation has the additional characteristic of being 
only virtually existent, it is called a virtual organisation. With this specific 
pattern the lack of a formally and well- defined hierarchical- bureaucratic 
structure can be hidden to the environment. From an outside perspective 
such a virtual organisation appears to be structured like a huge and com-
plex trust, and features like formalism and complexity are only imitated 
with this structure. Nevertheless, the performance of a virtual organisation 
and the services it is able to deliver are equivalent to those provided by 
a highly formalised hierarchical- bureaucratic organisation. Information 
processing and the structure of the flow of information play key roles in 
the ability of virtual organisations to perform in this manner. The lateral 
flow of information requires devices that are capable of processing vast 
amounts of information very quickly in order to substitute the hierarchy 
that is missing. Thus, the model of virtual organisation is a special case 
of the network organisation.257
The Hanse’s Network Trade and its Virtual Character
The theoretical concepts of network organisation and virtual organisation 
can easily be applied to the commercial relationships that existed between 
Hanseatic merchants in the late Middle Ages and that formed the Hanse as 
a whole. In Chapter 2 of this volume, we showed in great detail that this 
kind of structure fits very well to the pattern of internal Hanseatic trade, 
with its predominant lack of formal contracts and its obvious coordination 
by reputation, trust and culture.
Just to remember: a hierarchical- bureaucratic corporate organisation, 
which was already a common pattern used by Italian merchant bank-
ers and trading businesses from Upper Germany258, can rarely be found 
along the coasts of the Baltic Sea. In contrast, in order to handle their 
trading operations by employing agents who had to be instructed on a 
256 Cf. Beck 1998. See also Chapter 2 above.
257 See for an introduction to this concept Scholz 1996 and Kraut et al. 1999.
258 Cf. Bauer 1923; von Stromer 1968; Riebartsch 1987; Hildebrandt 
1996; 1997
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regular basis, the organisational mode of the Hanseatic businesses typi-
cally consisted of mutual transactions between two partners residing at 
distant locations, with each partner selling the other’s goods. This type 
of cooperation was not exclusive and did not need formal contracting, 
and the selling merchant was usually not paid for taking the commercial 
risk of a sale.
The organisational pattern that had evolved through the trading activi-
ties of Hanseatic merchants is rather typical for a network organisation.259 
Small- scale businesses of self- employed merchants, who were legally inde-
pendent and had little financial power alone, formed trading networks by 
mutually cooperating via reciprocal trade. The bilateral exchange between 
members of these networks was not only based on an informal consensus 
separate from the organisational units of the Kontore, where the joint use 
of the Hanseatic trade privileges was overseen, but the headquarters capa-
ble of coordinating and controlling the activities of the numerous network 
participants were virtually not existent. Moreover, as network members 
could trade with as many partners as they wished all over the Baltic, the 
network structure in principle was characterised by both cooperation of its 
members and occasional competition between them. The evolving networks 
of trade appear to have been a so- called ‘small world’, since, despite their 
weak overall density, these networks allowed each member to get in contact 
with any other participant via only a few mediating persons.260 The Hanse 
therefore was clearly a network organisation in a commercial sense, but 
it was also based on social networks, because merchants relied on fami-
ly networks to operate their trade across the vast geographical extent of 
Northern Europe, and because even the political institutions of the Hanse, 
town councils or the diets of the Hanseatic League, were to a great extent 
shaped by kinship bonds.
Moreover, the particular structure of trade inside the Hanse that origi-
nated from the multiple trading relationships of single merchants displays 
to a considerable degree the characteristics of a virtual organisation. This 
‘virtualisation’ of structure is obvious in at least two respects: firstly, the 
Hanse possessed well- defined boundaries insofar as it was always possible 
259 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001; 2005; 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2007; 2010.
260 Cf. Watts 1999.
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to distinguish between the Hansards on the one hand, who all shared the 
Hanseatic trade privileges, and non- Hanseatic traders on the other, who 
were excluded from sharing these privileges. Likewise, inside the Hanse a 
clear distinction between Hanseatic and non- Hanseatic merchants existed 
by the definition of the towns’ trading rights for guests. However, what 
was really going on behind this shiny façade was not clear to outsiders, 
of course, and it was presumably unclear to many insiders as well. Al-
though all sorts of goods were carried to every market in the catchment 
area of the Hanse by chains of commercial transactions involving many 
merchants261, and although a high and homogeneous product quality was 
guaranteed by a standardisation of weights and measures262, for single 
merchants as well as for customers these efforts certainly did not appear 
as if they could have been achieved without implementing complex formal 
structures. Secondly, the Hanseatic League263 as a rather loose alliance of 
cities and towns that had emerged by the middle of the fourteenth century 
still shapes the Hanse’s present- day outward appearance. Although the 
Hanseatic League never really had a headquarters’ function for Hanse-
atic trade, contemporary foreign merchants recognised their Hanseatic 
competitors as belonging to a group sharing privileges they themselves 
would have liked to share.
So, the Hanse can definitely be termed virtual, because its organisation 
constantly changed its outward appearance, in a sense that it always was 
recognised by outsiders as a juridical and economic entity, making outsid-
ers sometimes even believe that it possessed well- defined structures and a 
hierarchy. The Hanse, however, was neither a ‘state of cities’ nor was it a 
huge commercial trust. The above- cited episode of Hansards producing a 
list of towns being members of the Hanse but saying at the same time, that 
this list might be incomplete, shows vividly that even contemporaries often 
struggled to understand what exactly the Hanse was. Likewise, for many 
generations of historians, the Hanse had the image of a huge commercial 
trust or a mercantile empire, a false interpretation to which even nowadays 
observers still are sticking to. The book by Angelo Pichierri, which ap-
261 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000.
262 Cf. Jenks 2005.
263 Cf. Wernicke 1983; Henn 1984; Pitz 2001.
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peared in the year 2000, maintains this notion of the Hanse being a state of 
cities.264 Nevertheless, believing this, even if it is not adequate, points very 
much to the feature of virtuality, and a quite evident conclusion would be 
that the Hanse very successfully misled other merchants and continues to 
mislead historians by pretending to be a formally well- defined trust rather 
than really being one.
The Organisational Multiplexity of the Hanse
Much of the problem the Hanse had in developing strategic interests, 
defining rules and enhancing the cooperation of its members becomes 
clear when taking into account its rather complex structure. Simply by 
glancing at a map one can see the geographic dispersion of Hanse mem-
bers and the huge spatial dimensions that were covered by the trade of 
Hanseatic merchants. The sheer number of potential members alone and 
the long distance that had to be bridged for the transmission of informa-
tion should have been severe obstacles to any kind of cooperation. Apart 
from geographic dispersion, a second potential barrier to cooperation 
arose from the fact that different actors within the Hanse have to be 
distinguished with respect to economic claims and political decision- 
making. These actors are the peripheral commercial outlets (Kontore), 
the towns and finally of course the Hanseatic League as a seemingly 
formally well- defined kind of superstructure of the Hanse. A schematic 
of the structure of the Hanse formed out of these distinct organisational 
layers is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Organisation theory is a quite helpful tool, inasmuch as the actors of the 
Hanse and their attempts to structure and stabilise the Hanseatic cartel can 
be put into a more general framework of cooperation and coordination. 
In terms of organisation theory, the late medieval Hanse can not only be 
described as a virtual network organisation, it was also a multipolar or-
ganisation. Its multipolarity arose from the fact that decisions concerning 
economic and political action were made by several actors – the Kontore, 
the towns and the Hanseatic League. Multipolarity was also a result of how 
the Hanse had historically emerged.
264 Cf. Pichierri 2000.
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Figure 5.1: Organisational Layers of the Hanse
boundary defined by
Hanseatic trade privileges
and trade ban for foreigners




Schematic of the structure of the Hanse formed out of the different organisational 
layers of Hanseatic merchants, networks of merchants, towns and cities of the 
Hanse and the Kontore.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
In the beginning, groups of merchants obtained trade privileges in the North 
Sea and in the Baltic Sea. In sharing these privileges, the merchants then 
founded trading posts, but they also began to influence the politics of their 
respective home towns, even more so after many of them had become sed-
entary and could afford to spend more time on political affairs. Finally, the 
towns, in which the councils were often dominated by sedentary merchants 
and which were then represented by councillors with strong commercial 
interests, decided to cooperate on a case- by-case basis in order to enhance 
these primarily economic interests. Thus, over a longer period of time sev-
eral organisational layers emerged, which in the end coexisted and formed 
a non- central organisation. At three points within this multipolar organisa-
tion at least, personal bonds between the Hansards came into play through 
personal contact on a more or less regular basis: at the Kontore, where 
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some of them shared the Hanseatic trade privileges, in the towns, where 
some of them were members of the council, and at the diets of the Hanse, 
in which some participated as representatives of their respective towns. For 
the benefit of the Hanse, these organisational layers, which in part were 
interwoven through personal bonds, also had to interact with each other.
Problems of Coordination and Institutions  
to Enhance Cooperation
The First-order Problem of Coordination
Knowing that in theory cartels are thought of as being notoriously instable, 
the sustained cartel- like behaviour of Hanseatic merchants may surprise 
to some extent. It points to several basic questions regarding the coop-
eration within institutional settings that are characterised by incompletely 
specified property rights, weak legal means and conflicting claims of ac-
tors. The tendency of cartels to become instable is generally known as the 
‘first- order-problem of cooperation’.265 How could the Hanse, a multipolar 
network organisation, solve this particular problem? How could this kind 
of organisation with all its shortcomings nevertheless ensure that its mer-
chants cooperated not only repeatedly, but also in a coordinated manner?
The first- order-problem of cooperation applies to the merchants’ behav-
iour at the trading outposts (Kontore) of the Hanse, namely at Novgorod, 
Bruges, London and Bergen. Several cases from the history of the Hanse’s 
Kontor in Bruges show that the Hansards were well able to defend their 
trade privileges as a group. Following a dispute with the city of Bruges over 
several violations of the Hanseatic trade privilege, in 1280 the Hansards 
moved the Kontor to the nearby town of Aardenburg in Flanders. They 
even found allies to make their threat more credible, merchants from Spain 
who were also not satisfied with the actual conditions of trade in the city, 
and also the count of Flanders himself made use of the conflict for his per-
sonal political interests, namely to regain power over Bruges. The negative 
effect of this trade ban was the reason why the city of Bruges asked for 
negotiations. After the Hanseatic merchants were promised improved trade 
privileges, the conflict was settled in 1282 and they returned to Bruges. 
265 Cf. Volckart 2004a, p. 195 f.
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The conflict between Hansards and the city of Bruges in 1307–09 showed 
almost the same pattern.266 In 1358, the Hansards once again deployed the 
measure of leaving the Bruges market. By that time, the conflict between 
Hansards and the city of Bruges became much more serious than it had 
been in 1280–82. The Hansards felt their rights had been violated after 
a ship from Greifswald was seized by Englishmen near Bruges and the 
English king, reacting to the condemnation of the interlopers in Flanders 
that followed this seizure, had confiscated all Hansard goods in England. 
The Hansards themselves then entered claims of recompensation for the 
confiscated goods in Flanders. Since these claims were turned down by the 
count of Flanders, the Hansards declared a ‘war of trade’ against Flanders. 
To make their threat more credible, the Kontor was moved to Dordrecht 
in the county of Holland, and together with numerous Hanse towns the 
merchants of the Kontor in Bruges blocked all kinds of trade with Flanders. 
Because of the economic depression resulting from this trade embargo in 
Bruges as well as in the county of Flanders, the city of Bruges and the count 
of Flanders both had to give in, which they actually did in 1360. In turn, 
the Kontor was moved from Dordrecht back to Bruges.267
An older view of such collective action of the Hanse and its merchants 
would probably emphasise that the Hansards mainly committed to coopera-
tion because it was for a good and noble cause. We think it is not necessary 
to make this kind of strong and, in a sense, naive assumption to explain the 
collective actions of Hansards. In our view, arguing along the line of the 
problems of rational behaviour that typically evolve in connection with the 
provision and preservation of collective goods would make more sense. In 
general, cartels provide their members with public goods – a special case 
of the more general category of collective goods, the right to share trade 
privileges, for instance, or the power to influence market prices through a 
coordination of the group’s aggregate demand or supply. A typical spin- 
off of this kind of behaviour is that also merchants who are not members 
of a cartel do profit from such trade privileges or price shifts. Assuming 
the rational and opportunistic behaviour of actors, discipline within the 
cartel will thus be undermined. Since everybody wants to benefit from the 
266 Cf. Selzer 2010, pp. 38–40.
267 Cf. Selzer 2010, p. 50.
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public good provided by a cartel, but nobody is willing to pay the neces-
sary cost of producing and maintaining this public good, the cartel will 
break asunder and members will compete with each other again. So, from 
a rational- behaviour perspective, cartels prove to be notoriously unstable, 
because all members tend to act as free- riders, and free- riding is indeed the 
only rational strategy.
Hanseatic merchants could nonetheless prevent their cartel from dis-
solution. They were able to coordinate collective action by transforming 
the public good into a so- called club good. In economic terms this is a 
good that is owned by a group, but from which all potential consumers 
who do not belong to the group can be excluded. This transformation was 
achieved by defining formal rules for the membership, by introducing a 
hierarchy and by enforcing discipline within the cartel through the threat 
of punishing those who do not respect rules. Such rules can be found for 
all of the Hanse’s four main outlets of trade. Discipline and punishment 
was the duty of the Ältermänner (‘oldest men’ or heads), who were elected 
from the group of merchants. In Novgorod, Bergen and London, where 
all or most of the merchants lived together in the Kontore, the identifica-
tion of rule breakers in case of a defection was quite easy. Given the rather 
big and even growing group of merchants, however, the marginal costs of 
free- riding of individual traders were decreasing. Hence, the formalisa-
tion of interaction at the Kontore and the implementation of a hierarchy 
there was a straightforward approach by Hanseatic merchants to solve the 
first- order-problem of cooperation they were faced with. And, conflict in 
general helped to stabilise the Hanseatic cartel, insofar as the necessity of 
binding rules became obvious to everyone. During the Flemish trade ban of 
1358–60, at least two cases show that merchants who did not respect the 
regulations and resolutions commissioned by their respective Kontor had 
to fear a severe punishment. There are good reasons to believe that Johann 
van Thunen, a factor of the Teutonic Order in Bruges, made use of some 
sort of insider information to buy Flemish cloth much cheaper than other 
Hanseatic merchants were able to just before the trade embargo ended. As 
his practice had become obvious, his property was confiscated and he was 
also threatened with a physical punishment. Another example is that of 
Tidemann Nanning from Bremen, who was suspected of having traded in 
Flanders, ignoring the general Hanseatic trade ban. This case shows that 
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a cartel- like behaviour could also be enforced indirectly. In response to 
Tidemann Nanning’s disregard of the trade ban all merchants from Bremen 
were instantaneously excluded from the Hanseatic trade privilege until they 
attempted to punish their selfish compatriot and confiscate his property.268
Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast showed in their 
seminal paper of 1994 that a clear formal and hierarchical internal struc-
ture of the Hanseatic cartel was even in the interest of the prince or the 
town who / which had granted trade privileges to merchants, because this 
structure reduced the costs for all kinds of negotiation and made trade more 
profitable even for the granting instance.269
The Second-order Problem of Coordination
Being able to solve the first- order-problem of cooperation for the trading 
outlets was an important factor in the rise of the Hanse and the economic 
success of its merchants. Unfortunately, other problems regarding the col-
lective and coordinated action of actors of the Hanse could not be handled 
that way. In addition to the first- order-problem of cooperation, also a so- 
called ‘second- order-problem of cooperation’ usually arises.270 Or, to put it 
more explicitly: in the beginning, it is not automatically clear who is actually 
coordinating the cooperation of cartel members. Here, this applies to the 
widely informal cooperation of Hanse towns, which again emerged mainly 
in situations of conflict. What appears to have been a relatively easy and 
straightforward solution at the Kontore, where supervision was handed 
over to the elected officials (Altermänner), turned out to be a much more dif-
ficult task with respect to the cooperation of Hanse towns. It was only later 
on that representatives of Hanse towns began to come together at the diets 
of the Hanse (Tagfahrten) on a more regular and also more formal basis. 
The Hanse’s claims and strategic interests as a political actor in North and 
West Europe had to be specified and also enforced in the case of conflict.271
In several wars in 1361–70 and again in 1427–32, different coalitions of 
Hanse towns fought against the political and geostrategic aspirations of the 
268 Cf. Selzer 2010, p. 48 f.
269 Cf. Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994.
270 Cf. Volckart 2004a, p. 198 f.
271 Cf. Henn (ed.) 2001.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
113
Danish king at the time. Again, the cutback or breach by foreign actors of 
already existing rights like market access or the opportunity for Hanseatic 
merchants to use waterways caused conflict. The war of 1361–70 is quite 
an illustrative example of the formation of a cooperative structure among 
the towns of the Hanse. In 1361, King Waldemar IV of Denmark took over 
the herring markets in Scania and denied merchants from Lübeck access to 
these markets. He also conquered the town of Visby on the isle of Gotland, 
an important centre of Hanseatic trade in the Baltic, and he finally gained a 
hold over the Sound, which made Hanseatic maritime trade from the Baltic 
towns to Western Europe more difficult, if not impossible. As a consequence, 
the diet of the Hanseatic League concluded on a trade ban on Denmark, 
and Lübeck, together with some of the Wendian towns, went to war with 
Denmark. The armament of a small fleet of twelve vessels was financed in 
part by the pound toll (Pfundgeld), a tax paid by all incoming ships in the 
harbour towns. At first glance, the first phase of this war seemed to have 
ended in catastrophe for Lübeck and its allies, since the complete fleet of the 
Hanse was defeated. Nevertheless, following a ceasefire with the Danish king, 
which was maintained until early 1368, the merchants from Lübeck could 
regain access to the important herring markets in Scania. Hostilities flared 
up again in 1368 when a Hanseatic fleet conquered some important Danish 
strongholds in the Sound and, as a result, the Sound route could be opened 
again for Hanseatic maritime trade. However, to be prepared for this second 
phase of the war, complicated and lengthy negotiations between the Hanse 
towns were necessary. Since the commercial position of Lübeck was more or 
less fully re- established in the ceasefire of 1362, by which the access to the 
markets in Scania was guaranteed, Lübeck no longer had a deep interest in 
going to war again with the Danish king. In contrast, the trade of the Prussian 
towns and also that of Amsterdam, Kampen, Harderwijk, Dordrecht and 
Briel in the West suffered from the fact that the Sound route was still closed. 
At a diet in Cologne in November 1367, the towns decided to go to war again 
(‘Federation of Cologne’), a resolution that was only accepted by Lübeck and 
the Wendian towns with great reluctance. With a second ceasefire in 1369 
and the ‘Peace of Stralsund’ in 1370, the conflict was finally settled.272 Surely 
272 Cf. Selzer 2010, p. 66 f.
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these wars, commonly seen as wars of the Hanse, were responsible for the 
false interpretation of the Hanse as a powerful, well- armed and coordinated 
political actor encompassing numerous cities and towns. In fact, as can be 
seen from these cases, only a few of the Hanse towns were actively involved 
in these wars and other towns, like Amsterdam, at no time members of the 
Hanse, were included in the Federation of Cologne. Nonetheless, these con-
flicts then in turn had a catalytic function for a clearer definition of both the 
internal structure of the Hanse and its strategic claims.273
The problem of organising a powerful collective response to a violation 
of the towns’ commercial interests can be modelled in a game- theoretical 
framework, making the usual strict assumptions of utility maximisation, 
simultaneity of choice and absence of a third- party actor who would be able 
to enforce a cooperation of players. Then a simple game for two towns (play-
ers A and B) is defined as follows: costs CA and CB are the players’ individual 
contribution to the maintenance of a certain level of collective security, for 
instance. In a cooperative solution both players A and B accept to bear an 
equal share TC/2 of total maintenance costs, TC = CA + CB, but each of them 
is willing to pay the amount of WPi ≥ TC/2, if that level of collective security 
can be realised. There is a fundamental difference to the classic ‘public goods 
problem’274: unlike the production of knowledge for instance, here the pub-
lic good (collective security) cannot be generated by the efforts of only one 
player, simply because in most cases this would be too costly, and therefore 
would be an unrealistic choice. Thus, both WPA and WPB definitely lie below 
TC. In addition, a failure to maintain a certain level of collective security 
would affect the commercial interests of particular towns as well as those of 
the Hanse. As a consequence, the absence of the public good is felt by the 
towns as some sort of disutility –Ui, and their commercial interests are in fact 
at stake if collective security cannot be guaranteed. The amount of disutility 
cannot be clearly specified, but assuming risk aversion, it certainly lies below 
zero, and even if some towns are not aware of the commercial risks coming 
from a blockade of the Sound by the Danish, e.g., this value would equal 
zero at best. This was the case for the Westphalian towns during the con-
273 Cf. Dollinger 62012, pp. 83–90.
274 The classic public goods dilemma is described in terms of the so- called prison-
ers’ dilemma in Holler / Illing 31996, p. 8 f.
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flicts of the Hanse with the Danish king, because to them, at first glance, this 
blockade of maritime trade between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea did not 
appear to have any impact on their own trade. And this was also true for the 
strategic considerations of Lübeck before joining the Federation of Cologne 
rather unwillingly. Naturally, the rather abstract willingness to pay can only 
be converted into utility if the public good concerned is actually generated. 
In a cooperative solution, utility is calculated by subtracting individual costs 
from the willingness to pay (WPi – Ci). For the remaining potential outcomes 
of the game where collective security will not be generated, because at least 
one player is not contributing, players would face a disutility –Ui, and in the 
case that one decides to contribute while the other does not, they would also 
have to write off their own share of costs. Utility levels are displayed in the 
pay- off matrix of Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Pay- off Matrix of a Two- Player Collective Security Realisation Game
P layer B
P layer  A contributing not contributing Min. (A)
contributing A: WPA – TC/2
B: WPB – TC/2
A: –UA – TC/2
B: –UB








Min. (B ) –U B – TC /2 –U B
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
For this two- player-game, the outcome can easily be derived from the behav-
ioural assumptions that are made. For the purpose of maximising their own 
utility but minimising their risk both players will play a ‘min- max-strategy’; 
that is, they will opt for the best result of their personal worst cases, which in 
fact is not to contribute. Not contributing gives the maximum of the minima, 
which is –Ui respectively, the players A and B would have to face with regard 
to the other player’s possible decision. However, without the help of further 
institutions the players’ acknowledgement of the positive value of collective 
security does not convert automatically into fruitful cooperation. The strong 
disutility resulting from the commercial risks of not maintaining collective 
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security is an insufficient condition to finally attain a cooperation of towns 
to respond collectively. The problem is not only caused by free- riding alone, 
as is the case of the classic ‘public goods dilemma’. Since by definition col-
lective security usually cannot be ensured without the contribution of both 
players, free- riding is merely impossible here. Players will not contribute, 
because they fear that their personal investment could be useless. Investing 
in the armament of a fleet, for instance, will by no means reduce their own 
commercial risk if the other player is not doing the same. As the public good 
of ‘collective security’ will not be realised, this outcome, called the Nash- 
equilibrium275, is not an optimum result of course, neither with respect to 
individual nor to overall utility. If both towns decided to contribute, they 
would be better off individually as well as at the group level. This notwith-
standing, refraining from contribution is nonetheless a rational decision given 
the behavioural assumptions of the game. Even if players do not acknowledge 
the commercial benefits from collective security (WPi = 0), which was very 
often the case among Hanse towns, and do not perceive commercial benefits 
as such (–Ui = 0), the outcome would be the same. With WPi ≥ TC/2 and –Ui 
the cooperative solution of the game is Pareto- efficient insofar as neither of 
the players can improve their own utility level, and therefore also cannot 
be better off without decreasing the other’s utility level. The much better 
solution of both parties contributing can only be attained by third- party-
enforcement or mutual trust, elements that by definition are missing in this 
particular setting.276
The game can be easily extended to the more realistic case of n players. 
For each player the willingness to pay for the maintenance of collective 
security remains below total costs (WPi < TC), but again is greater than or 
equal to the individual costs of contribution (TC/n). Unlike the two- player-
game, not all players involved necessarily have to decide to cooperate to 
generate the public good. Collective security nonetheless can only be real-
ised if a considerable number of players contribute. Utility levels for each 
player i are calculated in exactly the same way as in the two- player-game 
(see Table 5.2 for pay- offs).
275 See on the concept of Nash- equilibrium Kreps 1990, pp. 28–36; Holler / 
Illing 31996, pp. 9–13.
276 Cf. Gravelle / Rees 32004, p. 283 f.
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Table 5.2: Pay- off Matrix of a N- Player Collective Security Realisation Game
Number j of other players contributing
P layer  i n – 1 n – 2 … n – … … 0 Min. (i)
contributing WPi – TC/n WPi – TC/(n–1) … Ui – TC/n … Ui – TC/n –U i – TC /n
not
contributing WPi WPi … –Ui … –Ui –U i
public good is realised ⇐ public good is not realised ⇐
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
To a certain degree, returns now depend upon the number j of players other 
than player i contributing, because if enough players decided to contribute 
and collective action could be guaranteed, these players would have to pay 
the maintenance costs. If not enough players contribute to finally realise 
the public good of collective security, each player will have to write off the 
equal- share-contribution (TC/n) only. For a particular player i the worst 
case scenario still is the one where he would pay for the maintenance of 
collective security, but many other players would not, so that security can-
not be maintained in the end. Thus, the equilibrium reached will be exactly 
the same as in the simpler two- player-case. Free- riding is now possible, 
and this can enhance the towns’ unwillingness to further contribute to 
the maintenance of collective security, because their own contribution not 
only is perceived as useless, but there is also an opportunity to get rid of 
the unpleasant commercial risk by not paying for it. This result does not 
change if the game is played in a sequential mode and players no longer 
have to decide simultaneously. For that reason the outcome can be referred 
to as a ‘missing- hero-dilemma’, because on rational grounds no player 
would decide to contribute, and be one of the ‘heroes’ who is paying for the 
maintenance of collective security. And even if, for whatever reason, enough 
players decided to contribute, incentives for the remaining players would 
not be altered in a way that encourages contribution. Quite the reverse in 
fact; by free- riding on the others’ investments the last players could benefit 
from the collective security already ensured.277 This might very well explain 
why only a few Hanse towns decided to contribute to any collective action.
277 Cf. Diekmann 1992.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
118
An open- ended repeated game now is an even more appropriate model 
to describe the real- life situation of the medieval Hanse. In general, trust 
between players can be built up if a game is played repeatedly. Setting the 
game with infinite repetitions then can make players opt for cooperation, 
accepting temporary losses of utility in one round, because the likelihood of 
being compensated in subsequent rounds is quite high due to the existence 
of trusted relationships. In contrast, given a finite number of repetitions and 
given that players know when the last round will be played, cooperation 
cannot be reached. Rationally behaving players will decide not to contrib-
ute in the last round, because no there are no more rounds to compensate 
for losses. This last- round-rationale can be transferred backward to earlier 
rounds, yielding always the same result.278 As long as not all players’ con-
tributions are needed to finally realise the public good of collective security, 
incentives to free- ride still exist, and any free- rider can assume that his own 
decision to not contribute to ensuring collective security will not prevent 
the production or the maintenance of this public good.279
The formal, but overall fairly weak structure of the Hanseatic League 
per se was certainly not able to enhance the cooperation of towns for the 
benefit of all. Participation in the diets of the Hanse was voluntary, the 
diets’ resolutions only encompassed non- controversial issues because of the 
underlying principle of unanimity, and the Hanseatic League itself had no 
real authority in getting resolutions accepted. To some degree mutual trust 
might have been effective here. Trust is a powerful tool for the coordination 
of private interests in smaller groups280, and the number of towns eligible 
for potential cooperations was small enough to let trusted relationships 
be an effective means of coordination, at least in the earlier history of 
the medieval Hanse. From the prosopographical research of both Dietrich 
W. Poeck281 and Friedrich Bernward Fahlbusch282 it is a now well- known 
and acknowledged fact, that there existed many kinship bonds between 
the councillors of different towns of the Hanse. And even though the diets 
278 Cf. Axelrod 1984, p. 10; Volckart 2004b, p. 28.
279 Cf. Volckart 2004b, p. 28.
280 Cf. Diekmann 1992.
281 Cf. Poeck 2002; 2010.
282 Cf. Fahlbusch 2002; 2005.
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of the Hanseatic League might not have been instrumental as a legislative 
institution of the Hanse, what is more important is that these events created 
opportunities for town representatives to meet on a more or less regular 
basis, and in this respect the diets certainly helped to build up trusted re-
lationships between towns. This personal element of the Hanseatic League 
can very well be seen in the formal structure of the written resolutions of 
the Hanse diets. These resolutions always began with a lengthy list of the 
names of those town representatives who were present at a particular diet. 
So, trusted relationships between town councillors helped to attract towns 
willing to cooperate, to pass resolutions at the diets and also to put such 
resolutions into action. On the other hand, the ever growing number of 
potential members of the Hanse in the end was dysfunctional for a fruit-
ful cooperation of towns based solely on trusted relationships and for ef-
fectively preventing free- riding among Hanse towns. Hence, with players 
assumed to behave rationally, in the long run voluntary care for the avoid-
ance of commercial risk and the contribution to the provision of collective 
security were barely possible.
A simple, but efficacious solution to enhance cooperation in this sort 
of situation is to transfer leadership to the actor involved whose private 
economic interests are at stake as a kind of reward for bearing the major-
ity of costs. In these cases, collective security remained a public good, but 
the defence of private economic interests served as a strong incentive to 
also enhance the willingness to contribute to its preservation on the part 
of those actors whose economic interests were not at stake. This was the 
case in the war between the Hanse and the Danish king in the period of 
1361–70. Lübeck assumed the leadership of the alliance in the first phase of 
the war with the clear aim of re- establishing the commercial position of its 
merchants in Scania, but thereafter, in the second phase of the war, handed 
leadership over to a group of Prussian and Dutch towns, simply because 
these towns had a much higher interest in ending the Danish blockade of the 
Sound. In both phases of the war, the pound toll made it possible to receive 
at least a share in the necessary military expenses of those towns which had 
initially been quite reluctant to join the cooperation. This notwithstanding, 
in similar cases the Westphalian towns often argued that they were not 
affected by such far away conflicts. So in the end a good explanation was 
needed as to why the resolution of a single conflict would be in the interest 
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of all Hanse towns. Letting private interests appear as common interests 
was usually a viable strategy for the potential future leader of the coalition. 
The leading role of Lübeck within the Hanse developed slowly over time, 
because the town representatives of Lübeck always tried to turn private 
strategic interests into common Hanseatic interests in order to pursue their 
proper economic objectives with the help of other towns. Finally, this pat-
tern also worked well with respect to the fight against interlopers, because 
here a common interest of usually more than one town was obvious.
As a result, the Hanseatic League as a formal, but in the end weak 
association of towns evolved, trying by and by, under the leadership of 
Lübeck, to monopolise Hanseatic decision- making. However, formalisation 
and hierarchisation of such cooperations on a case- by-case basis is neither 
a straightforward nor necessary outcome in the long run. This result may 
explain why such attempts to formalise the cooperation of Hanse towns 
and to establish a sort of central instance of decision- making were never 
truly successful. This central instance also failed, because free- riders and 
rule breakers could not be easily identified. A real threat to them would 
have been their exclusion from enjoying the trade privileges at the Kontore. 
However, the merchants of the Kontore were neither capable nor were they 
always interested in identifying and punishing those who did not respect 
the regulations which were negotiated at the Hanse diets.
Determinants of Fruitful Cooperation and of Cooperation Failure
Finally, we shall produce some general conclusions regarding the interplay 
of the different organisational layers of the Hanse. As has been shown in this 
chapter, the Hanse was a virtual and multipolar network organisation. Eco-
nomically, Hanse members formed a cartel to defend the quasi- monopoly 
of trade they enjoyed in Northern Europe, especially in the Baltic.
Quite similar to modern multipolar organisations, such as NATO, the 
EU or temporary military alliances, the cooperation of Hanse members 
was in principle rather difficult and required special conditions. The history 
of the Hanse, mainly the episodes of conflict with actors from outside the 
Hanse, can help to identify these requirements, especially with respect to the 
interaction of towns, merchants and the Kontore in the late Middle Ages. 
An economic theoretical analysis allows an explanation as to why certain 
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forms of cooperation emerged within the Hanse and others remained poorly 
developed or were even still lacking at the end of the fifteenth century.
From the Hanse example it becomes quite evident that a lasting coopera-
tion only evolved in the event that a formally and hierarchically structured 
organisation could be established, as was the case at the Kontore. Only this 
sort of organisation was capable to stabilise the merchants’ cartel in the 
long run. This was because general binding rules were defined and members 
of the cartel committed to these rules because they were threatened with 
punishment or, even worse, with the exclusion from the cartel in the event 
they broke these common rules, and because rule- breakers knew that they 
could easily be identified. Thus at the Kontore the cooperation and coordi-
nation of merchants became possible by setting mainly negative incentives.
In other parts of the virtual and multipolar organisation known as the 
Hanse this kind of regulation was either not implemented or attempts to do 
so were not successful in the end. Cooperation between Hanse towns was 
nonetheless possible, and it was usually a result of setting positive incen-
tives. Hence, it was a rather straightforward outcome that such forms of 
cooperation could only be achieved from time to time, and these occasional 
cooperations never really turned into a sustained form of cooperation. 
NATO and the EU have formal rules, and to some degree they also pos-
sess hierarchies. The late medieval Hanse lacked both of these institutional 
elements. Cooperation at the level of towns was based on the principle of 
setting positive incentives. A transformation of the network structure of 
the Hanse into a hierarchical structure more or less failed completely when 
Lübeck switched from setting positive incentives to setting negative ones, by 
intending to punish those towns or even to exclude them from the Hanse, 
which were ignoring or breaking the rules that had been negotiated at the 
Hanse diets, for instance, or by trying to influence the decision- making at 
the Kontore in a commanding manner, even though the competence to rule 
the Kontore historically lay exclusively in the hands of those merchants 
who traded there. A key factor of this failure was certainly the fact that the 
economic interests of towns and the commercial interests of merchants who 
traded at the Kontore could never be completely synchronised.
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Chapter 6 
Competitive Advantage or Limit to Business? – 
Contingency and Path Dependence
The Context of the Hanseatic Network Organisation
So far, we have shown in the previous chapters that the organisation of 
Hanseatic trade during the late Middle Ages was in many ways shaped by 
the principle of network organisation, and we provided arguments as to 
why this system of trade was instrumental to Hanseatic merchants in oper-
ating their commercial activities efficaciously and efficiently, at least from a 
short- term perspective. However, was this kind of structure also beneficial 
in the long run in creating a competitive advantage for the merchants, or did 
it tend to turn into a limit to their business? Or, to put it in a more abstract 
way, what effects did the Hanse’s network organisation produce in general?
To answer this question, two levels of potential impacts of the network 
organisation have to be distinguished. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
explain to what extent the form of network enterprise was an economically 
effective tool at the individual level for Hanseatic merchants in operating 
their trade. On the other hand, it would also be essential to assess the 
manifold repercussions this form of trade organisation had on economic 
development, growth and welfare in Northern Europe. So, both microeco-
nomic as well as macroeconomic features of the Hanse’s network organi-
sation shall be examined. Due to a rather poor basis of sources, the latter 
aspect seems to be far more difficult to analyse than the former. This is also 
because, unlike individual economic effects, economic development, growth 
and improvements in welfare cannot be exclusively attributed to the form 
of network organisation. General economic trends that were independent 
from the organisation of trade and the changing behaviour of the Hanse’s 
competitors also would have to be considered.
However, under which general conditions was it possible for the Hanse’s 
network organisation to work smoothly as well as successfully? This can 
be discussed in terms of the contingency theory of organisation. Following 
this theory, the form of organisation chosen by the Hanseatic merchants 
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can be explained by looking at some general conditions of their trade. This 
context, or trade environment, encompasses various features: the Hanseatic 
merchants saw themselves confronted with a variety of market conditions 
because the fairly high degree of market development already achieved in 
the West gradually stopped progressing eastwards.283 The Hanse’s trade 
also covered an immense geographical area, which is why sending messages 
along the trading routes took quite a long time. And finally, merchants 
could only rely on poorly developed legal and financial institutions. As a 
result, the exchange of commodities between Hanseatic merchants was still 
done in a rather simple way, without much need for capital, and transac-
tions took quite a long time and they also were highly uncertain. Within 
the contingency theory of organisation, both the smooth behaviour of the 
network organisation and its success can be explained as a kind of twin 
adaptation.284
Figure 6.1: Contingency Approach to the Hanse
Schematic of the contingency approach to the Hanse, showing the twin or double fit 
between structure and context, and between means of coordination and structure.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
283 See Chapter 4 in this volume and Ewert / Selzer 2006a.
284 Cf. Lawrence / Lorsch 1967/68; Kieser / Kubicek 31992, pp. 59 f. and 410 f.
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The first of these two necessary adaptations was that of the structural 
choice to its environmental conditions, or in other words: the network 
organisation and its ability to enable simple forms of exchange and loose 
cooperations suited the aforementioned general conditions of long- distance 
trade in the North Sea and the Baltic during the late Middle Ages. Hanseatic 
merchants dealt with these conditions by creating a network organisation 
for trade in the Hanse’s region itself, and by selecting, a more formalised 
type of organisation for their trading outposts, the Kontore. The second 
adaptation necessary was then the choice of a suitable coordination in-
strument. Within the network organisation of internal Hanseatic trade, 
non- hierarchical means such as trust, culture and reputation were chosen, 
whereas the Kontore were to some extent hierarchically organised. It was 
only thanks to this sort of twin adaptation that Hanseatic merchants were 
able to trade over long distances both efficaciously and efficiently.
This notwithstanding, there are unfortunately some drawbacks in using 
this theoretical concept. Even though contingency theory provides a general 
concept to explain the principle determination of organisational choices, 
this approach cannot explain variations in the particular choice of organi-
sational forms. Economic agents in general – and this certainly applies to 
Hanseatic merchants – are not restricted to simply accepting a certain causal 
mechanism triggered by environmental conditions; they are able, to some 
extent at least, to influence the design of their trade environment. In this 
respect, the contingency approach would have to be enhanced with some 
actor- related institutional economic considerations that might have affected 
the merchants’ rationale. In our view, the example of the medieval Hanse 
very clearly demonstrates that the economic agents had a fairly high degree 
of autonomy in their decision- making.
Economic Effects of the Hanseatic Network Organisation
Effectiveness and Profitability of Hanseatic Trade
The network organisation was especially suitable for increasing the indi-
vidual welfare of Hanseatic merchants, and this choice of structure made 
it possible to cut transaction and information costs significantly. The in-
formation costs of the Hanseatic merchants remained comparatively low, 
because with their reciprocal and reputation- based trade they could delegate 
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the gathering of all the relevant information for their commercial activities 
at the sales markets to their independently acting trading partners. This 
meant that such information did not need to be transmitted across the long 
distances within the Hanse’s realm.285 This increased both the flexibility 
and the speed of transactions, even though environmental conditions at 
first glance not appeared to have been amenable to a flexible and fast com-
mercial exchange.
As a result of the high degree of autonomy of trading partners it was pos-
sible, even under rapidly changing conditions, to react to market develop-
ments without the need for the owner of the goods to intervene. Following 
the principle of reciprocity, commercial exchange could be done without 
complicated written contractual commitments. This saved enforcement 
costs, because on legal grounds such commitments would have been virtu-
ally unenforceable. Hanseatic merchants were also able to reduce their or-
ganisation costs. As shown in previous chapters, they could minimise a wide 
range of potential contractual risks even though their transactions were 
only based on implicitly defined informal contracts in most cases.286 The 
network structure of the trade system facilitated the finding of trustworthy 
trading partners when establishing new business contacts. Reciprocal trade 
itself forced the merchants to act in the interests of the trading partner who 
had sent them goods, because the reciprocal structure of exchange meant 
that in the end the profit a merchant made by selling these goods was the 
profit he could pocket. This idea is clearly expressed in the legal principle 
by which anyone who dealt with the property of others as carefully as 
his own was legally unburdened. Thus, it was not necessary to carefully 
monitor commercial agents, and both sides involved in such reciprocal 
partnerships could, as owners of deliveries, use the other’s goods as a type 
of security. This institutional arrangement of trade worked because fair-
ness was enforced by a multilateral reputation mechanism, by which any 
form of merchant defection was threatened with the loss of reputation, and 
consequently with the complete loss of a merchant’s trading partnerships.287 
So, the first economic effect of the Hanse’s network organisation to men-
285 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001; Ewert / Selzer 2010.
286 Cf. Ripperger 1998, p. 63 f.
287 Cf. Ewert / Selzer 2010.
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tion is that such a simple, but very flexible system enabled the Hanseatic 
merchants to trade in a wide range of goods, and they were able to do so 
way into the sixteenth century.288
It is, however, not only the reduction of individual commercial risks that 
can be attributed to the network- supported trade on a reciprocal basis. 
‘Hard’ economic effects can also be quantified, at least indirectly. Walter 
Stark289 has attempted to estimate the profit rates of the maritime trade 
between Bruges and Novgorod. The empirical basis of his calculations 
is given by the fairly well- documented trade between the Veckinchusen 
family and the Danzig / Gdańsk merchant Johann Pyre. Although profits 
measured in terms of the turnover of goods were volatile, Stark ended up 
with an estimate of the average profit rate as 15 per cent. This meant that 
Hanseatic firms must have been just as profitable as the South German 
firm of Runtinger in Regensburg, for example.290 In the 1570s, Wolter von 
Holsten made even greater profits than that, due to an exceptional boom 
in the trade with Russia.291 It seems as if in Southern Germany it was not 
possible to make higher profits than this from traditional trade in the long 
run. Only through speculative deals involving much higher information 
costs, and through risky loans to princes, merchants were able to increase 
their profit rate significantly.292 Thus, with network organisation Hanseatic 
merchants appeared to have found the economically ideal answer to all the 
restrictions of their long- distance trade, which generally made their simple 
and less capital- intensive business lengthy and extremely uncertain.293
Economic Growth and Collective Welfare
It goes without saying that economists would certainly expect the growth 
effects of the Hanse’s network organisation to be quantified. Here, the 
medieval historian definitely comes up against the limits of the available 
source material. Economic growth and increasing welfare can nevertheless 
288 Cf. Ewert / Selzer 2006b.
289 Cf. Stark 1985; 2002.
290 Cf. Eikenberg 1976.
291 Cf. Pelus 1981.
292 Cf. von Stromer 1970.
293 Cf. Ewert / Selzer 2010.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
128
be derived from various indicators in qualitative terms. The most vis-
ible indicators are population growth, the increase in population density 
and the urbanisation of the areas covered by the eastbound European 
colonisation between the river Elbe and the Baltic, and in Scandinavia 
too. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a dense network of vil-
lages and towns evolved in what were formerly only sparsely populated 
areas. In these newly settled areas, prior to the sharp cut that happened 
in the first half of the fourteenth century, the population appears to have 
sporadically doubled every 25 years.294 Some of these newly founded 
settlements experienced kind of an economic ‘take- off’ within just a few 
years, a take- off that was not repeated until the nineteenth century period 
of industrialisation, as is exemplified by Lübeck in the first half of the 
thirteenth century.295 The most visible sign of the pre-1350 long- term eco-
nomic boom (which in the short term was potentially a very changeable 
one in terms of the urban property market296) was produced by the lead-
ing medieval segment of the building industry. The ‘petrification’ of the 
newly established towns, dominated by the typical red brick structures, 
became the very sign of communal wealth in the North of Europe.297 As 
residents of these towns, the Hanseatic merchants did not just profit from 
this economic boom; in part they were also the creators of an increasing 
collective welfare, inasmuch as their trade system played a major role in 
promoting economic development and growth.
Distribution of Income and Wealth in the Hanse towns
The rather slim organisational structure of Hanseatic enterprises and the 
low level of costs resulting from this organisational design made it espe-
cially easy for newcomers to start trade with only little capital at hand. 
The fact that a large number of small merchant enterprises existed in the 
Hanse must have certainly had an impact on the distribution of wealth 
in the Hanse towns. Theoretically, one would assume that the choice of 
network organisation would result in a specific, presumably relatively 
294 Cf. Borgolte 2002, p. 236.
295 Cf. Ranft 1995.
296 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 1988.
297 Cf. Thalheim (ed.) 2002.
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smooth distribution of wealth within the region of trade.298 This theoreti-
cal assumption coincides with the results of the research on inequality and 
the distribution of wealth in Hanse towns, which was done by Ahasver 
von Brandt.299 Using a tax list from 1460, he discovered that Lübeck had 
a much more balanced distribution of wealth than Augsburg (in 1475). 
This result was not only found for the town population as a whole, but 
in particular for its upper class. Despite all the difficulties that typically 
arise in such isolated analyses of the social structure of medieval towns300, 
the main feature to be stressed appears to be fairly valid. Late medieval 
Lübeck had a larger and more broadly supported upper class than Augs-
burg, while Augsburg at that time showed more inequality, and income 
and wealth concentrated on a much smaller group of people. More recent 
research into the social stratification of the towns of Greifswald, Rostock 
and Stralsund tends to confirm Ahasver von Brandt’s estimates rather 
than contradicting them.301
The Scope of Hanseatic Trade
In the case of Lübeck, undoubtedly the most important trading centre in 
the Baltic region, it is only possible to obtain a sketchy impression of the 
scope of Hanseatic trade from customs invoices. A few of these invoices 
survived in the archives. In 1368 over 1,800 ships entered or left the port of 
Lübeck. More than a century later, in the period 1492–96, the figures show 
only 760 arrivals and departures of commercial ships, although the average 
size of ships had increased in the meantime, of course.302 However, to give 
a more reliable picture these figures would have to be compared to trends 
elsewhere in Europe. Peter Spufford attempted to show that, compared 
with the sales conditions in Lübeck in the fourteenth century the turnover 
in the port of Genoa must have been five to six times greater than that.303 
It goes without saying that it would certainly not be incorrect to conclude 
298 Cf. Greif 2000, p. 278.
299 Cf. von Brandt 1979.
300 Cf. Meinhart / Ranft (eds.) 2005.
301 Cf. Igel 2005.
302 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 1993.
303 Cf. Spufford 2004, p. 281 f.
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that the volume of late medieval Hanseatic trade was much smaller than 
the trade volumes that were exchanged in the Mediterranean by that time, 
or those in sixteenth century Antwerp.304
The wealth of merchants and economic growth in the areas of Hanseatic 
trade thus also had its downside, because the lean structure and smaller size 
of the Hanseatic enterprises was surely related to the scope of Hanseatic 
trade. While the network organisation and reciprocal trade increased their 
capability to deliver a wide range of products everywhere in the North Sea 
and Baltic regions305, it was not possible for individual traders to handle 
large amounts of a particular commodity. So in the end, the network struc-
ture did not really produce ‘economies of scale’.
The Development of the Hanse’s Network Organisation and 
Path Dependence
Although the effects of the Hanseatic network organisation for the mer-
chants themselves as well as for welfare and growth in the North Sea and 
Baltic regions in the Middle Ages are obvious, at least in qualitative terms, 
it must not be forgotten that the story of the success of this organisation is 
ultimately a story of its long decline. The formal organisation of the Han-
seatic League continued to exist until 1669, and some merchant enterprises 
still remained successful in the sixteenth century. Also, several Hanse towns, 
such as Hamburg and Danzig / Gdańsk, first experienced great economic 
prosperity as early as in early modern times. Yet, this picture of a partially 
continuing economic success cannot hide the fact that the trade monopoly 
held by Hanseatic merchants in the Baltic region already began to erode 
during the fifteenth century, and that by the sixteenth century the Hanse 
had almost lost all of its political and economic importance. And unlike 
their upper German, English, Dutch and Italian competitors, the Hanse-
atic merchants had failed to get a foothold in the new transatlantic trade. 
At the end of the fifteenth century the commercial advantages Hanseatic 
merchants possessed in the Baltic were rapidly ceasing. Hence, had the 
Hanse’s network organisation, even though it had once enabled highly 
304 Cf. Spufford 2004, p. 282 f.
305 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001, p. 158.
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profitable trade, now turned into a serious limitation to their business, a 
barrier that increasingly began to spoil any further development of Han-
seatic commerce? And, was this institutional arrangement of trade, as a 
consequence, not only responsible for the obvious rapid economic growth 
before 1400, but did it also block a continuing expansion of Hanseatic 
trade, and therefore inhibited further economic development, growth and 
welfare in Northern Europe after 1400?
The reasons for the decline of the Hanse at the transition from the late 
Middle Ages to the early modern period are either generally sought at a 
political level or this decline is explained by exogenous economic factors 
only. These determinants primarily include the loss of importance of the 
commercial centre of Bruges in the late fifteenth century and, as a result 
of the discovery of the American continent and the opening of the sea 
route to India, a shift of the European trade routes towards the Atlantic. 
Such explanatory concepts require a further improvement. It is very likely 
that some of the factors that determined the decline of the Hanse and the 
Hanseatic League in the long term were inherent to the structure and to 
the restructuring of the network organisation, and can thus be interpreted 
as so- called path dependencies. The concept of path dependency combines 
the classic straightforward economic explanation, which assumes foresight 
and the actors’ unrestricted ability and autonomy in decision- making, with 
a historical and process- oriented interpretation.306 This kind of an explana-
tory concept is very well suited to showing the manifold growth- inhibiting 
effects of the Hanse’s network organisation.
Any organisation can be inefficient for various reasons. Inefficiency can 
occur, for example, because the organisation’s structure and its form of 
coordination create natural limits to growth, because the smooth function-
ing of the organisation causes all kinds of change to appear superfluous, or 
because with a change in either the structure or the coordination mechanism 
the necessary fit of structure and means of coordination disappear. It may 
also be that the context of the organisation changes over time, or that the 
context is deliberately changed by the members of the organisation them-
selves. Even if such an attempt aims to increase both the effectiveness and 
306 Cf. Arthur 1989; David 1994; Puffert 2006.
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the efficiency of the organisation, it might nevertheless result in inefficiency. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that with the intention of further developing their 
system of trade, and of protecting themselves against an increasing compe-
tition, the Hanseatic merchants repeatedly made decisions by which they 
unintendedly forced their network organisation into irreversible structural 
changes. This then led to a so- called ‘lock- in’ of the institutional arrange-
ment, a development path that could not easily be left again after a certain 
point in time, with the result that Hanseatic trade was no longer efficient. 
This failure of the institutional arrangement of trade as a whole was path- 
dependent307 insofar as precisely those strategies that had been employed 
by the Hansards successfully at earlier stages in the history of the Hanse 
then turned into a severe hindrance to further sustained growth of their 
trade system.308
When applying the approach of path dependency to the Hanse case, it 
is very sensible to distinguish different periods in its history between the 
thirteenth and the sixteenth century, and to ask to what extent the organi-
sational choices that were made by the Hansards shaped the development 
of the network organisation. In the literature on the Hanse to date, three 
main phases of development are distinguished, each of which are connected 
to a certain historical event, namely: the rise of the Hanse in the late twelfth 
to the early fourteenth centuries beginning with the second foundation of 
Lübeck by Henry the Lion in 1158/9, the Hanse’s climax in 1370 (‘Peace of 
Stralsund’) and its decline after 1474. We attempt to use an economic his-
tory perspective to test whether this political split of the Hanse into several 
development phases still holds (or not) when the parallel development of 
the trade organisation over time is analysed.
Network Size, Cultural Borders and the Network Paradox
Various structural elements of the Hanseatic network organisation can be 
identified, which inherently created natural boundaries for the growth of 
the organisation on a long term basis. Thus the decision to have a network 
307 See on the theoretical concept of path dependency, a paradigm which is dis-
cussed in economic theory for some time already, for instance Arthur 1989; 
David 1994; Puffert 2006; Sydow / Schreyögg / Koch 2009.
308 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005; Ewert / Selzer 2007.
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organisation typically caused a path dependence, and as a consequence 
this also could imply a growth- inhibiting effect, at least in the very long 
run.
The founding conditions of the Hanseatic merchants’ long- distance 
trade network were shaped, as we saw previously, by the eastward migra-
tion of families from the Rhineland, from Westphalia and from Lower 
Saxony in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a migration that was part 
of the general eastbound European colonisation at that time. The foun-
dation of branch towns in the Baltic region created kinship ties between 
the trade centres, which were then preserved for generations. However, 
a significant difference between the Hanseatic network organisation and 
modern network organisations was that the emergence of a specific or-
ganisational pattern, at least in the beginning, was not really the result of 
conscious effort, but evolved from the geographical and demographical 
conditions of the time. In the beginning, networking proved to be almost 
the only viable strategy to establish commercial exchange between the 
developed regions in the West and the still undeveloped regions in the 
East, a fact that was tested within a simulation model of early Hanseatic 
trade.309 There is some evidence however, that over time the so- called 
‘network paradox’ appeared in the case of the Hanseatic merchants’ net-
work organisation. The network paradox describes the divergence of the 
organisational design on the one hand, and the actual pattern in which 
the members of an organisation cooperate with each other on the other.310 
A typical development that can be observed in connection with network 
organisations is the emergence of a rather fixed, sometimes almost hier-
archical structural pattern. What was originally thought of as a loosely 
structured and non- hierarchical organisation becomes petrified as a result 
of the repeated clustered interaction of network members. This transfor-
mation of a network organisation is clear when compared to possible 
developments within bureaucratic organisations.
309 Cf. Ewert / Sunder 2012.
310 Cf. Aderhold / Meyer 2003, p. 154.
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Figure 6.2: The Network Paradox
Cross- classification of the type of organisation and intended vs. actual structure 
of cooperation inside the organisation. Graph developed following Aderhold / 
Meyer 2003.
Source: Authors’ own drawing.
Bureaucratic organisations are based by design on formal hierarchies, but 
in reality social networks matter very much indeed, as they often allow 
a much quicker and more efficient way to deal with tasks. Likewise, the 
organisational design and the actual pattern of cooperation within the or-
ganisation can differ tremendously in a network organisation. Although 
implemented with the intention of enabling loose and flexible cooperation 
in the best interests of all members, a network organisation can easily turn 
into a fragmentary group of clusters with a quasi- petrified, formal and even 
hierarchical structure (see Figure 6.2).311
311 Cf. Aderhold / Meyer 2003.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
135
In the long term, the concentration of trade partnerships to relatives 
over several generations, the reliance on kinship networks, the emergence 
of separate subgroups within the network organisation thus led, step by 
step, to a petrification of the network, a result that fundamentally contra-
dicted the flexibility of this organisational choice. Kinship bonds and social 
proximity created areas within the Hanse’s network organisation where 
power was distributed asymmetrically. Hence, the Hanseatic habit of pre-
dominantly cooperating with family members and friends, which produced, 
as we have repeatedly shown in previous chapters, significant economic 
benefits for merchants, nevertheless threatened the generally flexible and 
variable character of the commercial network.
In addition, the question concerning the exact meaning of reputation 
and trust as cooperation- enhancing mechanisms arises, as commonly net-
work members’ activities only could be coordinated when both trust and 
reputation already existed. The process of building up trust and reputation 
took time, of course, and once trust and reputation had been built up, in 
most circumstances it would have been a non- efficient decision for mer-
chants not to capitalise these means. Nevertheless, using reputation for 
commercial purposes and only relying on trustworthy partners definitely 
increased the likelihood of sticking with virtually the same set of trading 
partners. In turn this meant that the whole commercial network became 
fragmentary. And in fact, despite trading goods with quite a number of 
commercial partners, Hanseatic merchants nonetheless usually held on to 
these already established core partnerships for quite a long time. More-
over, this development of structure then made expansion more difficult, 
or even impossible. In the case of the Hanse and the Hanseatic merchants, 
this transformation was even further accelerated, because the multilateral 
reputation mechanism in reciprocal trade favoured the merchants’ ori-
entation towards relatives and partnerships based on kinship bonds, and 
thus fostered a tendency for the established cluster of persons to close 
ranks against outsiders.
Finally, for exactly the same reason the concept of ‘cooptition’ has to 
be taken very cautiously, even though Hanseatic merchants, in contrast 
to their contemporaries from Upper Germany, never really forbade cross- 
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competition inside their networks.312 Hence, ‘cooptition’ might be a bril-
liant idea in theory, but in the long run it seems to have been a rather poor 
concept in practice for the late medieval Hanseatic merchants.
A second growth- limiting element inherent to the network organisa-
tion is its cultural boundary.313 It is a well- established fact of sociological 
research and network studies, that networks that are based on cultural 
bonds are hardly able to incorporate members who lack these commonly 
accepted values, and that such networks cannot be expanded beyond a 
certain group size without attracting free- riders in greater numbers due to a 
resulting malfunction of the underlying multilateral reputation mechanism. 
The organisation therefore cannot grow because cultural identity creates a 
natural border. A mutual cultural orientation of the network members can 
only have a coordinating effect if the network is limited to members with 
the same cultural background. The multilateral reputation mechanism that 
is an effective and efficient means of coordination in network organisa-
tions prevents the crossing of such cultural borders, but above all it loses 
its effectiveness as the network expands. A greater anonymity of network 
members and participants of the network significantly reduces the prob-
ability of being caught in the case of fraud, just as it becomes less likely 
with an increasing number of persons that cases of fraud become public.
These very general empirical results regarding networks do apply to 
the Hanse and its merchants, and they are confirmed by various trends 
in the development of the Hanse’s network organisation of trade. It has 
been shown previously that the Hanse was in a sense a ‘small world’ – but 
only for Hansards. To strangers, however, the Hanse must have appeared 
as a closed society, almost impossible to reach. And in fact, it really was. 
The negative impact of such self- containment is quite typical for networks 
based on cultural identity and kinship bonds. The Florentine banker Ghe-
rardo Bueri proved to be one of the rare exceptions to this rule, because 
he managed to settle in the city of Lübeck and establish his business there. 
However, it was only after he had married into a rich local family that he 
could also join a Hanseatic network.314
312 Cf. Sprandel 1984.
313 Cf. Greif 2000, p. 275 f.
314 Cf. Fouquet 1998.
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A cultural border was already created by the first trade privileges that 
were awarded to Hanseatic merchants, inasmuch as the initially distinct 
groups of Lower German merchants who had cooperated in order to gain 
these privileges had one thing in common – the Low German language.315 
Ideally, their only contact with other foreign traders was at the markets 
where the goods entered the Hanseatic trade system, or where goods 
from North and East Europe left the system again. Moreover, there was 
a distinct lack of trade fairs in the Hanseatic region.316 Cooperation with 
non- Hanseatic merchants, the so- called Butenhansen, became increasingly 
and also formally forbidden.317 In addition, Hanseatic merchants tended 
to avoid commercial activities in Southern Germany. They frequented of 
course the Francfort trade fairs, but there was no real Hanseatic trade as 
such south of the river Main.318
This cultural barrier as a kind of informal network boundary was less 
problematic for economic growth in the Hanseatic region as long as the 
European trade regions still largely existed alongside one another. In the 
early stages of the Hanse, trade was restricted to Hanseatic merchants, and 
it was possible to massively expand the network organisation by founding 
branch towns in the Baltic and through the easternbound migration of 
merchants. As a result, by the fourteenth century the Hanse’s network or-
ganisation became a clearly defined entity. However, with the emergence of 
an overall European, and soon to be transatlantic economic area after 1450, 
the Hansards could not explore the new market opportunities that emerged 
outside of the Hanseatic region. They were not able to gain a foothold in 
these new markets to the same extent that their competitors were able 
to penetrate the Hanse’s economic realm at the same time.319 Particularly 
symptomatic in this respect is the collapse of the Venetian trading company 
of the Hanseatic Veckinchusen family. What is striking is that this com-
pany, which was especially created for the Italian trade, had different legal 
and organisational structures than those the same merchants commonly 
315 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, S. 61.
316 Cf. Irsigler 2002.
317 Cf. Sprandel 1984, S. 32 f.
318 Cf. Schneidmüller 1991.
319 Cf. Sprandel 1984; Jenks 2005.
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practised within the Hanse’s network trade. This enterprise nevertheless 
failed due to a lack of knowledge about the personal relationships that were 
necessary in the Venice trade and that proved to be completely different to 
the well- known personal bonds within the Hanseatic commercial setting 
the Veckinchusen family was used to.320 And, since Hanseatic merchants 
very strictly held on to the trade privileges of the Hanse in London, Bruges, 
Bergen and Novgorod, and since the multilateral reputation mechanism 
only worked to perfection in smaller or medium- size networks, it was quite 
difficult for them to expand beyond the borders of their settled network- 
based system of trade that had been working for so many generations with 
such great success.
Adaptations Missed Because of the Success  
of the Network Organisation
The long- distance trade of the Hanse was successful because of the mer-
chants’ privileges in the markets at the outposts of the Hanse, and because 
the form of cooperation of reciprocal trade within the network organisation 
had apparently worked smoothly for such a long time. The position of the 
Hanse in Bruges was unrivalled among the merchants from other European 
trader nations.321 This traditionally superior position, however, resulted in 
the Hanse’s strategy to maintain its relationship to the Bruges stockyard 
longer than other nations, and as a consequence, this made it difficult for 
Hanseatic merchants to use the markets of Antwerp and Bergen- op-Zoom, 
which were already becoming more important by the end of the fifteenth 
century. It was only in 1564–68 that the Hansards finally abandoned Bru-
ges and built a new Kontor in Antwerp, a much belated attempt to catch 
up with an economic shift that by this time had in fact been accomplished 
decades before.322 The ‘network memory’323, which saw Hanseatic trade 
automatically connected to the market of Bruges, thus led to a delay of the 
necessary restructuring. This in turn facilitated Southern German merchants 
320 Cf. Stieda 1894; Kluge 2013.
321 Cf. Vermeersch 1992.
322 Cf. Friedland 1963.
323 Cf. Windeler 2001.
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to penetrate Northwestern Europe, merchants who were far more active 
than the Hanseatic merchants in sixteenth century Antwerp.324
A second field, where ongoing success inhibited structural change, is 
banking and financial institutions. The Hanseatic merchants’ trade network 
was well- adapted to the lack of cash in the Hanseatic region.325 Risk capital 
was virtually unnecessary in a long- distance trade of this dimension. In 
addition, the risk capital that firms from Upper Germany obtained from 
investors in the form of deposits from princes, noblemen and the church, 
was not available to the urban upper and middle classes in the Hanseatic 
area, certainly a spin- off of a relatively balanced distribution of income in 
the Hanse towns. Initially, there was an old contract form known as the 
wedderleginge or vera societas326, which enabled the pooling of free capital 
by various merchants for a mutual trading venture. This form of coopera-
tion however, was no longer of great importance in the late medieval period, 
which also points to fact that there was no capital market worth mention-
ing in the Hanse’s realm. Around 1500, when the Hanseatic merchants 
were confronted with the appearance of effective capital markets – first in 
Antwerp and later in the sixteenth century in Amsterdam – this lack of risk 
capital inside the Hanse and the Hanse’s only poorly developed banking 
system then turned into a commercial disadvantage, because Hansards were 
now faced with competitor enterprises, which were substantially better 
capitalised, and which also had easy access to risk capital.327
Likewise, within a system of long- distance trade that operated with little 
capital and also vehemently attempted to protect itself against competition, 
there was virtually no need for radical developments of trading techniques, 
such as the introduction of an efficient accounting system. Nor should it 
be forgotten that even in the fifteenth century, the simple Hanseatic sys-
tem of trade was flexible enough to integrate regions which still differed 
a lot in their economic development. The network organisation enabled 
Hanseatic merchants to be equally active in the poorly developed market 
324 Cf. Harreld 2000.
325 Cf. Sprandel 1975.
326 Cf. Cordes 1998; 2000.
327 Cf. Schonewille 1998.
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of Novgorod328, where they had to be present in person to trade with the 
Russian suppliers of furs, skins and wax, and the already highly developed 
medieval ‘world market’ of Bruges329, where cashless payment had been 
common for a long time. However, since the reciprocal trade preferred by 
Hanseatic merchants preserved a smaller volume of trade and less capital 
resources in general, the competitiveness of the Hanseatic merchants suf-
fered significantly during the transatlantic expansion of European trade 
that was a matter of fact in the early sixteenth century.
The Multiplicity of Structure, and a Mismatch  
of Structure and Coordination
Besides the fact that Hanseatic businesses were quite small in size and thus 
had to adapt themselves to a given heterogeneous context, the Hanse’s 
commercial exchange was embedded in several overlapping organisational 
layers – traders’ networks, the Kontore, Hanse towns and the Hanseatic 
League. A higher degree of formalisation of the cooperative structure of the 
Hansards can be detected from the middle of the fourteenth century on-
wards with the formal emergence of the Hanseatic League. This structural 
change was formerly understood as a transition from the ‘Hanse of mer-
chants’ to the ‘Hanse of towns’330 , and it can be derived from a rationalisa-
tion, institutionalisation and recording of the decision- making procedures.
This notwithstanding, the likelihood of potential conflicts between the 
individual interests of merchants and the collective interests of town com-
munities and of the Kontore presumably increased even more after the for-
mation of the Hanseatic League. As the institution that enforced privileges, 
the Kontore were not controlled by any central instance; quite the reverse, 
in fact. The Kontore often developed their own trade policies, which then 
counteracted the objectives of Hanseatic merchants who not traded at the 
Kontore as well as the policies of Hanse towns. In addition to the Kontore 
in London, Bruges, Bergen and Novgorod, the Hanseatic League itself thor-
oughly developed its own economic and political scopes and vigorously at-
328 Cf. Angermann / Friedland (eds.) 2002.
329 Cf. Vermeersch 1992; Murray 2000; Stabel 2001; Greve 2000; 2001.
330 Cf. Wernicke 1983; Henn 1984.
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tempted to get these interests accepted, not only by foreign traders, but also 
by the Hanseatic merchants themselves.331 Originally designed to coordinate 
the merchants’ interests, to oversee trade and to provide the enforcement 
of privileges and trade regulations, it was this multiplicity of structure itself 
that put a further constraint on the activities of Hanseatic merchants.332 
The most important Hansards acted as town representatives at the diets of 
the Hanseatic League. These regular meetings of envoys from the Hanse 
towns are often misunderstood as a sort of ‘Hanse parliament’. However, 
the group of representatives at these conventions typically claimed that 
they were acting in the interests of the society of German merchants333, 
but the coercive measures available to them usually proved to be much 
too weak to enforce and to maintain any of the agreed resolutions. Often, 
massive conflicts with the Kontore arose, typically concerning the measures 
to be employed to promote Hanseatic trade in a particular place.334 The 
emergence of the Hanseatic League as a formal political entity furthermore 
points to the problems of collective action and the notorious instability of 
cartels as has shown previously in Chapter 5 of this volume. It was foresee-
able, that a powerful member of this cartel, namely Lübeck, had to take 
over to prevent its dissolution.335
As the Kontore in Bruges, London, Bergen and Novgorod, particular 
Hanse towns and the Hanseatic League often did not have the same eco-
nomic and political scopes, merchants became increasingly trapped by the 
negative effects of this multiplicity of structure. This of course could cre-
ate situations in which single merchants came into conflict with higher 
order economic interests, for instance when they were confronted with the 
Hanse’s typical ban on the formation of business partnerships with non- 
Hanseatic traders.336 This seems to have been the case during embargoes. 
During the Hanse’s blockade of Flanders lasting from 1358 to 1360 for 
331 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 31 f.
332 Cf. von Brandt 1963.
333 Cf. Pitz 2001.
334 Cf. Henn 2001.
335 See for a description of this economic phenomenon in a medieval setting 
Volckart 2004a; 2004c.
336 Cf. Sprandel 1984, p. 32 f.
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instance, the traders of the town of Kampen tried to profit from the circum-
stances by neglecting to respect the prohibition of trade.337
All in all, this development can be seen as the typical kind of confronta-
tion that evolves when attempts are made to coordinate a network organi-
sation in a hierarchical manner. In the terminology of contingency theory, 
one could say that as soon as the more or less regular diets of the Hanse 
started to be effective, there was no longer a match in the structure and 
coordination of the Hanse’s network organisation. As a consequence, inef-
ficiency within the network organisation was inevitable. Such a negative 
consequence could arise, as in the case of Breslau / Wrocław in 1474, if a 
town voluntarily renounced its membership of the Hanse338, also causing a 
rupture in the network at merchant level. Following the town’s departure 
all merchants from Breslau / Wrocław were officially excluded from the use 
of the Hanse’s trade privileges, a fact which tore apart numerous personal 
bonds between Breslau / Wrocław merchants and merchants from other 
Hanse towns.
The acceptance of responsibility for the cooperative structure of the 
Hanse by the town councils from which the members came also provoked 
conflicts of interests within towns, which is vividly expressed in the form 
of the many urban riots that can be observed in Hanse towns from the 
last third of the fourteenth century onwards.339 In most cases, neither all 
of the citizens, nor all of the merchants of a particular Hanse town were 
equally interested in the use of the Hanse’s trade privileges. The distribu-
tion of load between the members of the cooperative as the beneficiaries 
of trade privileges became even more complicated by the involvement of 
the towns insofar as these had very different interests in the privileges at 
the different trading centres. This becomes clear when looking at the com-
mercial interests of those groups that were involved in the Lübeck riots at 
the beginning of the fifteenth century. It was only the ‘Old Council’, which 
traditionally consisted of merchants, that explicitly argued with Hanseatic 
interests, and not the opposition party, which was also supported by a 
337 Cf. Friccius 1932/33.
338 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow 2000, p. 111 f.
339 Cf. Ehbrecht 1976.
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group of merchants.340 In such conflicts the diets of the Hanseatic League 
commonly took the side of the established council members, who in turn 
also supported the interests of the Hanse, and vigorously expelled towns 
from the Hanseatic League after a violent change of the town council. As 
a consequence of such a Verhansung (‘an exclusion from the Hanse’) the 
Hanseatic network organisation of trade was partially damaged, because 
expulsion also always meant a rupture of valuable personal bonds.
The Change of Economic Conditions
Changes, either exogenous or endogenous, in the commercial environment 
to which the Hanse’s network organisation of trade had originally been 
so well adapted, obviously put this trading system under severe pressure 
towards the end of the fifteenth century. Firstly, the merchants’ poten-
tial to remain flexible at the cost of an under- developed capital market 
structure within the inner reach of the Hanseatic system of trade meant 
that Hanseatic merchants, unlike their non- Hanseatic competitors, had 
almost no access to risk capital, which would have been urgently needed 
for much bigger commercial endeavours than those that had been typically 
undertaken within the internal Hanseatic trade.341 Secondly, the Hanse’s 
policy to block opponents on the grounds of the privileges and liberties its 
merchants enjoyed in Bruges prevented both of them from realising early 
enough that the economic importance of the Bruges market was rapidly 
declining as the Antwerp market expanded during the second half of the 
fifteenth century. And finally, harmonisation of the conditions of internal 
Hanseatic trade reduced transaction costs inside the Baltic for Hanseatic 
merchants, vastly facilitating their trading operations. By a standardisation 
of weights and measures, the introduction of quality control for goods, the 
increase in legal security for shipping goods abroad and the attempt made 
at introducing a main currency by establishing a regional minting associa-
tion the Hansards were able to gradually harmonise the economic regions 
of Northern Europe, and thus reduce the transaction costs of trade.342 This 
340 Cf. Barth 1974.
341 Cf. Schonewille 1998.
342 Cf. Jenks 2005.
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much is true. Yet, the externalities of such harmonising attempts lowered 
transaction costs for non- Hanseatic merchants as well. As a result, by the 
end of the fifteenth century the commercial competitors of the Hanse were 
then more and more able to enter the Hanseatic system of trade, and this 
posed a serious threat to the privileged commercial position Hanseatic 
merchants had so far enjoyed in the Baltic.
However, a serious point of criticism using contingency theory with 
regard to the causal impact of the organisational context on the organisa-
tion itself is that this kind of explanation sticks to a far too mechanistic 
perception of the world.343 In this view, organisations, or their members, 
are thought of as actors, who are only capable of reacting to a changing 
environment. It unquestionably makes sense in the short term, for example 
because of transaction cost economics considerations, to choose a structure 
to suit the context, but in the long term the context itself can, in turn, be 
altered by the members, to a certain extent at least. Therefore organisations 
and their members do not always have to passively accept a given environ-
ment for their activities, and in the long run their ability to act is not solely 
limited to designing the organisational structure in a reactive manner and 
to selecting the appropriate coordination mechanism. In the strict sense 
of the concept, the further development of the organisation is considered 
path- dependent only if such adaption and a restructuring of the organisa-
tion would be, for whatever reason, impossible.
There is another form of organisational path dependence, however, which 
is characterised by initially unintended externalities that are produced by a 
proactive behaviour of organisation members. Such a proactive behaviour 
appears to have happened with regard to the Hanse’s network organisation 
of trade. In what were originally very heterogeneous economic zones of 
trade and a commercial world with poorly developed institutions, network-
ing proved to be an optimal strategy for Hansards to operate their trade. 
Using the pattern of reciprocal trade, in combination with the coordinating 
effect of the merchants’ reputation, was initially an ideal choice of structure 
for the emerging institutional arrangement of trade. With the establishment 
of the Hanseatic League by the middle of the fourteenth century at the 
343 Cf. Child 1972; Kieser / Kubicek 31992.
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latest, the Hanse and Hanseatic merchants tried to alter these basic condi-
tions for their trade in such a manner that the network organisation was 
no longer suitable as an alternative means of organisation, simply because 
it no longer fitted the context. It was at this point that path dependence 
came back into the picture, because all of the restructuring and harmonis-
ing attempts had unintended, but nevertheless serious consequences for 
the competitiveness of Hanseatic merchants. What sought to improve the 
market position of Hanseatic merchants finally turned against them. Even 
though these measures actually reduced transaction costs for Hanseatic 
merchants, transaction costs for all of their potential competitors were 
equally reduced. For potential competitors it now became easier to operate 
in the core areas of the Hanse, because they could no longer be effectively 
excluded from making use of these newly established public goods.344 There 
was also a general reduction of transaction costs at the Kontore, which in 
turn diminished the commercial value of the trade privileges enjoyed by the 
Hanse and its merchants. As a consequence, the commercial advantages of 
Hanseatic merchants began to slowly fade away. Under these circumstances 
potential competitors of the Hanseatic merchants were now able to achieve 
higher ‘economies of scope and scale’ with their more efficient forms of or-
ganisation than those of the Hanseatic merchants, and this was one of the 
reasons for the Hanseatic merchants’ loss of ground in international trade 
around 1500 and the beginning of the Hanse’s long decline.
344 Cf. Seifert 1997.
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Chapter 7 
Perspectives of Research into Hanseatic  
Trade – the Impact of the Model  
of Network Organisation
A Short Look Back
Our first article on the network pattern of Hanseatic trade dates back to the 
year 2001 and was published in the Hansische Geschichtsblätter, the lead-
ing scholarly journal of Hanse historiography.345 Through a description in 
terms of network organisation of the typical modes by which the Hansards 
usually handled commercial exchange we were able to use economic theory 
to explain many features of the Hanse’s system of trade, such as a domi-
nance of small- size firms, a dominance of reciprocal trade without formal 
contracting and an obvious lack of risk capital, and this in turn revealed 
that the whole trade system of the Hanse must have been a very efficacious 
and efficient and thus viable pattern of commercial exchange. We gained 
our insights on the basis of the, in those days still relatively scarce, available 
source material on the commercial practices of Hanseatic merchants, some 
of which was already edited, and on the grounds of a careful interpretation 
of the published literature.
With this first result the floor was open to further analyses of Hanseatic 
trade and the Hanse’s institutions of trade. However, even though the idea 
of network and of network organisation in connection with Hanseatic 
trade was quickly picked up by many other researchers and is now widely 
accepted within the scientific community, progress in this field proved to be 
much slower than initially expected. We ourselves recurrently contributed 
with numerous articles and working papers to the vivid evolving discussion 
on the characteristics of the institutions of Hanseatic trade.346
345 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2001.
346 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005; 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2001; 2006a; 2006b; 2007, 
2009, 2010, 2015.
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Yet, what we hoped for some 15 years ago – a much richer empirical test 
of the hypothesis of network organisation with respect to Hanseatic trade 
and a much more fruitful discussion in economics and economic history on 
general trends in the development of late medieval institutions of trade – has 
so far not been fulfilled by Hanse historiography. Nevertheless, compared 
with the situation that was apparent around the year 2000, Hanse research 
since then had developed significantly into this new field, theoretically as 
well as empirically. Hence, we will finally give a brief sketch of what in 
particular has changed during the last decade and of the newer trends in the 
economic history of the Hanse that have emerged in recent years.
Methodological Advances and Newly Published Sources
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, around the year 2000 research into 
the Hanse was not really strongly connected to economics in a broader 
sense, neither to economic theory nor to economic history. In this first 
chapter we attempted to show how, for various reasons, an older relation-
ship between Hanse historiography and economics that existed in the late 
nineteenth as well as in the early twentieth century was broken after 1945. 
Given this tremendous divergence in the development of Hanse histori-
ography on the one hand side and of economics on the other, it is quite 
astounding in retrospect that economists like Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom 
and Barry M. Weingast were taking the Hanse, or to be more precise, the 
voluntary cooperation of Hanseatic merchants at the Bruges Kontor, as an 
example of their model of guild formation they developed in their seminal 
and extremely influential paper of 1994.347
In contrast to what was the standard at about 15 years ago, recent pub-
lications, namely those in the Hansische Geschichtsblätter, on Hanseatic 
trade and topics related to it, now have a different scope and a much more 
pronounced theoretical emphasis. They often incorporate concepts from the 
social sciences or from economics such as transaction cost theory348 or sys-
347 Cf. Greif / Milgrom / Weingast 1994. For a discussion of this approach 
see Clark 2007 and Ogilvie 2007.
348 Cf. Selzer / Ewert 2005; Jenks 2005; Link / Kapfenberger 2005; Ewert / 
Selzer 2009.
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tems theory and cybernetics349. Even the methodological approach of game 
theory to both the Hanse and to Hanseatic trade, used before by Mark 
Schonewille350 and ourselves, has also been taken up again.351 Certain ideas 
originating from another historical context, as is the case with the concept of 
a distributive revolution in the nineteenth century, have now been transferred 
to the commercial world of late medieval Hanse towns, thereby making use 
of Hanseatic source material.352 This newly established and fruitful openness 
also pertains to several recently published surveys on the Hanse.353
What is presumably most important for the apparent ongoing change 
in scope and methodology within the research into the economic history 
of the Hanse is the fact that during the last 15 years several valuable series 
of source material have been edited and published, which in the near fu-
ture will certainly allow for tests of some of the hypotheses regarding the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of Hanseatic trade institutions, hypotheses 
that have so far only been formulated on the grounds of economic theory. 
Among these recently edited sources are the pound toll lists of Danzig / 
Gdańsk, some of the account books of the commercial agents and the chief 
sales and buying officer (Großschäffer) of the Teutonic Order, many of the 
journals and manuals of the Veckinchusen family and a pound toll list from 
1485/86 for Hamburg and Lübeck.354
Network Organisation as a Formative Pattern  
of Pre- modern Trade
Our initial approach to take the institutional arrangement of Hanseatic 
trade as an early case of network organisation is widely accepted now.355 
349 Cf. Jahnke 2013; Jenks 2014.
350 Cf. Schonewille 1998.
351 Cf. Wubs- Mrozewicz 2013.
352 Cf. Jenks 2015.
353 Cf. Selzer 2010; Wubs- Mrozewicz / Jenks (eds.) 2013; Jahnke 2014; 
Harreld (ed.) 2015.
354 Cf. Jahnke (ed.) 2006; Hess (ed.) 2008; Link / Sarnowsky (eds.) 2009; Jenks 
(ed.) 2012; Laczny / Sarnowsky (eds.) 2013; Lesnikov / Stark (eds.) 2013.
355 See e.g. De Boer 2007; Holbach 2009; Brand / Knol (eds.) 2009; Ed-
wards  / Ogilvie 2011; Häberlein 2011; Schulte  Beerbühl 2011; 
Hammel- Kiesow 2012; Jenks 2013.
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The examples we used to illustrate certain features of this model like the 
lack of formal contracting, the great variety of trade partners or the build-
ing of mutual trust over time, were taken from the older literature. This 
empirical basis has been enriched substantially in recent years with several 
case studies on the trade of certain Hanseatic merchants, on groups of 
traders as well as on the means these merchants used.356 Also, the graphical 
representation of trade networks and other economic issues is now under 
careful research in Hanse historiography.357
Nonetheless, Hanseatic networks of trade are not the only elements that 
were analysed by the network approach during the last decade. In a way, 
the focus of Hanse historiography has also moved to social networks and 
their various appearances, which could be identified as a formative element 
of social cohesion between the inhabitants of Hanse towns.358 In the model 
of network organisation, social nearness, friendship and kinship are nec-
essary prerequisites for a form of trade organisation that is mainly based 
on trust and reputation. This notwithstanding, in the literature one does 
not always find a proper discrimination of social networks on the one side 
and network organisation of trade on the other, although such a clear- cut 
distinction would be extremely important to explain specific mechanisms 
of Hanseatic trade.
Apart from kinship and friendship, social proximity and cooperative 
forms of interaction among Hansards, the aspects of communication and 
mobility have so far been treated rather poorly.359 Communication and 
mobility are pivotal elements of the Hanse’s network trade system inasmuch 
as these elements can reveal a lot about the likelihood of long- distance 
trade evolving within in a wide geographical area like the Baltic and the 
North Sea as well as about the opportunities for the Hansards to design 
their commercial exchange in such a commercially different environment, 
as shown in Chapter 4 of this book.
356 Cf. Jahnke 2005; 2010; Burkhardt 2009; 2012; Pajung / Poulsen 2011; 
Kluge 2013.
357 Cf. Selzer 2016b.
358 Cf. Igel 2002; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2010; Koppe / Koppe 2006; Meyer 
2010; Poeck 2010; Ewert / Selzer 2015.
359 Cf. Mähnert / Selzer (eds.) 2012.
Ulf Christian Ewert and Stephan Selzer - 9783631661833
Heruntergeladen von PubFactory am05/16/2018 01:20:11PM
via Peter Lang AG
151
At first, our approach to explaining the specific pattern of commercial 
exchange prevalent among Hansards in terms of network organisation also 
dealt with the hypothesis of Wolfgang von Stromer. It was intended to 
put his claim of a seemingly commercial backwardness of the late medieval 
Hanse to the test and to find empirical evidence in order to possibly reject 
this hypothesis. In a paper published in 1976, Wolfgang von Stromer had 
claimed that the Hanse and its merchants were in a way outdated in the 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, in part because of the apparent lack 
of centralisation within the Hanse and the lack of bureaucracy of Hanseatic 
business firms, and because Hanseatic merchants seem to have been quite 
reluctant to commit to formal contracts and to make use of the commercial 
innovations in European trade of the later Middle Ages.360 In dealing with 
this hypothesis our argument was that because of the network structure of 
Hanseatic trade that guaranteed coordination and fairness through culture, 
trust and reputation, merchants neither needed much formal contracting 
nor did they have to use newer business techniques.
Very soon, however, it transpired that categories like ‘modern’ or ‘back-
ward’ are inappropriate to assess and to judge both the institutional arrange-
ment and the economic performance of a particular system of commercial 
exchange. Taking the Weberian bureaucratic- hierarchical model as a point 
of reference, like Wolfgang von Stromer did, the Hanse’s institutions of 
trade certainly appear to have been backward at the end of the fifteenth 
century. In contrast, if the reference is changed to the model of network 
organisation, the same institutions appear as an extremely efficient, clever 
and modern solution to all the problems of organisation and coordination 
that typically arose in late medieval long- distance trade. Consequently, the 
question of backwardness of Hanseatic trade no longer is an issue, because 
with the model of network organisation at hand, Hanse research now is 
in possession of arguments able to convincingly reject any such reproach.
Moreover, nowadays it is obvious that the pattern of network organisa-
tion pertained to much more historical systems of trade than previously 
thought, and therefore the geographical spread of this particular institu-
tional arrangement was much wider in the late Middle Ages and in early- 
360 Cf. von Stromer 1976.
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modern times. Numerous case studies as well as several recently published 
collected volumes based on the papers prepared for workshops and con-
ferences prove this361, and even the traditional ‘Reichenau- Tagung’ of the 
German medieval historians in its 2008 conference dealt with the concept 
of networks in medieval trade.362 In sharp contrast to the judgement of 
Wolgang von Stromer dating back to the year 1976, and based on the 
results of present- day research on medieval and early- modern long- distance 
trade, today one would say that in late fifteenth century and even beyond 
this historically important watershed, network patterns of trade were much 
more common than bureaucratic- hierarchical organised businesses, repre-
sented by a few firms from Upper Germany, that were taken, not without 
reason, of course, as a point of reference by Wolfgang von Stromer.
The Hanse as a Political Organisation
The explanatory power of theoretical economic concepts is not restricted 
to the analysis of the institutions of Hanseatic trade. Theoretical economic 
concepts are also instrumental in the analysis of the Hanseatic League and 
they can help to reach a better understanding of the Hanse as a political 
organisation. Beginning with Angelo Pichierri’s publication on the Hanse 
as a state of cities in the year 2000363, several approaches to the analysis of 
the Hanseatic League can now be found that rely, at least in part, on social 
science concepts or theoretical economic reasoning.364
At the beginning, the issue of the Hanseatic League was not the focal 
point of our own research, which was originally directed towards the sphere 
of individual Hanseatic merchants and their commercial exchange. How-
ever, in Chapter 5 of this book we describe the formation of the Hanseatic 
League as the association of Hanse towns, as the emergence of a multipolar 
network organisation evolving in times of crisis through a more formal and 
more vigorous cooperation of certain actors within the Hanse, including 
merchants, the Kontore and town representatives, and therefore producing 
361 Cf. von Saldern 2009; Kalus 2010; Lamikiz 2010; Gestrich / Schulte 
Beerbühl (eds.) 2011.
362 Cf. Fouquet / Gilomen (eds.) 2010.
363 Cf. Pichierri 2000.
364 Cf. Schellers 2003; Brand (ed.) 2007; Take 2013.
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additional organisational layers, again interwoven with each other by the 
ever- present personal relationships of Hansards.
To a certain extent, this approach is in line with other interpretations 
of the Hanseatic League that are based on institutional economics, public 
choice and game theory, like the concept of Functional Overlapping Com-
peting Jurisdictions (FOCJ), which was introduced to public choice theory 
by Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger in 1996365 and has now been 
used by Alexander Fink in several articles on the Hanseatic League.366 
Nevertheless, some aspects that are important in understanding the history 
of the Hanse are missing within this concept. Neither the historical reasons 
for an association of Hanse towns to emerge nor the fact that a majority 
of towns were non- permanent members with only a loose association to 
the Hanseatic League are taken into account. The personal element, which 
in pre- modern societies was extremely important in reconciling eventual 
conflict, is also lacking. This is fairly straightforward because the concept of 
FOCJ developed from a modern states’ background. Instead, our model of 
a multipolar network organisation is able to incorporate the organisational 
attempts that were made around 1350 to form a closer cooperation of Han-
sards at various levels, and it can also explain why a fundamental problem 
of cooperation arose in several instances belonging to this newly existing, 
yet loose association. The manner in which cooperation was handled over 
time, namely by attempts to formalise and to centralise it, naturally pro-
duced disincentives for merchants, for the Kontore and even for the towns 
to commit unreservedly to this kind of association, which in turn was one 
of the reasons for the Hanse’s declining economic performance at the end 
of the fifteenth century.
The Structural Change around the Year 1500
For various reasons, there were significant changes around the year 1500 
in global trade routes, in patterns of European long- distance trade and 
in the dominance of particular merchant groups in Europe. It was at this 
time that Hanseatic merchants started to lose the competitive advantages 
365 Cf. Frey / Eichenberger 1996; Frey 2005.
366 Cf. Fink 2011; 2012.
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they had enjoyed for so many generations in the North Sea and the Baltic. 
Based on trade privileges, Hanseatic merchants had been able to form an 
extremely stable cartel for quite a long time, which then became instable 
and, showing first signs of dissolution, began to erode. In Chapter 6 of 
this book we attempted to show that the end of the Hansard’s competitive 
advantage was in part due to the network organisation of long- distance 
Hanseatic trade, because this institutional arrangement not only enhanced 
trade but in the long run had negative repercussions on economic develop-
ment and growth, too.
The rising competition the Hansards were faced with around the year 
1500 was also caused by additional determinants, which lie beyond a purely 
organisational explanation. In a recently published collected volume, the 
structural change around 1500, its potential determinants as well as its 
consequences are discussed from a Hanse perspective.367 For the history of 
the Hanse this transition is extremely important insofar as the change of the 
economic environment marked not only a change in the state of commercial 
competition at the merchant level, but also a change in the meaning of the 
political organisation of the Hanseatic League. By focusing particularly on 
this transitional period, the German research into the Hanse becomes more 
closely connected to the rich strand of literature on Flemish and Dutch eco-
nomic and urban history, which has long been well aware of the ongoing 
commercial change and of the impact the late medieval and early- modern 
business cycles had in these areas. Flemish and Dutch economic historians 
have naturally analysed these business cycles, which become most evident in 
the increasing and decreasing importance of the markets of Bruges, Antwerp 
and Amsterdam, on the grounds of modern economic concepts.368
Insights Relevant to Historical Economics of Trade
The above- cited paper of Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry S. Wein-
gast on the interaction of medieval rulers and merchants can undoubtedly 
be considered as extremely influential, in economic history as well as in 
economics, but also in political science. One recent example of this influ-
367 Cf. Hammel- Kiesow / Selzer (eds.) 2016.
368 Cf. Gelderblom 2013; Caracausi / Jeggle (eds.) 2014; Ogilvie 2014.
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ence is a volume on development economics where the Hanse case and the 
considerations of Greif, Milgrom and Weingast are described at some 
length within a section on alternative institutions for contract enforce-
ment.369 Given this immense scientific impact, and the fact that the authors 
used the cooperation of Hansards at the Bruges market as an example of 
guild formation in the Middle Ages, one would have expected the Hanse, 
and especially the trade institutions of its merchants, to be back on the 
agenda of international economic history. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case. As a consequence, debates in international economic history of the 
Middle Ages in most cases do not really consider developments in Northern 
European trade. Meanwhile, because the Hanse perspective is rather under-
represented in these scholarly debates, Hanse historiography cannot profit 
from the empirical findings and conceptual improvements that typically 
arise in connection with the study of a wide range of European examples.
Two of the current discussions in economic history will be briefly men-
tioned here. For quite a while now, the role of guilds in medieval and 
early- modern trade has been re- assessed conscientiously in the interna-
tional literature. A series of newer publications on this topic370 show that 
merchant guilds not only had positive effects on the volume of trade, on 
economic development and on economic growth. Since a general principle 
of medieval and early- modern guilds was to include as well as to exclude 
individuals, merchants who were members of a guild could benefit from 
the collective goods the guild provided to them, whereas others, the non- 
members, did not. Growth, however, was obviously much more pronounced 
in a setting where not only groups of merchants were privileged, but also 
where individual traders were granted access to reliable and efficient insti-
tutions of trade, meaning that communities and not just guilds provided 
merchants with all kinds of services to enhance trade. The work of Erik 
Lindberg, even though it covers the later developments of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, reveals interesting insights and inspiring results 
for Hamburg, Lübeck and Königsberg / Kaliningrad in this regard.371
369 Cf. Altmann 2011, pp. 59–61.
370 See in general Grafe / Gelderblom 2010 and Ogilvie 2011, and for the 
Kontor of the Hanse in Bergen Wubs- Mrozewicz 2008; 2010; 2011; 2012.
371 Cf. Lindberg 2008; 2009; 2010.
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Another important and rather controversial discussion on medieval trade 
in economic history is currently concerned with the mechanisms of enforc-
ing cooperation between merchants in impersonal exchange. Arguing on the 
grounds of the cases of the Maghribi traders, the Hansards’ guild in Bruges, 
and Genoese merchants, Avner Greif strongly advocates the outstanding 
role that in his view self- enforcing institutions and corporative mecha-
nisms played in contract enforcement and in securing merchants’ property 
rights.372 In opposition to this, Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh C. Ogilvie 
are eager to stress the importance of public legal institutions in enhancing 
impersonal exchange.373 In their opinion, the medieval Champagne fairs are 
a good example of public institutions having been a necessary requirement 
for providing merchants with an institutional arrangement by which mer-
chants’ property rights could be secured and contracts could be enforced. In 
the case of the medieval Champagne fairs, this was achieved with a certain 
commercial policy of the count of Champagne.
We think that this point would be of fundamental importance for the 
research into the institutions of Hanseatic trade, but unfortunately a specific 
Hanse perspective has not been established so far in this scholarly debate. 
Yet, there would be a good reason to do so because the Hanse’s network 
organisation of trade consists of private- order institutions as well as of 
public institutions, even more so after the Hanseatic League emerged at 
the middle of the fourteenth century. Hence it follows that the Hanse is a 
good example of self- enforcing institutions of the like Avner Greif mainly 
points to, co- existing with means of third- party-enforcement. Corporative 
mechanisms of enforcement based on common values, trust and reputation 
were extremely instrumental in enhancing the cooperation of Hanseatic 
merchants, but to make these institutions work effectively, public institu-
tions such as the merchant law or the communal responsibility to enforce 
372 Cf. Greif 2000; 2002b; 2006. Avner Greif was recently criticised for having 
seemingly copied – without correctly citing his source – the idea of corpora-
tive mechanisms of enforcement in commercial networks based on culture, 
trust and reputation from the work of the American anthropologist Janet 
Landa, who had developed this idea in a study on a group of Chinese traders 
in Southeast Asia (see Landa 1978; 1981; 1994). Cf. Rowley 2009, and the 
reply to this allegation by Greif 2009
373 Cf. Edwards / Ogilvie 2011; 2012.
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the merchants’ property rights abroad were also necessary. In addition, 
the Hanse would also be a good example of how important for the overall 
economic performance of the institutional arrangement of trade a perfect 
tuning of different types of enforcement was. As discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this book, the attempts to re- structure the Hanse’s network or-
ganisation of trade and thereby superimpose private- order and corporative 
institutions with public institutions of enforcement, presumably contributed 
substantially to the economic decline of the Hanse that had begun in late 
fifteenth century, because with these attempts some of the traditional but 
efficient institutions of Hansards like the Kontore, were seriously at risk of 
being neutralised in a more centralised, more hierarchical and more town- 
oriented structure.
In our view, the Hanse’s institutional arrangement of trade is worth 
consideration as a significant case of institution building in medieval and 
early- modern commercial exchange. Both economic history and Hanse 
historiography would benefit from such analysis. The Hanse’s institutional 
arrangement of trade and the network organisation of Hanseatic trade has 
all the ingredients needed for good institutional economics reasoning – rules 
of trade and trading practices, distinct forms of merchants’ cooperation and 
institutional change – all of these enable us to derive incentives as well as 
disincentives to trade, and to analyse the manifold repercussions institu-
tional change had on trade. Vice versa, for Hanse historiography this would 
be a valuable approach because the Hanse’s institutional arrangement could 
be embedded into a more general framework of trade in medieval Europe, 
and this in turn would allow Hanse research to make profound statements 
about what the institutions of Hanseatic trade had in common with other 
institutional arrangements of medieval European traders, and in what re-
spect the Hanse’s institutions were special. For rather obscure reasons such 
a potentially fruitful scientific exchange between different fields in economic 
history can thus far only be considered as underdeveloped. We continue to 
hope that our analysis of the Hanse’s network organisation of trade pre-
sented in this book may help at least a little bit in improving this.
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